Abhisit's failing state

Village defense volunteers (Chor Ro Bo) demonstrating their skills at a Buddhist temple in Maigaan (ไม้แก่น) district of Pattani province. August 2009.

In June 2009, at a seminar hosted by the King Prajadhipok’s Institute called “Politics Outweighs the Military: A Solution to Sustainable Peace in Southern Thailand”, Prime Minister Abhisit talked about bringing justice to the Deep South.

He said that the perpetrators of the June 2009 mosque shooting in Narathiwat, “no matter who they are”, would be brought to justice and that this issue is a key point from which to judge the performance of his government.

I would like to now pass judgment on the performance of his government: failed.

Failed misserably might be more accurate.

In regards to the mosque shooting, a warrant was issued a few months ago for a Thai-Buddhist township defense volunteer (Or Ror Bor) named Suthirak Khongsuwan, yet the whole case seems, like every other legal case in the Deep South, to have disappeared without resolution and certainly without justice.

Obviously, Abhisit's bold rhetoric is fundamentally disconnected with the fact that his weak government is beholden to the military.

Worse, the fact that Thai-Buddhist militias, such as the one Suthirak Khongsuwan belonged to, are armed under patronage of the Kingdom's highest institution which ensures that Abhisit's rhetoric is simply rhetoric.

The Nation is reporting today that the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is not happy about the failure to see justice in the Deep South:

"Four Prime ministers passed by in just two years and all have failed to deliver justice and really sustainable development as hoped by the Malay Muslims, who are naturally anxious to manage their own affairs," it said.

Implicit in the PULO statement is that the Thai state's failure to deliver justice is a rational for autonomy or separatism.

They may have a point.

Not a single official has been prosecuted for any human-rights violations or killings since the surge of fighting began in 2004. Even the Tak Bai case in which state security forces killed 86 protesters – 76 from mistreatment after being taken into custody – were ‘acting in accordance’ of the law as judged by a Songkhla provincial court.

More worrisome, is that Abhisit's failure is part of a habitual failing of the Thai state that is akin to the symptoms of a failed state.

What exactly is a failed state?

From the Failed States Index: A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination...

From the perspective of the Deep South, the Thai state is clearly bordering on failed state territory.

When a failed state can not provide justice, politically motivated armed groups (separatists) will try to take over the functions of a state as a means of garnering legitimacy in the eyes of locals.

This is already happening.

As reported in Matichon today (sorry, cant find the story on their website but saw a copy of it early), separatists have released their own 'wanted' poster complete with photos and names of the five Thai-Buddhist suspects from the mosque shooting incident. While it does look like a wanted poster for criminals, theirs is titled 'จับตาย' which translates as 'wanted dead'.

Such vigilante actions are a symptom of the Thai state's inability to provide justice.

While I do still appreciate Abhisit's flowery promises of justice, his government has clearly failed to deliver.

Yet the real problem is not simply the current government's failure to provide justice, its the fact that its the sixth year in which the Thai state has failed to provide justice for citizens of the Deep South.

From a southern perspective, the perpetual lack of justice suggests that the Thai state is a failed state in the Deep South.

And that, of course, supports PULO's argument for autonomy or even independence.

Guns, guns, guns

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Traveling with the the Aor Sor (อส) militia in Maigaan (ไม้แก่น) district of Pattani province. August 16, 2009

Its nice to see some needed scrutiny in the media over the proliferation of small arms and militias in Southern Thailand lately.

The photo above I took last week while traveling the Ministry of Interior's Aor Sor militia.

Notably, most of the militia members didnt wear uniforms or travel in a vehicle with any official markings. Tennis shoes, mismatched military surplus pants, and pick up trucks with tinted windows but no insignia or markings to identify them. But they were well armed with M-16 and shinny new M4A1 assault rifles.

Professor Marc Askew, who spends a substantial amount of time in the southern border provinces, has been focusing on the issue of how non-insurgent violence makes up a surprisingly high percentage of southern violence.

"It is common knowledge among people in the violence-wracked deep South that much of the killing that punctuates daily life stems not just from insurgents' much-publicised military campaign against the state, but from personal disputes and local political rivalries. This lethal mix makes the region a highly complex killing field."

The rest of the worth-reading article in the Bangkok Post is here.

And while fixing a percentage of violence upon general criminality vs. insurgency is both difficult and controversial there is little doubt that the proliferation of arms and militias are a contributing factor to frequency of violence in the south.

The recent killing of 12 worshipers in the mosque in Narathiwat is a prime example. The rumor is that an arrest warrant is out for a 34 year old Thai Buddhist militia member but the fact that his militia is under certain royal patronage will likely prevent justice from ever seeing the case.

And the complicated divide between insurgency and criminality is currently taking place during this month's Ramadan in the South.

There has been a spike in the number of violent incidents and accentuated by the car bombing in Narathiwat on Tuesday. Suggestions by the military are being put forth that the recent violence is attributed to the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in which insurgents might be seeking to make a violent statement to mark the holiday.

Alternatively, the Tambon Administrative Organization or TAO elections are being held and, as insiders know and Marc Askew has highlighted, such elections are often marked by political killings.

Either way - insurgency or criminality - the flood of guns and militias are certain to feed into the complicated and intractable configuration of the southern insurgency.


For more on this topic see Rule by the Gun by Nonviolence International and the International Crisis Group's influential report The Problem with Paramilitaries.

Mosque shooting fallout

*All Photos Copyright*
Pondok (Islamic school) student in Narathiwat province, 2008.

The fallout from the mosque shooting last week in Narathiwat has succeeded in exacerbating the religious tensions between Muslims and Buddhists.

From Muslim militants in the South, there has been a flurry of retributive violence directed along religious lines.

In addition to the usual southern chaos, a Buddhist elementary school teacher was shot and killed while on her way to work. She was the 117th teacher killed in the Deep South since the outbreak of violence.

And a particularly grizzly beheading of an Buddhist rubber tapper whose head was left impaled on a post outside his house also occurred on Monday in Yala.

Besides being deplorable acts of terrorism, the attacks do demonstrate how the mosque shooting has triggered a wave of violence aimed at further dividing southern communities along religious lines.

Clearly separatists and their supporters believe the state or those sponsored by the state (Buddhist militias) are responsible and are using the mosque shooting to further expose religious divisions.

The flurry of violence has also shown that southern militants have the ability and means to continue attacks despite approximately 60,000 troops trying to enforce security.

And from the Buddhist side, the mosque shooting has spawned the ugly appearance of the nationalist right-wing criticism against the government.

Criticism at the government's handling of the south is certainly welcome but the critic quoted bellow demonstrates how Buddhist nationalists have a fundamental misunderstanding and dangerous outlook of the southern situation.

According to Prasong Soonsiri, a right-wing nationalist and former National Security Council member, in an interview on the PAD mouth-piece ASTV station and quoted in this Bangkok Post article:

"The former NSC chief said if he was prime minister he could resolve the southern insurgency problem within three months"

Unless Prasong is planning to arrest every southern Malay-Muslim male resident between the ages of 15 to 45 or simply granting the southern provinces independence then his ridiculously bold statement is simply right-wing nonsense.

Prasong also goes on to make dangerous comments like:

"Now, they [the insurgents] had established a network and infiltrated all three troubled provinces. They were trying to build a base of power within the government administration and were fighting to win support from the mass of the people."

This is dangerous because it is a xenophobic allegation leveled at southern residents whom participate in local democratic governance. To be clear, he is talking about Malay-Muslims as, obviously, there are no Thai-Buddhist separatists.

A major part of the problem is the Deep South is the lack of opportunities in local government for Malay-Muslims as well as venues for them to enter into national-level politics.

If xenophobes like Prasong want to keep Malay-Muslims out of legitimate government where they can channel their grievances through peaceful democratic means then the only other option is armed struggle against an inaccessible and intolerant government.

In addition, he raises the specter of jihad:

"Prasong said the insurgents had become more aggressive because they now had more fighters who were trained abroad"

Prasong is orienting his argument in religious terms as it is somewhat implicit that Muslim fighters trained abroad would be jihadists whom would be conducting a religious war.

Ultimately the mosque shooting has highlighted the ever-present and rather precarious religious sub-plot of the southern insurgency.

As the religious frontline of the conflict has been exposed, both Muslim militants and Buddhist nationalists have used the incident it to further exacerbate and define the conflict along religious lines.

At the risk of stating the obvious, were the military or police to identify, arrest, and pursue charges against the perpetrators of the mosque shooting through the proper legal channels much of this religious-based fallout could be mitigated.

But as incidents at Krue-Ze or Tak Bai have demonstrated the rule of law and a resolution to the mosque shooting is unlikely.

And in the absence of a resolution, the fallout from the mosque shooting will be an increased emphasis on the religious component of the southern insurgency.

Gunman kill 11 in Mosque - Media and PM Lose the Plot

*All PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Solider at a mosque in Banang Sata District of Yala back in 2007.

Dramatic events with the mosque shooting in the South (BBC story here) and I am not sure if this should be a rant at the pitiful English-language Thai media, criticism over Abhisit's misguided optimism, or a general commentary about the abysmal situation in the Deep South so it will have to be all three.

On the Media:
Specifically the Bangkok Post's lame story Gunmen kill 11 at mosque: Updated

When 'Suspected militants' kill 11 and injure another 12 people it might be a good idea to question who the 'Suspected militants' are.

Are Buddhist militias to blame, is there factional fighting amongst insurgents like the RKK or BRN-C, are villagers striking back at militants, is it a blood feud, was it overzealous village defense volunteers, a business hit, or troops taking revenge for a previous militant attack in the area?

The point is there are a number of possibilities and it is important to get at the truth.

Instead of simply quoting the army spokesman (which i presume they mean 4th Army spokesman) saying "They are trying to make it look like the attackers are the authorities, because Muslims would apparently not shoot inside a mosque. But it's impossible that it is the work of the military,''

Why is it impossible that is it the work of the military? That might be a good starting point for the media to ask because one of the MOST LIKELY sources of well armed and highly mobile attackers who would shoot up a mosque would be some pissed off troops or those who receive weapons and support from the military!

How about ask the villagers, ask the victim's families, ask the bystanders, ask the village defense volunteers, ask other military units, hell, you might even ask the police!

(on a side note, I did call a local resident in Pattani who said villagers blame Thai-Buddhist militants and I tend to believe this theory which leads to the question of whether there will be revenge attacks on Buddhists in the next few weeks...but that is a whole other conversation.)

On PM Abhisit:
Specifically: PM visits Malaysia for talks on southern unrest

"We remain optimistic that things will get a lot better if we continue emphasizing economic development and giving them a better future," he said.

Yes, this was two days before the mosque shooting.

And what misguided whimsical fantasy did Abhisit base his optimism on?

"Let me reiterate that my government's approach is based on the belief that the key to peace and security is justice and opportunities," he said.

If he really believes that then Abhisit has lost the plot of the southern insurgency.

Justice is simply the lowest common denominator that most people can agree upon about the South. Really, who can really argue against justice?

Sure, justice and opportunities (presuming that these are the economic/development type of opportunities) are nice but that is not the southern storyline that the PM should be following.

How about political empowerment or a substantial devolution of state powers that gives southern residents the power to lead and develop their own communities as they see fit?

But I guess Abhisit is following the ultra-conservative military/royalist/bureaucratic fantasy which imagines that 'benevolent' and 'enlightened' leaders should be sent from central Thailand to rule over the 'backwards rural Muslims' and kindly giving them justice and opportunities. How kind of them.

That is an old Thai fantasy and recently appeared, albeit in a lite-version, with the National Reconciliation Commission's report in May 2006 and was most recently and heavily propagated by Surayud's ultimately useless efforts at addressing the southern conflict.

It is a fundamentally flawed fantasy and should no longer be told to the public as some sort of feel good bed-time-story where the situation is really not that bad and some good people will come along and sort this mess up.

On the Abysmal State of the Deep South:

If the Prime Minister doesn't seem to have a clue about the core grievances in the South and the Thai media are largely uninterested in investigating and reporting on events there then the abysmal state of the Deep South is rather implicit.

Yet what is not immediately implicit is that the authorities and the general public seem unprepared to admit the seriousness of the situation in the South and this is a serious harbinger of the future of the conflict.

If the media and the PM have lost the southern plot, then Thai society is years away from grappling with the social and political concessions needed to build a durable and lasting peace.