Photo of the Day: Orwellian Thailand


*All Images Copyright* (this means that newspapers like the Seoul Times should not be stealing my photos!)Politics, Insurgency, and the State of the Thai nation


*All Images Copyright* (this means that newspapers like the Seoul Times should not be stealing my photos!)
* All images copyright *
Red shirts at Government House February 24th 2009.
Bangkok Post Cartoon, July 31, 2008.
From the Bangkok Post: Noppadon to Abhisit: Get temple back
Former foreign minister Noppadon Pattama has urged Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva to keep his promise to get the ancient Hindu ruins of Preah Vihear back from Cambodia.
He said when he was foreign minister he made it clear that the Preah Vihear case was closed.
But Mr Abhisit, who was then opposition leader, insisted he would reserve the right to press for the return of the border temple to Thailand.
So how do you take back disputed territory with another country? By launching an military offensive of course. And it seems more than a little stupid of Noppadon and Abhisit to be debating the point of 'taking back' the temple (that was never Thailand's to take back) when they are really talking about instigating armed conflict with a neighbor.
Now PAD and the Thaksin faction are both employing ultranationalist brinkmanship for national political gain at a staggering cost of potential war with Cambodia.
And lets not forget that inside Abhisit's government is the PAD Foreign Minister Kasit Piromya:
Mr Noppadon said he was unhappy about Mr Kasit's remarks about Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen.
He claimed Mr Kasit made offensive remarks against Mr Hun Sen that could affect relations between Thailand and Cambodia.
This all bodes ill for the long term stability of the government and has dangerous implications for relations with Cambodia.
*all photos copyright*
Rama 5 (King Chulalonkorn) statue worship near Government House.
Over at the New Mandala there is an important discussion about Thailand's draconion lèse majesté laws.
The article, written byAndrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly, is well written, articulate and I post it here because of how important this issue is in Thai society.
The whole article can be read bellow or at New Mandala here.
In Thailand the legal system seeks to ensure that public comment about the monarchy can only be favourable. Under the lèse majesté provision of the criminal code, any action that insults or disrespects the royal family can bring a sentence of up to 15-years behind bars.
The most recent victim of this law is Melbourne man Harry Nicolaides, who has worked in Thailand as a university lecturer and freelance writer. He was arrested at Bangkok airport on 31 August 2008. As Nicolaides continues to languish in a Bangkok prison cell, the use and abuse of the lèse majesté law has received a modicum of worldwide scrutiny. However since 21 September, Nicolaides’ case has been completely out of the news.
He has been quietly forgotten.
Lèse majesté is a weapon used to defend the perceived honour of Thailand’s royal family. According to Paul Handley, the author of an unauthorised 2006 biography of the king, “[i]n Thailand, all that truly stands between royal virtue and London-tabloid-style media treatment is the lèse majesté statute.”
Since Handley’s controversial book–which is banned in Thailand–there have been a number of high-profile cases of lèse majesté involving foreigners. The two most recent instances where accusations have been levelled at non-Thais are illustrative of the problems with implementing this law.
In December 2006 Oliver Jufer was charged with the offence after defacing images of the king in Chiang Mai during a drunken spree. He was held for four months without bail, and after a quick trial was sentenced to ten years in prison. Jufer served another few weeks before he was pardoned by the king and deported to his native Switzerland.
At the time, outrage about his draconian treatment for an act of immature vandalism led to even more outlandish attacks on the Thai monarchy. There was a flurry of provocative and childish online protests that used the global reach of the YouTube video-sharing website to mock the Thai royals. In response, the Thai government banned YouTube. This sparked further international bemusement and condemnation. To conform to local expectations of fair comment, YouTube is today only available in Thailand in filtered form.
Since the Jufer fiasco, in April 2008 the BBC’s Bangkok correspondent Jonathan Head has been embroiled in a lèse majesté fight of his own. He has not been charged but is the subject of ongoing investigations. Head’s case is related to that of Jakrapob Penkair, an outspoken critic of military intervention in Thai politics and an eloquent ally of deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Comments made to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand during 2007 landed both men in trouble.
When only Thais are involved, lèse majesté does not get as much attention. But one case that has entranced the international press involved student activist and social critic, Chotisak Onsoong. Earlier this year he was charged with lèse majesté after refusing to stand during the playing of the king’s anthem at a Bangkok cinema. Almost unique among recent lèse majesté cases, Chotisak welcomed the charge with further acts of public defiance.
The view of the king himself on lèse majesté is not completely clear. In his 2005 birthday speech he cautioned against the over-exuberant use of this criminal provision. Nonetheless many factions within the Thai elite continue to indulge in episodes of lèse majesté accusation and counter-accusation to score political points.
The king’s formidable media management apparatus is apparently comfortable with this situation. While he may have some personal reservations, the king has yet to make any explicit recommendation that lèse majesté be abolished. Perhaps it remains too useful as a tool for stifling open public debate about the role of the royal family in national political and economic life. Lèse majesté helps guarantee an unrelenting public diet of positive royal news.
In Thailand, it is even hard to report the details of a lèse majesté charge without fear of sanction. Detailed reporting runs the risk of repeating the offence. Self-censorship reigns. So Harry Nicolaides will be unlikely to ever see substantial details about his case published in the Thai media.
Hopefully foreign journalists will exercise their greater freedom to report on his predicament. Some, including the BBC’s Jonathan Head, The Age’s Peter Gregory, Reuters, the Associated Press and Reporters Without Borders have already made important contributions. But for the past two weeks there has been silence.
All reports suggest that the charge relates to a passage in an obscure book published by Nicolaides that describes the rather flamboyant private life of a Thai prince. This may have been an error of judgement on Nicolaides’ part but it does not, in any way, justify his current treatment. Respect for other country’s legal systems is all very well. But this is a law that silences Thais and foreigners alike. It prevents what we would regard as perfectly normal, if somewhat prurient, reporting on royal lives. More importantly, it muzzles public discussion of a range of issues that lie at the heart of Thailand’s ongoing political crisis.
The Australian media could be doing more to highlight the plight of Nicolaides and to open up broader regional discussion on this outdated taboo.

Bangkok Post Cartoon, July 31, 2008.
*all images copyright*
Rama 5 statue near Government House
Nationalism is a poison.
It might not have always been so as nations across Southeast Asia fought off the yoke of colonial oppression by harnessing the power of nationalism.
But it is a poison now that has reached such critical mass in Thailand that issues like the border conflict over Phra Vihear with Cambodia and the festering southern insurgency are perpetuated by Thai nationalism.
Essentially, close minded nationalists have prevented rational discourse on what Thailand is and who it represents to such an extent that the ability of the country to deal with conflict - like Phreah Vihear and the southern Insurgency - in a rational way is severely challenged.
So it is refreshing to see some people speaking out against the vile nationalist non-sense that Thai students are force-fed at their schools.
From the Bangkok Post:
What makes us proud of our country? At the Education Ministry, our patriotism is judged by how much we can memorise national history in textbooks as sacred fact written in stone.
That is why they are extremely worried about the future of patriotism here.
Despite the emphasis on rote learning to enforce conformity and to kill a questioning mind, the education authorities believe our children still cannot parrot well enough.
The future is bleak when many students still do not know about Pantai Norasingh, a popular folk hero who symbolises loyalty to the monarchy. Worse, the educators lament, many still do not know about King Naresuan who freed the Thais from Burmese rule.
The protracted save-the-country theatre at Government House does not convince these bigwigs that there is no shortage of ultra-nationalism here.
The spiralling southern violence cannot make them see that the crux of the problem lies in their version of nationalism, which states that only the dominant Buddhist Thais own the country. Nor can they see that if they insist on pushing this down the throats of the ethnic Malay Muslims, peace will remain out of reach.
Hence their plan to make children across the country parrot more of what they define as national history, what they equate as patriotism, which boils down to a dangerous racist nationalism in a conflict-ridden society where respect for cultural plurality remains indispensible for peace.
When I told my 12-year-old daughter of the Education Ministry's plans for her history classes next year, she screamed at the idea.
"Why do they want to put us through more boring hours? Why do they think we will love the country by remembering about battles, blood and death? Why is history so full of killing and scary events? What is the point of making us remember so many difficult names and dates? I just don't see any use of it."
Playing devil's advocate, I said we need to know about historical roots to know who we are so we can move forward confidently. The boredom may stem from how history classes are conducted, I suggested.
She defended her teacher vehemently. "We're allowed to do open-book quiz in class, which is fun. But the materials are boring."
"So what do you want to learn?" I pressed.
Civilisations, she said. Old civilisations in all parts of the world. How the pyramids were built, for example. When I pointed out that pyramids are not Thai, she just shrugged her shoulders.
When I asked if she wanted to learn how different geographical landscapes shaped different cultures and civilisations, how an ancient civilisation based on the salt industry in the Isan Plateau rose and fell, how it was replaced by principalities in the river basins which prospered from rain-fed rice cultivation, how different ethnicities in the region lived alongside one another since prehistoric times in this region and, closer to home, how true it was that Bangkok's roots were essentially Chinese - she cut me short.
"Anything, mummy. Anything is better than what it is now."
However boring, ultra-nationalism has still succeeded in seeping in to poison kids' minds. My daughter, for one, truly believes that Thailand once owned parts of our neighbouring countries, making us the greatest in this region.
"Because the textbooks say so."
Like most Thais, she feels Burma is fierce and heartless, Cambodia cannot be trusted and Laos is inferior to Thailand - because the history textbooks teach her so. And since national history only has room for ethnic Buddhists, she considers it an alien notion that other ethnic minorities must have equal rights to the dominant ethnic Thais in a democratic society.
She is only 12, I told myself. If others can rise above such ugly nationalism to understand how it makes us cruel and heartless, my girl can do it too, one day.
The Education Ministry may want to tighten the chains of racist nationalism, but any mother who cares for her children's humanity and peace in an increasingly tense multi-cultural world, will never give up the fight for it.
Neither will I.
"Dangerous Racist Nationalism" how apt.
Bangkok Post Cartoon, July 31, 2008.
Bangkok Post Cartoon, July 31, 2008
The above title quote is from an article called The Narcissim of Minor Difference by Michael Ignatieff.
And it seems rather apt here.
The following images are from a forwarded email that is making the rounds in Thailand.
It is titled "ประเทศไทย ช่วยกันส่งต่อให้มากๆ นะ" which translates roughly as: Help Thailand by forwarding this message.
The content is clear without the need to read Thai - Thailand was, and still is, in threat of being riped apart by rapacious colonial powers and neighbours.
And everyone wants a peice; the English, the French, the Chinese, the Burmese, and the Cambodians.
The timeliness of the message, in particular to the Preah Vihear temple dispute is clear.
But, to believe this nationalist nonsense, does require the suspension of disbelief. The series of images show an imaginary Thailand that nationalists belief once existed.
But it never did of course.
It was never a unified and demarcated territory until AFTER the colonial powers demarcated British Burma/Malay and French Indochine.
There was conquest and there were 'Thai' armies laying siege to other disparate kingdoms but it was never a demarcated territory as this nationalist propaganda suggests.
The main point in Ignatieff's article - which is focused on the war in the Balkans - is that "neighbours once ignorant of the very idea that they belong to opposing civilizations begin to think - and hate - in these terms; how they vilify and demonize people they once called friends; how, in short, the seeds of mutual paranoia are sown, grain by grain, on the soil of common life."
These maps are the seeds of growing nationalism, and the seeds of hate between neighbours who share a common land.
















Thai Solider outside a mosque in Ampur Bananstar, Yala province.
Is Thailand a failed state?
The short answer, I think, is no, but the longer answer is maybe.
I once talked with Dr Chaiwat Satha-anand from Thammasat University – a prominent academics and a common face on Thai TV – who told me; “Thailand is not a failed state…but we are starting to show signs of failure.
He was talking about the southern crisis and was specifically talking about the life of southern residents.
He told me that there is a panic for legitimacy in the Thai government, a panic that started in Thaksin's time and has gone on to consume the various governments since.
Samak's government is particularly at risk and can only focus on its own survival. It has no time, no moral authority, and apparently no will to try to resolve the violent rebellion in the southern border provinces.
And law, already suffering in the border provinces, has further broken down in the south. Justice does not exist and citizens have resorted to carrying guns for their own protection because the state can not protect them.
This is a fundamental problem in that the state should have a monopoly on the use of force. Not only are armed insurgents challenging that, but ordinary people have decided to take their own safety, and the law, into their own hands.
The government has imposed draconian laws, such as the emergency decree and marshal law, that strip citizens of their rights and has give the security forces immunity from prosecution. The military, the police, and a growing number of armed militias are now operating with complete legal immunity.
The violence has also divided the community.
In the past, the Thai-Buddhists and the Malay-Muslim citizens were not divided by some bizarre civilizational barrier but lived in a distinctly multicultural space that was characterised by ethnic and religious diversity.
Now, the corrosive persistence of violence and poisonous nationalisms are pushing a divide between Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim citizens.
But compared to failed states like Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, Thailand doesn’t compare.
Burma is in utter shambles, so poverty stricken, repressed, and ethnically divided that some experts will admit that a resolution to the vast problems there might never emerge.
Cambodia is ruled by the self proclaimed 'strong man' Hun Sen for over 20 years and the country is also mired in poverty, and deeply scared from a genocide which the country has yet to reconcile with itself.
Laos is simply a communist museum, locked into the past, and seems unlikely to wake up to the modern world.
So, no Thailand is not a failed state but, as professor Chaiwat said, it is showing signs of being one.
*Warning* The first video is a little nasty as one PAD member seems to get set on by a pack "We Love Udon" animals. The police reaction is a case in point, the seem to do nothing.
Mob violence is really an ugly thing in Thailand.
As the following videos show, a group belligerent thugs calling themselves "We Love Udon" have decided to back up Samak's flailing government and physically put down a People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest. I believe two died in the incident.
I have no respect for PAD. Their view of 'democracy' would be comical if it wasn't so disturbingly anti-democratic. And their acerbic ultra-nationalism hatred is seriously dangerous and represents the very worst of type of nationalist poison that infects societies and directs them onto a path of violence against minorities, against political opposition, on other religions, and eventually violence that often turns on itself killing the same fools who instigated it.
So, although I dont really feel bad that PAD lunatics are getting beaten by other lunatics, I do worry about how the police failed to intervene. Peaceful protest is a cornerstone of democartic process and the police are supposed to maintain order.
Yet Thai police have two reactions to virtually all violent incidents. The first is to ignore the situation, allow it to grow out of control, and wait until people are injured or killed.
The other process is to unleash brutal violence on any one in their path.
As these videos show, Thailand's notoriously incompetent and corrupt police decided to watch the violence instead of stop it.
When a riot begins, they are the law and their duty is to protect the people - even if that means keeping two ignorant, hate fulled, and violent groups from slaughtering each other.

In a recent article in The Nation, Prime Minister Samak claimed that Thais would not do anything to harm their country and, to follow his logic, that would mean that those involved in the insurgency in the deep south must not be Thai.
From The Nation - PM blames "outsiders" for southern violence:
"Samak blames 'outsiders' for insurgent attacks, asserting that Thais don't do things that harm their country."
Such utterances might be brushed off as Samak's usual acerbic style but, at the intersection of Thai-nationalism and discontent in South Thailand, such comments only serve to increase the divide between Bangkok and the deep south.
A long-standing grievance held by Malay-Muslims in Southern Thailand is the often repeated suggestion that they are 'guests' in Thailand.
The Thai term keak (แขก) means a guest and particularly a guest of Indian or Arab descent. It is not necessarily a bad word on its own, but the term has often been used in Thai discourse when talking about Malay-Muslims in the southern provinces.
The trouble is that the Malay-Muslims are, of course, citizens of Thailand.
The awkward suggestion that Malay-Muslims are only guests in Thailand is not just offensive but should be understood in context of the region's history.
The southern provinces were an independent Islamic sultanate that Thailand officially annexed in 1903 and has administering like a colonial possession ever since.
To call Malay-Muslims guests in the country of their birth is an insult. To call them guests in the land of their forefathers feeds rebellion.
This might seem to be nitpicking and unfairly taking Samak to task over minor linguistic subtleties but that is not the case. As the Prime Minister, Samak is responsible for setting the tone of how the government will attempt to reign in the escalating violence in the South.
By suggesting that those responsible for the daily acts of resistance to Thai rule are not Thai, Samak has made a foolish blunder.
Essentially, Samak is encouraging ethnic/religious polarization by forcing citizens to chose between simplistic notions of Thai nationalism or the simplistic label of foreign separatist.
As the situation in the border provinces has been sliding ever and ever closer to a conflict based on ethnic/religious lines, Samak's divisive remarks are not just strategic blunders but will encouraging conflict between Thai-Buddhist and Malay-Muslim communities.
The Nation's article ends with:
"My visit to Malaysia will give me a clearer picture of the situation," he (Samak) says.
Yet it seems that Samak needs more than a clearer picture. He will need tact, diplomacy, and a sound strategy to prevent the southern crisis from escalating.
But, as Samak has already demonstrated, he has little tact or diplomacy.
One can only hope that Samak will at least have a strategy.
Burmese citizens, huddled together on a rubber inner tube, illegally crossing the Moei River that separates Thailand from Burma. Mai Sot, Thailand/Myawadi, Burma - 2005.
At 8 am and 6 pm the national anthem can be heard across Thailand.
In schools children sing it, television and radio stations dutifully broadcast it, loud speakers mounted upon telephone poles in cities and villages cackle with it, and everyone within the state – even at its very edges and whether citizen or not – are expected to stop what they are doing, stand-up, and wait respectfully until the song ends.
The national anthem, like the border containing the state, is a work of political fiction.
If Thailand was indeed ‘the unity of Thai blood’ with the territorial body of the state then the space created – the political state of Thailand – would be an exclusive space for ethnic Thais.
While circumnavigate the Thai border, the territorial edge of the ‘Thai body’, it is not the lack of actual ethnic Thais that is most striking but the range of ethnic diversity that is most striking.
The periphery of the state is characterized by ethnic diversity that is manifest in contested territory, contested identities, and contested politics.
The circumference of the ‘Thai body’ has very little in common with the narrow nationalist identity espoused by the state.
Yet it is not that the Thai state is particularly at fault.
The ethnic nationalism that causes alienation in peripheral communities is a by-product of the global system of demarcated nation-states.
To understand how embedded the paradigm of the demarcated nation-state is one simply has to think of one global institution – the United Nations. The Thai state is simply exercising spatial governance, with nationalism as a tool of state-craft, in a reflection of the international system of 'nations'.