Showing posts with label Prem. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Prem. Show all posts

Thursday, November 6, 2008

Abhisit Vejjajiva and Pattani-Malayu

* all photos copyright*

Military check stop in Yala in August. Language barriers are a serious problem in the South. Most residents speak Pattani-Malayu which is a dialect of Malay. The Thai civil service speaks either central Thai or, as in the case of the soldiers interviewing the women, speak the northeastern Lao dialect.


On August 27, 2008, I was given an exclusive interview with the official opposition leader and leader of the Democrat Party Abhisit Vejjajiva at his office in parliament.

This interview will appear in my forth coming documentary film about the southern insurgency. This is not the full interview transcript, of course, but an important point was raised about the southern language of Pattani-Malayu.


C: And what about the use of Pattani-Malayu? There are about two million speakers of this Malay dialect.

Abhisit : Yup, I think a commission that was set up under the Thaksin administration, ironically…

C: The National Reconciliation Commission.

Abhisit: they did make a proposal concerning the use of Malay as a local language and we think that should be encouraged. Similarly there are also cases, not criminal cases, where you could apply Sharia law, that should also be allowed.

C: In instances of family law?

Abhisit: That's right.

C: If the Democrat Party were to come to power, would Pattani-Malayu become a working language?

A: Yes, we support that proposal.

Friday, July 25, 2008

First-Ever Thai/Pattani-Malay Dictionary


When the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) – a government sanctioned commission comprised of academics, civil society leaders, and politicians tasked with recommending ways to relieve violence in the southern border provinces – recommended in 2006 that Pattani-Malay become a working language for the southern border provinces the idea was shot down by various spoilers.

The most devastating was most likely Privy Council President and former Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanonda. He employed an ultra-nationalist tone and claimed that "We cannot accept that [proposal] as we are Thai. The country is Thai and the language is Thai”.

Such narrow minded nationalist restrictions on what it means to be Thai are, of course, far from the ethnic/linguistic realities of Thailand.

For the majority of southern Muslims, their first language is Pattani-Malay. The language exists only in spoken form and is sometimes mistakenly called Yawi (อาวี) which is actually the name of the language when written with the Arabic script. The language is a dialect of Malay and can be heard in most of peninsular Thailand and even in some neighborhoods of the capital Bangkok. In the southern border provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat it is the most commonly used language and has strong roots in the culture and religion of the region.

Essentially, the language has roughly two million speakers and, if their knowledge of Thai is weak, they have no way to communicate with government officials.

And the NRC report addressed this cultural/communication barrier when the wrote “one cause of violence in the region stems from the actions of government officials. In particular, some civil servants who exercise state authority in the three southern border provinces do not understand religion, culture, language, and way of life of Thai Muslims”.

Their rational was that the relationship between government institutions and the Thai-Muslim population was dysfunctional and that improving the lines of communication was a key to deescalating tension in the region.

So, despite ultra-nationalist spoilers like General Prem, it is great to see that the first Thai/Pattani-Malay dictionary has been published.

If the dictionary can help ease communication barriers between the civil service and the local population, then it is an important step in mitigating sources of conflict on the southern border.

This dicationary has been publish by the Asia Foundation and more information can be found here: First-Ever Thai/Pattani-Malay Dictionary

Monday, April 30, 2007

The Climate of Coups


Troops reading the paper on top of their tank the morning after last year's coup. The newpaper's headline reads 'สนธิยืนยัน' or 'Sonthi Confirmed' meaning that General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was confirmed as coup leader.


Since the September 19th 2006 toppling of Prime Minister Thaksin there have been consistent rumours that another coup d’etat is looming.

The following is a typical scenario of how new coup predictions emerge.

On February 5th The Nation newspaper was reporting on the speculation of a new coup.

Troops from Thailand’s Second Army stationed in Nakhon Ratchasima were rumoured to be on their way to Bangkok under the orders of a rogue military commander and the Junta leader, General Sonthi, was in full denial mode.

A well connected academic from Mahidol University called me that evening and reported that General Sonthi was seeking to consolidate power and would launch a coup against the junta's own installed government.

Apparently that is a bit of a Thai tradition when it comes to coup history here.

Another phone call from an acquaintance at a European news agency casually asked if I had seen large numbers of troops or heard any gunfire or loud explosions.

My apartment happens to be near the Information and Communications Technology Ministry – which controls broadcast media capabilities – so the question was not that far-fetched.

The next day, a journalist from Thailand’s I-TV called and reported that the event was more of a 'coup-lite’ because infighting in the junta almost erupting into open hostility but either a power-sharing compromise or a barrel-of-a-gun compromise had been reached before actual fighting began.

Although most people seem to agree that something happened, no one is sure exactly what that something was.

Mixed into coup prognostications are ongoing bomb threats.

On April 11th the Canadian embassy sent sms messages (mobile phone text messages) to their nationals claiming that "Canadians should exercise caution and monitor local news due to reports of possible bombings in and around Bangkok between 11-17 April."

The New Year’s Eve bombings, despite convincing evidence pointing to insurgents in the deep south, are still being blamed upon ‘elements of the old regime’ so the threat of fresh bomb attacks further fuels the climate of political instability.

The latest coup rumor began yesterday evening with a phone call from an academic asking if I had ‘heard anything of another coup?’

To which I replied; ‘Just the usual rumors, what have you heard?’

‘I heard from a friend with police contacts who claims that between the 1st and the 5th of next month (May) the police will be keeping their families at home and preparing to retreat at the sight of large military movements. They (the police) are convinced something is about to happen.’

On the night of the last-year’s coup the police did, indeed, retreat from sight as they are closely aligned with the previous government so the rumor does contain some intriguing details.

So, once again, the forecast is suggesting a high probability of political turmoil and chances of a coup.

Whether another coup is imminent will only be answered over the next week but the consistency of the rumours is an undeniable reflection of the turbulent political climate and the lack of confidence in the junta.

Friday, September 22, 2006

Coup d'etat or Revolution?



Combat troops deployed to guard against a possible counter-coup at Democracy Monument. Bangkok - September 20, 2006.

On September 19th the Thai military, lead by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, removed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power.

The event was quickly labelled a coup d’etat and the international community – particularly Western states – condemned it and lamented the break down of democratic principles.

The view from the streets of Bangkok has been rather different.

The word revolution (ปฏิวัต) has been used to describe the recent events and scenes of citizens giving flowers to soldiers seem to support the idea of a popular movement against an unpopular government.

The difficulty is that ‘coup d’etat’ and ‘revolution’ are not interchangeable terms and each describes very different events.

The expression coup d’etat carries with it ideas of ruthless tyrants vandalizing democratic ideals in bloody street clashes.

Revolution, on the other had, conjures images of a people’s power movement breaking free from the iron grip of a brutal and unjust dictatorship.

If the terms coup d’etat and revolution have both been used to describe the toppling of Thaksin’s government then Thailand’s political crisis might be best understood as being a combination of both.

Was it a Coup?

The short answer is clearly ‘yes’ but the long answer is ‘yes, but…’.

Tanks did roll, combat troops were deployed, and Thaksin was overthrown by General Sonthi – that is a fact.

Yet the long answer would have to question Thaksin’s corrosive effect on democracy and the consequences of allowing him to remain in power.

Thaksin’s rise to power in 2001 as a populist billionaire was indeed a happier time in Thai democracy.

Sure, the Thai political arena is known to creatively bend the rules which results in vast sums of money exchanging hands, positions of power being doled out to cronies or family members, and blood is often spilled but there certainly are recognizable democratic traits.

At the poll booths citizens are free to choose who they like and the election process is perceived internationally as free and fair.

As Thaksin’s political problems began to mount the rules of democracy declined.

Libel suits launched by Thaksin against the media and private individuals became commonplace.

Yes, the media was free to say what they wanted but most could simply not afford it. Thaksin’s gang of lawyers had forced the media to ‘self censor’ to avoid costly and time consuming legal battles.

Thaksin had also dismantled the foundations of Thailand’s democratic institutions. The ranks of the judiciary, the Senate, and the now disgraced Election Commission were all swollen with Thaksin’s friends and family.

The most recent snap election that Thaksin called to defuse the myriad of calls for him to step down resulted in a boycotted single-party election, massive claims of fraud, a rare intervention by the king, the election’s subsequent annulment, and finally the jailing of pro-Thaksin Election Commission officials for malfeasance.

Thaksin’s stubborn grip on power had simply destroyed the democratic process.

Was it a Revolution then?

Maybe not a textbook revolution but there has been widespread public support.

The tanks forming road blocks around the seat of political power, Government House, have been covered in flowers in a spontaneous gesture by the residents of Bangkok.

The military has reciprocated with its own symbolic gesture of alliance to the people. Although the troops are combat ready, most have removed their ammunition clips from their rifles.

Yes, they are armed, but not armed against the people.

The justification for seizing power, as claimed by the military’s new Committee for Democratic Reform, was based upon welfare of the people.

Speculation that the highly polarized political crisis would lead to violent clashes was not just speculation but the public was resigned to the inevitability of violence.

Violent incidents between pro and anti-Thaksin camps were growing in frequency and in brutality in the weeks before military take over.

A large anti-Thaksin protest by the People’s Alliance for Democracy that was scheduled to take place if the military intervention had not happened had the very real possibility of massive bloodshed.

Rumours were circulating that a well armed division of Forestry Police were being transported to Bangkok put down the protest.

Because widespread violence was expected the military claims they were duty bound to intervene.

The highly influential retired General, Prem Tinsulanonda, just over a month before the military action, gave a speech to cadets telling them that the loyalty of the military is to the king first, the citizens next, and the government trailing behind in a distant third.

It seems as though Prem’s words were not just hollow rhetoric but a strategic declaration of military alignment with the growing number of dissatisfied citizens.

A final, and extremely important, indication that the military action was on behalf of the people was the action’s royal approval. It is well known in Thailand that the King’s approval can legitimize or topple a government.

During the last major conflict that brought soldiers onto the streets, in 1991, the King intervened with some ‘words of advice’ and diffused a violent power struggle.

It was vitally important for the military leaders to have royal approval but, more revealing, is that royal approval would not likely have been granted if the overthrow of the government wasn’t in the people’s best interest.

During the first week of military rule there has been a palpable sense of revolution on the Bangkok streets.

The challenge is now for the military to maintain that feeling of revolution. Yet to maintain the revolutionary goodwill it will require the military to step down and return the political realm to civilian control.

If the feeling of revolution is lost then a true textbook coup d’etat has taken place and an era of military rule, an era of dictatorship, has began.