Warring Colours

“Final battle” can only end in Phyrric victory

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PAD thug at Government House. November 2008.

An insightful look at how much damage the political conflict spearheaded by the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) has caused to Thailand's institutions from the Rule of Lords.

Key quote:

"Whereas the former government played with institutions to obtain its objectives, this group is hell bent upon laying waste to them. Whereas the Thaksin regime had some image of the future, the alliance leaders conceive of their country only with reference to an imagined past."

To read more, click here: “Final battle” can only end in Phyrric victory

Elite Settlement between Liberals and Conservatives

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Photo from Government House at about 10:30 PM on Thursday November 27. Despite serious city-wide panic over coup rumors, it was business as usual at the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) encampment at Government House.

Academic Micheal Connors over at Sovereign Myth puts worth an interesting and alternative take on the class struggle framework which many have utilized to understand the conflict between PAD and the People's Power Party or former Thai Rak Thai.

Key quote:

"In place of the idea that this is a conflict between poor and rich, city and province, consider that the Thaksin regime progressively threatened an elite settlement between liberals and conservatives (in form since the 1980s) that envisaged a generational programme of regime change in a liberal political direction; a settlement that protected both the military and the palace. Class and geographical politics were certainly part of the equation in the 2006 conflict that led to the coup, but it is the subsequent conflict that has brought them to the fore."

To read the full article, click here: The Politics of Coups in Thailand 2008.

PAD English Lessons

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Since August 26, People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protesters have been loitering in Government House.

In addition to 24-hours of ear shattering anti-government and anti-Thaksin propaganda, they also can enjoy free food, free medical care, take in a massage, or buy souvenirs.

Or, they can learn English. The following statements, written in a cute little notebook, were presented to me and I was asked to edit the grammar.

From the top of the page, to the bottom it reads:

• God damn! Taksin
• Taksin! go to hell
• Send Taksin back to Thailand
• go to prison, Taksin.
• Taksin, Cheating man on our tax
• Son of a bitch

Very useful English phrases for the seething PAD masses whose anger has been sharpened into an irrational and dangerous hatred for their former Prime Minister.

Thailand's Drug Habit - Dateline Video

CS Pattani Hotel car bombing

For anyone working in the southern border provinces there was always one safe place to stay.

The CS Pattani Hotel, owned by Anusas Suwanmongkhol, was a curiously safe haven from the violence.

After working all day in the provinces, criss crossing military check points and speeding through the lawless 'red zones', the CS Pattani was a welcome relief.

Working days in the south are characterized by a heavy military menace, burnt down schools, suspicion, fear, hostility, and nerve wracking drives through insurgent haunted lands.

Once off the main highway in front of the hotel, and driving up the well trimmed lawns with children's playgrounds and friendly business' lining the roads there was a sense of leaving the conflict zone.

Returning to the CS Pattani was a blessing and their hospitality and delicious local tea was a delight. If you look at the picture above, on the left, under the burned out arch cluttered with debris, and i presume some blood, was the best seating for a tea and chat with the those in the know.

There were also no soldiers and no police....not even the usual shifty youths that often haunt the streets. I remember drinking beer at the corner store beside the hotel (even though the hotel owner is a Thai Buddhist, there is no booze inside the well decorated southern-style hotel) and trying to spot the security.

There were the ubiquitous parking dudes. Wearing the classic 'blue collar suit' they do navigate cars into spaces but, as a form of real security, there are not.

I must have spent the length of three relaxing street-side Singhas and could not spot even one undercover security agent. No soldiers, no police, and not a single gun in sight. I could have dosed off for a nap because it just felt that safe.

And because it was deemed safe, the whose-who of knowledge brokers stayed there. There werent many tourists, of course, but the hotel was filled with local and foreign journalists, NGO types, academics, some 'intelligence analyst' types, and packs of political carpetbaggers ranging from those blessed with local knowledge to those simply blessed but with out any local knowledge like former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Simply put, everyone with an interest in the region stayed there or at least held meetings and drank tea there.

Given the nature of the hotel's safety record and its clients, rumors were rampant that the owner had made his own security arrangements.

The story goes that owner, Anusas Suwanmongkhol, had cut a deal with both the military and other shady characters who might or might not be insurgents.

By cutting a deal between both parties, a peaceful space could exist in the midst of daily chaos.

But, as violence continues year after year, all boundaries will eventually be tested.

Anusas Suwanmongkhol has also recently been appointed as a senator. And, as many people know, a certain percentage of violence in the region is not just separatist but general-political and general-business related. So the lines could be blurred.

The always informative Bangkok Pundit noted that because there was another car bomb (detonated prematurely killing the suspected bomber) at another location it does suggest that there was a coordinated attack on disparate targets which would lead to the suggestion that it was indeed an insurgent attack.

Ultimately, what this attack means is two things.

The first is that more sophisticated and larger scale attacks have started. Reports stated that a first bomb was detonated in a ground floor washroom that, presumably, was designed to empty the hotel guests into the lobby and the street. And that is where the car bomb was waiting for them.

The next is more rudimentary. All lines of safety have been erased and the size of bombs are growing in sophistication as well as their tactical aim of causing more and more casualties is being testing and will likely be perfected.

The deep south might have lost a safe haven, but the entire deep south has also woken up to a new escalation in violence.

สมน้ำหน้า or น่าสงสาร?

Pro-Thaksin/Anti-Junta protesters at Sanam Luang on June 15th, 2007.


Thaksin Shinawatra’s political future has been dealt another serious blow with the Assets Examination Commission’s (AEC) decision to freeze his bank accounts pending a series of investigations into alleged corruption.

The decision, effective immediately, will place 21 bank accounts and approximately Bt 53 billion (US $1.6 billion) in suspension until the outcome of five separate charges are investigated.

The debate that the AEC decision will now inspire can be aptly summarized by two popular Thai phrases; สมน้ำหน้า and น่าสงสาร.

สมน้ำหน้า, or som nam nah, can roughly be translated as ‘it serves (someone) right’1 and there are bound to be thousands of people uttering the phrase with unrestrained glee as they hear of the AEC decision.

Thaksin’s tenure, in the eyes of numerous critics, was characterized by his habitual abuse of power and his obscene wealth is certainly fueling his critic’s anger.

The most notorious of allegations, and certainly instrumental in Thaksin’s overthrow, was the sale of his telcom giant, Shin Corp, to the Singapore based Temasek.

The deal netted Thaksin and his family Bt 73.3 billion and, much to the fury of the critics, went 100% untaxed.

Thaksin is accused of using his position as Prime Minister to manipulate tax laws in the transaction which suggests that his position as a political leader was more about advancing his own business interests than working for the betterment of the country.

For those in the som nam nah camp, the Junta has finally taken off their kid gloves and begun to dismantle Thaksin’s political/financial foundation.

Last week’s decision by the Constitutional Tribunal to disband Thai Rak Thai and ban Thaksin from politics for five years, coupled with the investigation by the AEC, are going to be serious, if not fatal, decisions for the future of the former Prime Minister.

For those saying som nam nah, Thaksin certainly had this coming and the decision by the AEC will be welcome, if not long overdue.

And then there is the other camp.

น่าสงสาร, or nah song san, is translated as ‘it’s a pity’ and the 10,000 plus demonstrators on the Bangkok streets venting anger at the Junta and waving pictures of Thaksin are certainly thinking this way.

For Thaksin’s supporters the AEC decision will be viewed as the further prosecution of their rightfully elected leader.

Thaksin’s popularity, particularly the rural poor who benefited from his 30 baht healthcare scheme, is undisputed.

His success, overwhelmingly proved at the polls, was not simply through populist policies but also orchestrated by his personal popularity.

The fact that he was Thailand’s richest business man seemingly holds no contradiction as self-professed champion of the rural poor.

Thai politics has always been plagued by corruption so why should rural voters, whom have been given unprecedented political attention and pro-poor policies, be fussed about corruption-as-usual?

Now that the AEC along with the Constitutional Tribunal, who were both created by the Junta, have implimented serious efforts to permanently remove Thaksin his supporters will certainly be saying nah song san for their former leader.

More importantly than expressing their pity will be the possibility that they will express their anger.

As previously stated, the streets are teeming with anti-junta/pro-Thaksin supporters and they could turn their sympathy for Thaksin into a serious expression of anger on the streets in the coming days and weeks.

Some, like the editor of the english language daily The Nation, Tulsathit Taptim, are even speculating that Thaksin could instigate a dangerous game of brinkmanship and attempt to start a full scale violent revolt against the Junta.

What the som nam nah and nah song san arguments reveal is how deeply polarized the country is over the former Prime Minister and in Thai politics in general.

The recent decisions against Thaksin, by both the AEC and the Constitutional Tribunal, look more likely to result in further political chaos in the short term than pave the way for national political reconciliation in the long term.

But there is one last group who don’t fall into either camp and their expression might be อะไรก็ได้ or arai ga dai.

Arai ga dai means something akin to ‘whatever’ and there will certainly be some Thais expressing this sentiment.

Bt 53 billion might seem like a lot of money but, as both critics and supports concede, it is widely assumed that Thaksin has transferred ample funds from the country and can live comfortable ‘whatever’ the outcome of the AEC investigation.

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1 สมน้ำหน้า or som nam nah is actually an idiom with a more abstract etymology than simply meaning 'serves (someone) right'. Som means appropriate, nam means water, and nah means face. The appropriate (som) word is literal but the water (nam) and face (nah) are not. I initially thought it meant tears but, in fact, it stems from an older - before the arrival of the mirror - concept. The water and face idea is actually an expression of gazing upon one's own face (told to me as looking into the water inside a freshly split coconut) in the reflection of water during a time of soul searching. So, som nam nah really means something like; the appropriate self refection of one who is faced with a conflict of their own creation. Either way of understanding it, it makes an endlessly comical statement when employed at the inconvenience of friends but it makes and even harsher attack upon one's enemy.

Victors Justice = Dictators Justice

Although it is common knowledge that some protesters at the Anti-Junta Pro-Thaksin rallies are being paid ฿300 baht (about $10 usd) to attend, the enthusiastic support from many protesters seems genuine. The Thaksin supporter pictured here was crying during Thaksin's June 15 speech to supporters.


Thailand’s historical Constitutional Tribunal verdict has just been handed down and it appears that ‘justice’ was based upon the persuasive barrel-of-a-gun commanded by the military dictatorship rather than a step towards resolution to the political crisis.

The Democrat party escaped unharmed while the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was dealt a death sentence. TRT has been dissolved and their executives barred for five years in politics.

The legal debate whether the judgement was politically motivated will take time to emerge yet the immediate consequences are easier to understand.

The Democrats, whom have mustered a rather ineffectual opposition to the TRT, are now positioned to dominate a politically decimated election landscape. The newspapers are already hailing Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva as the next Prime Minister.

The future of the political juggernaut TRT, whom command upwards of 16 million voters, seems final.

The acting leader of TRT, Chaturon Chaisaeng, in an emotionally charged post-verdict statement, claimed that the decision was "unacceptable" and that "The country is now under a dictatorship."

He might have a point.

The junta has been singularly obsessed with erasing former Prime Minster Thaksin’s questionable legacy from Thai politics and the Tribunal’s ruling might be understood as the last nail in the TRT coffin.

Backing the Tribunal’s decision is the up-coming draft constitution. Replacing the popular 1997 ‘people’s constitution’ that the junta resigned to the rubbish bin when seizing power, has been described as decidedly ‘anti-Thaksin’ and a legal way of removing Thaksin and his TRT from political office.

So what about the backlash, particularly the TRT supporters?

That is what everyone is asking. Businesses are planning to close, people are talking about stalking up on food, and rumours that floods of TRT supporters are aiming for Bangkok are ripe.

Tomorrow will be a fresh, and possibly violent, day in Thai politics. A day in which the country’s most popular political party has been dissolved by a military dictatorship and the electorate will come out to express their anger.

Judgement Day

How will the military react to large scale angry street protests? No one is sure because, so far, they have been very small. Yet tomorrow's uncertainty could force the junta to act.

The only thing certain on the eve of Thailand's historic constitutional ruling is that it is a perfect recipe for chaos.

Tomorrow the Constitutional Tribunal will hand down its verdict on the conduct of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and Democrat parties in last April’s elections.

TRT is accused of fronting smaller parties in place of a legitimate opposition because most political parties had boycotted the elections. The Democrats, in turn, are accused of luring TRT into electoral fraud by encouraging small parties to accept TRT funds and fill the required opposition role.

Although shady elections are the norm rather than the exception the current crisis is threatening to see both the TRT and the Democrat parties disbanded and their executives barred from running for public office for five years.

The consequences of dismantling the country’s two main political parties is fraught with long term consequences but the short term consequences are what most are worried about now.

TRT alone has 16 million supporters and their reaction to a negative ruling has the very real potential to be expressed with violence.

Yet it isnt as one demensional as only TRT supporters as there are various factions with grievances to express. Anti-Coup protesters, whose strength and ferocity has been steadily growing, are likely to gain further support from the Tribunal ruling. The legitimacy of the junta is already weak but the dissolution or punishment of mainstream political parties is certain to bolster the numbers of protesters waving anti-coup placards.

Mixed into the equation is the consistent threat of politically motivated bomb attacks in the capital. Since the New Year’s Eve bombings there have been at least two more attacks and foreign embassies have been issuing near-monthly warnings that a new wave of attacks is immanent. Already, bomb squads are on the prowl around shopping centers, transportation hubs, political party headquarters, and the Constitutional Tribunal building.

Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s highly revered monarch, has already expressed his wishes that this political crisis will pass without bloodshed but his outlook was somewhat bleak. He warned the tribunal judges to "make a right interpretation (of the law) or the country will be doomed" yet he said that any decision they make will still result in heavy criticism.

One of the few leaders that might be able to scale down the potential violence is the former Prime Minister. Yet any plea for calm from Thaksin is unlikely. Although he is prone to populist rhetoric claiming love for his country he knows that blood in the streets does more to damage the image of the military than his TRT party.

In preparation for massive protests the Council for National Security (CNS) has deployed a 15,000 strong security force in strategic locations across Bangkok and setup road blocks in the provinces to stop protesters from entering the city.

On another front, the military has been deployed to TV and newspaper stations. Although initially it seemed to suggest a crackdown on the already restricted media it actually falls in line with the climate of coups. The soldiers are ‘guarding’ the media outlets in case a rouge faction of the military – obviously unhappy with the Tribunal’s decision NOT to dissolve TRT and/or the Democrats – decides to launch a fresh coup.

Although there is now way to know if violence will be ignited on the Bangkok streets tomorrow and what that chaos might actually mean for the country it could be a preferred outcome of some in the military.

The junta, when justifying last year's coup d’etat, claimed that they were duty bound to intervene because ‘unprecedented divisions in society’ would lead to prolonged political violence. If violence does erupt, the junta can use the same logic they used to seize power but this time to extend their time in power.

Initially, such a senario might seem a bit farfetched yet one worried reporter at Thailand’s T-ITV reminded me that the junta in Burma has been using that same excuse to remain in power since losing the general elections there back in 1990.

Tomorrow might just be a point in history that illumiates the true motives of those in power. The military has, since their coup, maintained that they will return power to the people. If the junta does not capitalize upon tomorrow’s expected chaos then they might actually be telling the truth about Thailand’s return to democracy.

The Thin Line of Military Rule

It didn't take long for protests to form and test the limits of marshal law. The golden object at center on the top of Democracy Monument is a representation of Thailand's constitution. Protesters are particularly angry that the 1997 constitution was thrown out. Bangkok - 2006.

In the days and weeks following September 19, 2006, when the military deposed controversial Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there was a palpable sense of celebration in Bangkok.

Prior to the coup the country had been locked in a dangerous stalemate; many urban middle-class citizens despised the Prime Minister, yet he commanded enough support in the rural areas to remain in office.

Most analysts worried that the political divide, aggravated by Thaksin’s failure to either step-down or negotiate with the mounting opposition, would not just keep the country trapped in political limbo but would lead to serious and bloody clashes in the streets.

When General Sonthi Boonyaratglin’s tanks forced Thaksin from power many people celebrated because they felt that the stalemate had been broken without bloodshed, and were hopeful that the political crisis was over.

Thailand was in its coup d’etat honeymoon period.

Now that two months have passed, the optimistic honeymoon period is now giving way to a much more cynical mood.

The removal of the stalemate by military muscle has revealed itself to be a temporary solution. The “unprecedented divisions in society” that the Junta cited as their rationale for moving against the government may not be so easily healed.

Worse yet, the Junta’s foray into the political arena has created a host of new problems. In order to seize power the military trespassed upon democratic terrain, declared martial law, banned political gatherings, severely censored the media, and dissolved the popular 1997 constitution.

Removing Thaksin might have been popular at first, but once people realised that the “bloodless” coup d’etat had also delivered a serious blow to civil society and democracy, the political price of the coup increased dramatically.

The coup has also raised uncomfortable memories of military rule.

In the years 1971, 1973, and 1991 Thailand experienced violent struggles between supporters of civilian democratic rule and the military.

Those violent struggles have shaped Thailand’s political arena significantly. Clearly attempting to distance themselves from that history, one of the first statements made by the Junta (re-branded the Council for National Security), was that they would install an interim civilian government and hold elections within a year.

The appointment of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and his quasi-civilian government was seen as a good start, but one might argue that it is merely a token nod towards democracy.

The Junta has still reserved the right to dismiss the new government if they choose, so clearly power remains firmly in the military’s hands.

Anti-coup sentiment is already starting to appear on the streets of Bangkok.

The first act of direct defiance against martial law saw about 300 protesters gather around Democracy Monument to demand elections and the reinstatement of the 1997 constitution.

It was a cautious baby step as far as public dissent goes, but an important one nonetheless.

The huge anti-Thaksin protests that had rumbled around the capital before the coup might begin to trade in their old placards for anti-coup placards and return to the streets.

If this happens, the Junta will be faced with a damned if they do, damned if they don’t scenario. If they end martial law and allow protestors to gather, the numbers could swell into a dangerous challenge to the Junta’s authority.

If they quash the budding movement they will trigger historical comparisons to the brutal military regimes of the past.

There is one situation that the Junta could capitalize upon in order to retain public support. This revolves around their dramatic policy u-turn vis-a-vis the insurgency-racked Southern provinces.

Unlike Thaksin’s violent and wholly incompetent track record in the South, the Junta has pulled back the stick and extended an olive branch.

This should not come as a real surprise since General Sonthi was, before seizing power, the military commander in charge of pacifying the uprising.

He had also publicly quarrelled with Thaksin’s strategy but was bound by hierarchy to submit to the Prime Minister’s authority.

Now that Sonthi is in charge he might just be in a position to alter the course of the rebellion. This would be a monumental undertaking, however, since Thaksin’s antagonistic failures did not simply produce sympathy for the separatists, but has opened the door for real Islamic extremists, who may be intent on declaring jihad.

Despite the changing mood, the Junta might still survive their brief tenure with some popularity intact, but they are on very perilous ground.

If they can resuscitate the basic rights of the citizens, restore democracy, avoid negative historical comparisons with past military regimes, weather the challenges from civil society, and make positive changes in the increasingly bleak Southern rebellion, then they could earn a novel place in Thai political history.

But their chances for success are extremely low and there seem to be a number of pivotal forks in the road.

If, for example, the “unprecedented divisions in society” have not been healed after a year of military rule, would the Junta postpone elections? If such a delay did take place, or if any other hurdle scuttles the Junta’s exit plan, then the Junta’s reputation and governing term might quickly transform into a dictatorship.

As the Thai people are well-aware, such a dictatorship might have much darker prospects than Thaksin’s controversial tenure.

Coup d'etat or Revolution?

Combat troops deployed to guard against a possible counter-coup at Democracy Monument. Bangkok - September 20, 2006.

On September 19th the Thai military, lead by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, removed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power.

The event was quickly labelled a coup d’etat and the international community – particularly Western states – condemned it and lamented the break down of democratic principles.

The view from the streets of Bangkok has been rather different.

The word revolution (ปฏิวัต) has been used to describe the recent events and scenes of citizens giving flowers to soldiers seem to support the idea of a popular movement against an unpopular government.

The difficulty is that ‘coup d’etat’ and ‘revolution’ are not interchangeable terms and each describes very different events.

The expression coup d’etat carries with it ideas of ruthless tyrants vandalizing democratic ideals in bloody street clashes.

Revolution, on the other had, conjures images of a people’s power movement breaking free from the iron grip of a brutal and unjust dictatorship.

If the terms coup d’etat and revolution have both been used to describe the toppling of Thaksin’s government then Thailand’s political crisis might be best understood as being a combination of both.

Was it a Coup?

The short answer is clearly ‘yes’ but the long answer is ‘yes, but…’.

Tanks did roll, combat troops were deployed, and Thaksin was overthrown by General Sonthi – that is a fact.

Yet the long answer would have to question Thaksin’s corrosive effect on democracy and the consequences of allowing him to remain in power.

Thaksin’s rise to power in 2001 as a populist billionaire was indeed a happier time in Thai democracy.

Sure, the Thai political arena is known to creatively bend the rules which results in vast sums of money exchanging hands, positions of power being doled out to cronies or family members, and blood is often spilled but there certainly are recognizable democratic traits.

At the poll booths citizens are free to choose who they like and the election process is perceived internationally as free and fair.

As Thaksin’s political problems began to mount the rules of democracy declined.

Libel suits launched by Thaksin against the media and private individuals became commonplace.

Yes, the media was free to say what they wanted but most could simply not afford it. Thaksin’s gang of lawyers had forced the media to ‘self censor’ to avoid costly and time consuming legal battles.

Thaksin had also dismantled the foundations of Thailand’s democratic institutions. The ranks of the judiciary, the Senate, and the now disgraced Election Commission were all swollen with Thaksin’s friends and family.

The most recent snap election that Thaksin called to defuse the myriad of calls for him to step down resulted in a boycotted single-party election, massive claims of fraud, a rare intervention by the king, the election’s subsequent annulment, and finally the jailing of pro-Thaksin Election Commission officials for malfeasance.

Thaksin’s stubborn grip on power had simply destroyed the democratic process.

Was it a Revolution then?

Maybe not a textbook revolution but there has been widespread public support.

The tanks forming road blocks around the seat of political power, Government House, have been covered in flowers in a spontaneous gesture by the residents of Bangkok.

The military has reciprocated with its own symbolic gesture of alliance to the people. Although the troops are combat ready, most have removed their ammunition clips from their rifles.

Yes, they are armed, but not armed against the people.

The justification for seizing power, as claimed by the military’s new Committee for Democratic Reform, was based upon welfare of the people.

Speculation that the highly polarized political crisis would lead to violent clashes was not just speculation but the public was resigned to the inevitability of violence.

Violent incidents between pro and anti-Thaksin camps were growing in frequency and in brutality in the weeks before military take over.

A large anti-Thaksin protest by the People’s Alliance for Democracy that was scheduled to take place if the military intervention had not happened had the very real possibility of massive bloodshed.

Rumours were circulating that a well armed division of Forestry Police were being transported to Bangkok put down the protest.

Because widespread violence was expected the military claims they were duty bound to intervene.

The highly influential retired General, Prem Tinsulanonda, just over a month before the military action, gave a speech to cadets telling them that the loyalty of the military is to the king first, the citizens next, and the government trailing behind in a distant third.

It seems as though Prem’s words were not just hollow rhetoric but a strategic declaration of military alignment with the growing number of dissatisfied citizens.

A final, and extremely important, indication that the military action was on behalf of the people was the action’s royal approval. It is well known in Thailand that the King’s approval can legitimize or topple a government.

During the last major conflict that brought soldiers onto the streets, in 1991, the King intervened with some ‘words of advice’ and diffused a violent power struggle.

It was vitally important for the military leaders to have royal approval but, more revealing, is that royal approval would not likely have been granted if the overthrow of the government wasn’t in the people’s best interest.

During the first week of military rule there has been a palpable sense of revolution on the Bangkok streets.

The challenge is now for the military to maintain that feeling of revolution. Yet to maintain the revolutionary goodwill it will require the military to step down and return the political realm to civilian control.

If the feeling of revolution is lost then a true textbook coup d’etat has taken place and an era of military rule, an era of dictatorship, has began.

The Tragedy of Tak Bai

"For anyone willing to spend 100 Baht (€ 2) they could watch uniformed Thai security forces shoot, beat, and ultimately murder 76 Malay-Muslim citizens of Thailand." Although the soldiers pictured here were not involved in the Tak Bai incident they, and the whole armed forces, have a more difficult job assuring citizens that they are there to protect them. Fourth Army soldiers guarding a Buddhist Wat, Pattani - 2005.

If claims of abuse by the military and police had been hard to substantiate in the past, the events of October 25, 2004 turned suspicion into fact.

Malay-Muslims had gathered in protest at a police station in the far Southern border town of Tak Bai.

The protesters were angry over the arrest of local village defense volunteers whom, the police had claimed, had surrendered their government supplied firearms to suspected Islamic insurgents.

Water cannons were initially used to break the lines of protesters yet non-lethal tactics were quickly abandoned when protesters responded by throwing rocks and a firearm was rumored to have been discharged.

The security forces, comprised of both police and Thailand’s Fourth Army, trained their new American made M-16 rifles on the crowd and opened fire.

In the ensuing violence seven protesters died from gunshot wounds while hundreds were handcuffed, dragged into the police station compound, and “stacked like bricks” onto waiting trucks (BBC – http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3954587.stm).

As news began to emerge from the confrontation it was revealed that 76 protestors died in the protest - the majority suffocating will stacked on the military trucks awaiting transportation.

The incident in Tak Bai drew global protest from Islamic groups, human rights organizations, foreign governments, the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, and considerable wrath from the Malaysian government.

Yet most damaging for Thaksin’s government was the fact that Thai security forces had filmed the whole violent episode.

The video footage was leaked to the public and cheap VCD's of the incident were sold in the markets across the country. For anyone willing to spend 100 Baht (€ 2) they could watch uniformed Thai security forces shoot, beat, and ultimately murder 76 Malay-Muslim citizens of Thailand.

As the video footage was replayed across Thai TV screens the country was both shocked and outraged.

Anger at the government and sympathy for the victims were common sentiments expressed in Bangkok. Yet the way the video was perceived in the deep South was a little different.

Obviously shock and anger were felt but many Southern residents looked at the video as proof to claims that the Thai state was actively persecuting Malay-Muslims.

It is not hard to imagine that the video created a new flood recruits into the ranks of militant organizations.

Although the video was a clear public relations disaster in the effort to pacify the South, Prime Minister Thaksin further enraged Southern residents, and arguably the country, by refusing to at least offer a public apology.

A Modern History of the Rebellion

As the signs of Southern unrest began to appear Thaksin’s only solution was to flood the South with combat troops – not reinstate the SBPPC. Fourth Army soldier on patrol with a Buddhist monk - Pattani. 2006.

The recent history of rebellion begins with the election of the Thai Rak Thai political party and its billionaire leader Thaksin Shinawatra.

Thaksin’s rise to power was based upon populist rhetoric and his support base was primarily rural, and specifically the rural poor.

As Thaksin was busy wooing Thais in the central and northern regions he was quietly alienating the Southern residents.

One of the many criticisms of his tenure, and a particular tactical blunder, was the dismantling the long standing security force know as the Southern Border Provinces Peace-Building Command (SBPPC).

The SBPPC had long been credited with keeping a lasting peace through its highly specific understanding of the challenges facing Southern governance, its ability to gain local trust, and to mediate conflict between the state and the South though peaceful means.

As the signs of Southern unrest began to appear Thaksin’s only solution was to flood the South with combat troops – not reinstate the SBPPC.

The steady flow of military strength over the last two years transformed the South into a highly militarized war zone.

Combat troops poured into the streets, sandbagged road blocks controlled traffic, Buddhist wats (temples) were transformed into fortified military bases, and the local police began to resemble swat teams clad in black bullet proof vests and bristling with new assault rifles and grenade launchers.

The threat of violence that had once been subdued by a small intelligence force was replaced by daily violence aggravated by a large and often clumsy combat force.

The view from the South, regarding the large number of armed troops, has been extremely negative.

Either for Malay-Muslims or Thai Buddhists, there has been a near uniform agreement that heavy militarization is not just ineffective but does more to instigate violence.

The Thai Buddhists (and also the sizable ethnic Chinese population) are now faced with the very real threat that troops sent to protect them are, in fact, attracting unwanted attention.

The concern is not just that troops draw violent attacks from militants but they also force a division based upon ethnic and religious lines.

If the troops are associated with the Thai-Buddhists there is an accentuated partitioning of ethnic/religious groups that had once coexisted.

How the Malay-Muslims are weathering the military occupation is much more worrisome.

The large military force, according to Southern residents, is incapable of distinguishing between the minority of violent militants and the majority of peaceful residents.

The result has been a widespread mistrust between the Malay-Muslim population and the government of Thailand.

Coupled with the sense of persecution in the Malay-Muslim community has been numerous reports of gross human rights violations. Reports of residents disappearing and extra judicial killings have been daily events in the conflict.

The mistrust between the Malay-Muslims and the government has not only created the dichotomy of an ‘ethnic/religious minority vs. government’ situation but provides an endless supply of disenfranchised residents that are turning to militant groups to express their feelings.

Essentially, militarization has not prevented violence but has encouraged it.

Many Thai Buddhists claim that their safety has been compromised and many Malay-Muslims claim they are being persecuted.

The heavy military presence has resulted in a forced division of ethnic/religious groups which is precisely the goal that militants are espousing.

Thaksin's government has not only ignited wide-spread discontent in the South but has essentially orchestrated and fuelled the rebellion it claims to be combating.