Simple lies by Anupong

View of Narathiwat from a Black Hawk helicopter. November 12, 2009.

(This post was originally called 'fisking Anupong' until it was brought to my attention that there is another definition for fisking...who knew?!)

I personally don’t like unpacking questionable statements and articles in the news because it is time consuming.

Yet sometimes, an article is so littered with politician’s blatant lies and journalistic incompetence that it simply begs to be deconstructed.

The Bangkok Post’s recent article Army takes a hard line with rebels is a case in point:

PATTANI : The army has shot down a call to negotiate with insurgents to end conflicts in the restive South.

Army chief Anupong Paojinda said no talks would be held with separatist groups during his tenure, which ends in September next year. "We won't negotiate with them. But we will take legal action against them," he told the Bangkok Post.

NS: Anupong is simply lying, negotiations have been an ongoing, but largely a secretive process, since Surayud was installed as Prime Minister.

"They have to be brought to trial for having murdered innocent people," said Gen Anupong, who accompanied Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban on a trip to inspect government development projects in Pattani and Narathiwat last week.

NS: In this context, the Royal Thai Army also needs to be “brought to trial for having murdered innocent people” considering the long list of victims in the Tak Bai incident or prominent cases like Iman Yapa.

Gen Anupong was reacting to calls by Puea Thai chairman Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to negotiate with separatist groups to end the violence.

Gen Chavalit has also proposed an amnesty for militants in the three Muslim-dominated provinces.

Since violence resurfaced in the region six years ago, it has claimed almost 4,000 lives.

The Internal Security Operations Command believes 8,000-10,000 insurgents are active in the deep South. The insurgents took shelter in more than 200 villages in the so-called red zone and used pondok schools as a base to carry out attacks against civilians and state officials, it said.

"The insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area," the army chief said.

NS: This is a serious problem on two levels. If it is a translation problem then it is simply shoddy reporting by the Bangkok Post. But if it is what Anupong said, it is still shoddy reporting because he is clearly obfuscating issues and a professional journalist should have questioned this or at least qualified it by stating in the next sentence that Anupong was either confused or being purposely deceptive.

As for Anupong, and taking that he actually meant what he said, he is simply being a shifty liar. Separatism and autonomy are very different issues. Separatism would result in an independent state while an autonomous area would not violent the ‘one and unitary’ condition of the constitution, would not divide the nation (แบ่งชาติ), and would simply devolve local governance powers and decision making to the border provinces….much like Bangkok enjoys.

They carried out attacks to draw international attention to their "plight".

But the army leader said that the southern violence was a domestic issue that could be solved by the government alone.

NS: International attention is not exactly a major factor in southern militants’ tactics, but it is a major fear of Thai elites who are ever fearful that their prolonged incompetence in addressing the southern conflict will ultimately draw in the international community. But, this quote does allow Anupong to repeat the standard line that ‘conflict is a domestic issue’ and everyone should simply forget about it.

No other countries, including fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, had offered themselves as brokers in talks between the government and the separatist groups.

NS: It is common knowledge that Malaysia (while not an honest broker as they are a stakeholder in the conflict) and Indonesia have offered to broker talks.

Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia plans to tour the three southernmost provinces with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva early next month. The trip is intended as a show of Malaysian support for Thailand's efforts to tackle the violence.

NS: WTF?! Is this article an opinion piece from the self-deluded Nation or Manager? Malaysia might support the military’s declarations that they will not violent human rights but the Malaysian PM is certainly accountable to his own constituents who are critical of the Thai military’s heavy handed tactics. In addition, Razak floated the idea of autonomy which flip-flopper Abhisit initially supported but has since backtracked on. But really, the key point of the trip by Razak will be to show his constituents that he is pressuring Thailand to treat the Malay-Muslim minority in the Deep South with some dignity and respect for their rights and CERTAINLY NOT as a show of support.

Gen Anupong said no Asean members would interfere in the southern issue. NS: Yes, we got the message already, an internal issue. The army had no plan to withdraw troops from the area. There are 20,000 soldiers, 18,000 police and 40,000 defence volunteers providing security for two million people in the deep South.

NS: This is more complicated given the number of irregular troops.

As i understand it, it is higher and goes like this:

In addition to the 20,000 soldiers and 18,000 police there are 50, 000 village defence volunteers (ชรบ), 10,000 rangers (ทหานพราน), 20,000 defense corps (อรบ) and 6,000 Or Sor (อส which are well armed troops who are full time paid soldiers under command of the Ministry of Interior and the only ‘volunteer’ part of their work is that they are not conscripted). This total of armed state-sanctioned forces is at about 124,000 depending on a couple of variations. This rough works out to 1 state-armed person per 20 residents in the Deep South.

"We will not abandon people to live alone. Without us, how could they survive?" Gen Anupong said.

NS: Who is he abandoning and who would not survive? Clearly it is not the 80% Malay-Muslim population that he is talking about but the 20% Thai-Buddhist population and these kind of black and white comments are simply pandering to the nation by employing empty but emotional nationalist rhetoric.

He had told border officials to keep a close watch on people with dual Thai-Malaysian nationality as he believed many were involved in attacks in the deep South.

Security experts believe militants with dual nationality carry out attacks there, then flee to neighbouring Malaysia to avoid being caught.

NS: Case in point of the nonsense about Malaysian PM going to show ‘support for Thailand's efforts’. If Razak was supportive of Thai efforts then he would cooperate at the border on security issues and take action against suspected militants retreating into Malaysia.

The question of how to tackle assailants with dual Thai-Malaysian nationality will be tabled for talks between the two leaders when Mr Najib is visiting here, officials say.

Gen Anupong also criticised "the Pattani model" pushed by Gen Chavalit as a solution to the violence.

Gen Chavalit has proposed a form of elected self-government for the region, similar to the way Bangkok is run.

He says the government is deliberately misinterpreting his call as advocacy for an independent Pattani state, which he opposes.

NS: Yes, certainly. As Anupong did above and I mentioned here, it will be easy for the opposition to misrepresent what autonomy is.

He was not proposing separatism, just self-government. Gen Anupong, however, said the details were still unclear and had led to misunderstanding among southern residents.

" I don't understand exactly what Gen Chavalit is advocating. Further discussions are needed. I believe he has a hidden agenda," he said.

NS: More obfuscating the issues and simple lies by Anupong. ‘A hidden agenda’? Obviously it is a clear agenda to flummox Abhisit’s embattled and ineffective government. But what might be ‘hidden’ is potential long term solution to the intractable southern insurgency.

What do Malay-Muslims really want?

* All images copyright *

Ramadan and the Central Mosque in Pattani City. August 26, 2009

The question of what Malay-Muslims really want is a serious blind spot in the southern insurgency.

Obviously, it would seem a critical issue to understand not only the grievances fueling the insurgency but to understand the political desires of the nearly two million Malay-Muslim citizens in the southern border provinces.

This is also of critical importance as the issue of autonomy has been a hotly contested political issue lately.

Yet no one can say, with any authority, what the residents there want.

This is in part because the Thai state fails to differentiate between the legitimate political expressions of grievance and separatism. For Thai authorities, Malay-Muslims expressing dissatisfaction with the government is the same as expressing support for separatism.

Because we dont really know that Malay-Muslims want, journalists, academics, and myself, tend to simplify this blind spot and cluster all Malay-Muslims into a homogeneous group.

This is obviously not accurate but serves as journalistic shorthand for a complex issue without easy answers.

As Jason Johnson writes in the Asia Times Online, this has:

"led to widespread misconceptions about the spiraling conflict, including that nearly all of the minority group harbor Patani Malay Muslim nationalist sentiment and resentment towards the Thai state".

In fact, Jason's article makes a number of interesting comments and particularly:

"As de facto spokespeople for the Patani Malay Muslim nation [Malay Muslim intellectuals], they tend to overstate the nationalist cares and concerns of ordinary Malay Muslims, frequently speaking about group pride in the ancient Kingdom of Patani, the Malay Muslims unique way of life, and the need for the Thai government to give greater recognition to this identity by, for instance, allowing some form of autonomy."

With the debate over autonomy brewing, it would be nice to know if a possible autonomy agreement would be serving the political aspirations of a majority of residents or whether it will be an elite driven process granted by Bangkok and solely serving the needs of a few Malay-Muslim elites and by separatists who would be major beneficiaries of increased political power.

Autonomy!

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Singing on the beach in Pattani province. August 2009.

There has been a growing interest in granting some form of autonomy to the Deep South as a means of mitigating unrest in the region.

Since the rise of violence in 2003, the Thai state under has failed, often miserably, in its counterinsurgency efforts.

Normally, heavy handed tactics by security forces backed up by inappropriate and even warmongering rhetoric by successive Prime Ministers has done nothing but add fuel to the southern fire.

Yet there has been growing discourse in Thai academic and political circles that has admitted the state's persistent failures and has understood that greater political participation through the devolution of state powers is needed to quell the violence.

While Thai discourse has favored terms like decentralization or administrative reform what is really being talked about is a form of autonomy.

This is, of course, not separatism but a means of granting locals in the Deep South more political participation so that they have basic decision making control over affairs such as education, religious practice, and development.

A brief summary of the rise of Thai political discourse on autonomy might have started as early as 2005 when the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was formulating their recommendations for fostering peace in the Deep South. Insiders speculate that autonomy was the core recommendation that former Prime Minister and NRC Chairman Anand Panyarachun was planning to suggest. But, a 'powerful stakeholder' commanded that autonomy not be recommended and it was dropped.

In February 2008 Chalerm Yubamrung, then serving as Interior Minister, launched a trial balloon suggesting that public hearings on the issue of Southern autonomy be conducted. While immediately slapped down by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, Chalerm claimed to have support from the governors of the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, Yala, and Songkhla in addition to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) director Pranai Suwannarat

By June 2009, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, while speaking on his weekly television program, had already floated the idea of turning Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala into a “special administrative zone” while still being in line with the one and unitary state precondition established in the constitution.

And now, in response to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's suggestion that Thailand grant some form of autonomy to the Deep South, the Straits Times and Channel News Asia are reporting that Abhisit has considerably raised the bar:

"Thailand is supporting this approach but it's not an independent region. It does not contradict the constitution, but instead allows more public participation in the form of a local assembly," he told reporters."

Finally, and just after I called Abhisit's performance a failure, I must give him some praise.

This is just a small step in a long and evolving process of course, but it is an important and significant step towards a long term resolution to the conflict.

What will happen next will likely be a spirited attack by right wing nationalists.

If conservatives like Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda could not tolerate the idea of Pattani-Malayu (the dialect spoke by about two million Thai citizens in the Deep South) being a working language in the Deep South then he, and his intolerant brethren, will likely mount a fierce rebuke to autonomy.

The Royal Thai Army, which runs the Deep South like a fiefdom and basks in extraordinary state spending, will likely also strike back at Abhisit. This is serious. Abhisit's government is beholden to the military and, should they withdraw their backing, the government is on shaky ground.

And the ultra-nationalist lunatics that comprise the anti-democratic People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) will be furious. Their violent antics at Phrea Vihear could be replayed over any notion of special autonomy being granted in the Deep South.

Such a backlash could cause the government to considerably water down the details of autonomy.

And this is the real danger.

Autonomy as a means of mitigating conflict has the potential to address the core grievances in the Deep South that fuel unrest.

But a watered down autonomy agreement void of any meaningful devolution of powers reaffirms the fears and mistrust that many residents of the Deep South have in the Thai state.

It would also bolster the hawkish nationalists who would accuse the Deep South of not being cooperative and would lead to further calls for a military solution to the crisis.

And, as Abhisit and Panitan Wattanayakorn have been mulling over a Sri Lankan-type solution, it is not unfathomable to envision a different and very dangerous direction that the conflict could go if autonomy is not managed properly.

Abhisit's failing state

Village defense volunteers (Chor Ro Bo) demonstrating their skills at a Buddhist temple in Maigaan (ไม้แก่น) district of Pattani province. August 2009.

In June 2009, at a seminar hosted by the King Prajadhipok’s Institute called “Politics Outweighs the Military: A Solution to Sustainable Peace in Southern Thailand”, Prime Minister Abhisit talked about bringing justice to the Deep South.

He said that the perpetrators of the June 2009 mosque shooting in Narathiwat, “no matter who they are”, would be brought to justice and that this issue is a key point from which to judge the performance of his government.

I would like to now pass judgment on the performance of his government: failed.

Failed misserably might be more accurate.

In regards to the mosque shooting, a warrant was issued a few months ago for a Thai-Buddhist township defense volunteer (Or Ror Bor) named Suthirak Khongsuwan, yet the whole case seems, like every other legal case in the Deep South, to have disappeared without resolution and certainly without justice.

Obviously, Abhisit's bold rhetoric is fundamentally disconnected with the fact that his weak government is beholden to the military.

Worse, the fact that Thai-Buddhist militias, such as the one Suthirak Khongsuwan belonged to, are armed under patronage of the Kingdom's highest institution which ensures that Abhisit's rhetoric is simply rhetoric.

The Nation is reporting today that the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) is not happy about the failure to see justice in the Deep South:

"Four Prime ministers passed by in just two years and all have failed to deliver justice and really sustainable development as hoped by the Malay Muslims, who are naturally anxious to manage their own affairs," it said.

Implicit in the PULO statement is that the Thai state's failure to deliver justice is a rational for autonomy or separatism.

They may have a point.

Not a single official has been prosecuted for any human-rights violations or killings since the surge of fighting began in 2004. Even the Tak Bai case in which state security forces killed 86 protesters – 76 from mistreatment after being taken into custody – were ‘acting in accordance’ of the law as judged by a Songkhla provincial court.

More worrisome, is that Abhisit's failure is part of a habitual failing of the Thai state that is akin to the symptoms of a failed state.

What exactly is a failed state?

From the Failed States Index: A state that is failing has several attributes. One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international community. The 12 indicators cover a wide range of state failure risk elements such as extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination...

From the perspective of the Deep South, the Thai state is clearly bordering on failed state territory.

When a failed state can not provide justice, politically motivated armed groups (separatists) will try to take over the functions of a state as a means of garnering legitimacy in the eyes of locals.

This is already happening.

As reported in Matichon today (sorry, cant find the story on their website but saw a copy of it early), separatists have released their own 'wanted' poster complete with photos and names of the five Thai-Buddhist suspects from the mosque shooting incident. While it does look like a wanted poster for criminals, theirs is titled 'จับตาย' which translates as 'wanted dead'.

Such vigilante actions are a symptom of the Thai state's inability to provide justice.

While I do still appreciate Abhisit's flowery promises of justice, his government has clearly failed to deliver.

Yet the real problem is not simply the current government's failure to provide justice, its the fact that its the sixth year in which the Thai state has failed to provide justice for citizens of the Deep South.

From a southern perspective, the perpetual lack of justice suggests that the Thai state is a failed state in the Deep South.

And that, of course, supports PULO's argument for autonomy or even independence.

Guns, guns, guns

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Traveling with the the Aor Sor (อส) militia in Maigaan (ไม้แก่น) district of Pattani province. August 16, 2009

Its nice to see some needed scrutiny in the media over the proliferation of small arms and militias in Southern Thailand lately.

The photo above I took last week while traveling the Ministry of Interior's Aor Sor militia.

Notably, most of the militia members didnt wear uniforms or travel in a vehicle with any official markings. Tennis shoes, mismatched military surplus pants, and pick up trucks with tinted windows but no insignia or markings to identify them. But they were well armed with M-16 and shinny new M4A1 assault rifles.

Professor Marc Askew, who spends a substantial amount of time in the southern border provinces, has been focusing on the issue of how non-insurgent violence makes up a surprisingly high percentage of southern violence.

"It is common knowledge among people in the violence-wracked deep South that much of the killing that punctuates daily life stems not just from insurgents' much-publicised military campaign against the state, but from personal disputes and local political rivalries. This lethal mix makes the region a highly complex killing field."

The rest of the worth-reading article in the Bangkok Post is here.

And while fixing a percentage of violence upon general criminality vs. insurgency is both difficult and controversial there is little doubt that the proliferation of arms and militias are a contributing factor to frequency of violence in the south.

The recent killing of 12 worshipers in the mosque in Narathiwat is a prime example. The rumor is that an arrest warrant is out for a 34 year old Thai Buddhist militia member but the fact that his militia is under certain royal patronage will likely prevent justice from ever seeing the case.

And the complicated divide between insurgency and criminality is currently taking place during this month's Ramadan in the South.

There has been a spike in the number of violent incidents and accentuated by the car bombing in Narathiwat on Tuesday. Suggestions by the military are being put forth that the recent violence is attributed to the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in which insurgents might be seeking to make a violent statement to mark the holiday.

Alternatively, the Tambon Administrative Organization or TAO elections are being held and, as insiders know and Marc Askew has highlighted, such elections are often marked by political killings.

Either way - insurgency or criminality - the flood of guns and militias are certain to feed into the complicated and intractable configuration of the southern insurgency.


For more on this topic see Rule by the Gun by Nonviolence International and the International Crisis Group's influential report The Problem with Paramilitaries.

Greetings from beautiful Pattani - Wish you were here!

Although I will continue to highlight my (infrequent) blog postings with images that focus on the violent nature of the southern insurgency, it should be remembered that, of course, life largely goes on as usual for local residents.

And, the province of Pattani is a beautiful place with a rich and vibrant culture.

So instead of the usual images of soldiers and politics, here are some photos from my weekend in Pattani province.

Gunman kill 11 in Mosque - Media and PM Lose the Plot

*All PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Solider at a mosque in Banang Sata District of Yala back in 2007.

Dramatic events with the mosque shooting in the South (BBC story here) and I am not sure if this should be a rant at the pitiful English-language Thai media, criticism over Abhisit's misguided optimism, or a general commentary about the abysmal situation in the Deep South so it will have to be all three.

On the Media:
Specifically the Bangkok Post's lame story Gunmen kill 11 at mosque: Updated

When 'Suspected militants' kill 11 and injure another 12 people it might be a good idea to question who the 'Suspected militants' are.

Are Buddhist militias to blame, is there factional fighting amongst insurgents like the RKK or BRN-C, are villagers striking back at militants, is it a blood feud, was it overzealous village defense volunteers, a business hit, or troops taking revenge for a previous militant attack in the area?

The point is there are a number of possibilities and it is important to get at the truth.

Instead of simply quoting the army spokesman (which i presume they mean 4th Army spokesman) saying "They are trying to make it look like the attackers are the authorities, because Muslims would apparently not shoot inside a mosque. But it's impossible that it is the work of the military,''

Why is it impossible that is it the work of the military? That might be a good starting point for the media to ask because one of the MOST LIKELY sources of well armed and highly mobile attackers who would shoot up a mosque would be some pissed off troops or those who receive weapons and support from the military!

How about ask the villagers, ask the victim's families, ask the bystanders, ask the village defense volunteers, ask other military units, hell, you might even ask the police!

(on a side note, I did call a local resident in Pattani who said villagers blame Thai-Buddhist militants and I tend to believe this theory which leads to the question of whether there will be revenge attacks on Buddhists in the next few weeks...but that is a whole other conversation.)

On PM Abhisit:
Specifically: PM visits Malaysia for talks on southern unrest

"We remain optimistic that things will get a lot better if we continue emphasizing economic development and giving them a better future," he said.

Yes, this was two days before the mosque shooting.

And what misguided whimsical fantasy did Abhisit base his optimism on?

"Let me reiterate that my government's approach is based on the belief that the key to peace and security is justice and opportunities," he said.

If he really believes that then Abhisit has lost the plot of the southern insurgency.

Justice is simply the lowest common denominator that most people can agree upon about the South. Really, who can really argue against justice?

Sure, justice and opportunities (presuming that these are the economic/development type of opportunities) are nice but that is not the southern storyline that the PM should be following.

How about political empowerment or a substantial devolution of state powers that gives southern residents the power to lead and develop their own communities as they see fit?

But I guess Abhisit is following the ultra-conservative military/royalist/bureaucratic fantasy which imagines that 'benevolent' and 'enlightened' leaders should be sent from central Thailand to rule over the 'backwards rural Muslims' and kindly giving them justice and opportunities. How kind of them.

That is an old Thai fantasy and recently appeared, albeit in a lite-version, with the National Reconciliation Commission's report in May 2006 and was most recently and heavily propagated by Surayud's ultimately useless efforts at addressing the southern conflict.

It is a fundamentally flawed fantasy and should no longer be told to the public as some sort of feel good bed-time-story where the situation is really not that bad and some good people will come along and sort this mess up.

On the Abysmal State of the Deep South:

If the Prime Minister doesn't seem to have a clue about the core grievances in the South and the Thai media are largely uninterested in investigating and reporting on events there then the abysmal state of the Deep South is rather implicit.

Yet what is not immediately implicit is that the authorities and the general public seem unprepared to admit the seriousness of the situation in the South and this is a serious harbinger of the future of the conflict.

If the media and the PM have lost the southern plot, then Thai society is years away from grappling with the social and political concessions needed to build a durable and lasting peace.

Local media no longer feeling the Southern Fire

*All Images Copyright*
Flying over Yala Province courtesy of a development project tour conducted by the 4th Army August 2008.

From the Bangkok Post titled 11 Militant strikes in Narathiwat:

"There were 11 incidents attributed to southern separatist militants in five districts of Narathiwat province on Sunday night, but there were no deaths or injuries. Police said on Monday that bombs were planted in two locations in Waeng district. In Joh Airong district, insurgents set fire to a school and planted bombs in four places. The militants set fire to two transmission posts for cell phones in Ra-ngae district. In Bacho, they destroyed a power plant, causing a blackout of the entire district. A transmission post for cell phones was also burnt down in Janae district, and cell phone signals were cut in some areas. Police and soldiers were deployed to inspect the affected areas."

While it is clear that the insurgency in the Southern Border Provinces is not going away, it is also clear that the local media have lost interest in the story.

Southern militants on Sunday night demonstrated their strength and logistical capabilities by launching 11 coordinated attacks across the province of Narathiwat.

Local media demonstrated their disinterest by dedicating a parsimonious 7 sentences to the event.

While the Thai press has always been Bangkok-centric, there used to be a considerable media presence in the Deep South in the early years of the insurgency (2004-6).

TV stations, like the old I-TV, used to have satellite trucks and reporters permanently camped out at the CS Pattani Hotel who reported daily on the southern crisis.

Now, news gathering is almost exclusively from local stringers whom simply collect the basic facts from military spokesmen and forward that info to Bangkok where it is hastily organized into simplistic stories like the one quoted above.

In depth reporting on the sources of grievance, the lives of residents, or interviews with militants have all disappeared and local media complain that there is 'nothing new to report on' in the South.

Long gone is the national debate on solutions for and goal of understanding the conflict. This was apparent by late 2006, after the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission drifted out of national discourse, local reporting on the south became little more than simple reports detailing violent incidents.

Disinterest in the southern insurgency might seem inevitable while Bangkok and whole country is caught in the tumultuous ebb and flow of the Red vs Yellow political conflict.

Yet there is now a slight lull in the national conflict and the Abhisit Government appears to have weathered the latest storm.

There is even some discussion on reforming Government policy on the South.

While the lull in national conflict and window of opportunity for policy change might not last long, it would be nice to see the local media revive their interest and begin to regenerate debate on solving the Southern conflict.

Otherwise, the conflict will perpetually simmer and 11 violent incidents will continue to earn a mere 7 sentences in the local press.

Who is promoting jihad in Southern Thailand?

A photo of mine, used without permission, to illustrate an article calling for jihad in Southern Thailand.

Who is promoting jihad in Southern Thailand?

The short and somewhat awkward answer is: me.

At a recent seminar about the conflict in Southern Thailand there was a presentation about jihadist websites and magazines calling for holy war in Southern Thailand.

One of my photographs take a couple years ago in Pattani province was used, without my permission and without remuneration, in an article calling for Indonesian Muslims to go to Southern Thailand and fight a jihad against the Thai infidels.

Here is the original photo:







The less factitious answer to who is promoting jihad in Southern Thailand is Sabili magazine.

This Indonesian magazine, along with Jihadmagz and other Indonesian/Malaysian websites, apparently has links to the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI) and the regional terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah or JI.

They use typical extremist non-sense about the duties of Muslims to wage war against infidels who 'invade Muslim lands'.

To reinforce their argument, they employ widely available footage of Thai military human rights abuses such as the infamous video taken during the crackdown on Muslim protesters in Tak Bai.

They also employ the logic of proximity.

If Malaysia and Indonesia are geographically proximate, the logical destination of jihad for able bodied Muslims from Southeast Asia is Southern Thailand.

The question of whether there are foreign fighters or foreign extremists supporting southern insurgents has always been a point of speculation.

There have been some case like the 'accidental jihadist' that Philip Golingai wrote about and much speculation about tacit support from some in Malaysia but the southern insurgency largely remains an internal matter for the Thai state.

Yet one wonders, as the conflict festers into its fifth year of open hostilities, how long it will remain an internal matter.

*Thanks to P.T. for her research on this matter

Caught between insurgents and soldiers

* photo copyright *
Laila Pohetaedaoh and daughter in Yala's Krong Pinang district on 19 August 2008. Bottom right is a photo of Laila's husband who was shot and killed by insurgents.

In 2008, I had the honor to interview Laila Pohetaedoh in her home in Krong Pinang, Yala for a forthcoming documentary on the southern conflict.

At the time, she told me that she had already lost her husband and two sons to insurgent attacks.

Insurgents accused her family of working with the government.

She told me that she felt trapped between two hostile forces. The militants who were making death threats against her, and the military who treated the villagers like terrorists.

Tragically, it appears that insurgents carried out their threats.

Her death was scarcely reported in the mainstream press: from the Bangkok Post on 12/03/2009:

"In Yala's Krong Pinang district, Laila Pohetaedaoh was shot. She was taken to Yala Hospital. She recently received an award for being among the most outstanding women of the district"

From a Human Rights Watch report titled Insurgents Target Leading Muslim Woman Activist:

"On March 12, 2009, an eyewitness saw an insurgent fatally shoot Laila Paaitae Daoh, a prominent Muslim women’s rights activist and peace advocate, in broad daylight in Krongpenang district, Yala province.
She was rushed to Yala Hospital Center, but died of her wounds the next day. Laila and her family had long received threats and had been targets of insurgent attacks. Alleged insurgents killed her eldest son in 2004 and her husband and second son in 2006."

Southern paradise lost to a phantom war

Despite calling Southern Thailand "one of the most dangerous places on earth" - which i dont agree with - this report from France 24 is rather good.

Of particular note is the work of the Muslim Attorney Centre (MAC) which provides a much needed service in the South.

Accidental ‘Jihadist’

* all photos copyright*

Military check stop in Yala in August.

Despite often criticizing military policy in the southern border provinces for their heavy-handed and human rights violating habits, there is a genuine effort to win the people's hearts and minds.

The soldiers in the South are usually friendly, polite, and working hard to both do their jobs and keep themselves safe.

Yet the notoriety of past events like Tak Bai keep coming back to dismiss efforts to win hearts and minds.

More troublesome is the possibility that the military's violent antics will start to attract regional or even global jihadists to the cause.

From Philip Golingai:

"In my interviews (three 12-minute prison visits) with Muhammad Fadly, he related that Ustaz Muhammad, a secretive religious teacher in his early 30s, had convinced him to slip into southern Thailand to help Thai Muslims oppressed by the government.

The final year mechanical industry student believed the ustaz after watching video footage of the massacre in Tak Bai, a Thai border town on Malaysia-Thailand border, where 78 Thai Muslim protesters – who were packed like sardines – died of suffocation and injuries while being transported in military trucks on Oct 25, 2004."

Thai authorities are often very worried about internationalizing the southern conflict as they fear increased attention from the international community would ultimately lead to calls for international intervention.

But this is certainly another type of international attention that Thailand could best do without.

And, of course, it is just another in a long line of reasons for the military to maintain strict adherence to the country's laws and international conventions on human rights.

Remember the Insurgency?

* photo copyright*
Soldier guarding a rural school in Yala province August 2008.

With the dissolution of the government, the anti-democratic People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) releasing the airport, and the fugitive Pojaman returning to Thailand it is easy to forget the southern insurgency.

This is, of course, a disaster for the country. With a body count over 3500 people it is simply shocking that a country struggling with one of Asia's most violent conflicts can simply forget.

More interesting though is that the nine killed today were killed on the King's Birthday and that The Nation and the Bangkok Post reported these serious incidents of violence as minor news.

It is understandable that since Bangkok has been held hostage by PAD's fascist and militant actions that the focus has shifted, but it is simply shameful that newspapers will avoid reporting the news for fear of reporting something bad on the King's birthday.

It is tempting to comment on why self-censorship is important to narrow-minded nationalists and staunch monarchists because it is a challenge to the Chakri Dynasty but, honestly, I am as scared as everyone else in Thailand about archaic and draconian lese majesty laws.

So lets just say, this post is a reminder that Thailand still must come to grips with its southern insurgency.

Forgotten War? Yes. Policy Change? No.

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The view above Yala province courtesy of a helicopter flight with the 4th Army August 2008.

Most of what is in the International Crisis Group's (ICG) latest article about the insurgency in the southern border provinces is not really news.

ICG claims:

"Thais, numbed by the repeated atrocities and in any case unsympathetic towards the grievances of Malay Muslims in the south of Thailand, have lost interest."

And, in light if the chaos in Bangkok, it is obvious that Thais have lost interest.

What is more interesting is the idea of what they call a 'policy vacuum' in the South.

"It may seem unrealistic to argue that the Thai government should undertake a serious policy initiative on the south at a time when it is locked in deep political conflict in Bangkok. But unfortunately, waiting for an end to Bangkok's political crisis may mean waiting a very long time. The south cannot afford to wait."

This is utter nonsense. And uncharacteristic for an organization which I hold in high regard.

Since the 2006 coup d'etet, there has been very little in the way of concerted policy originating from Bangkok.

Surayud's government apologized, but failed to address long stranding grievances in the South.

Samak's government, besides being antagonistic and inept, did not have the time or inclination to do more than try to secure their own administration in the face of the growing challenge from the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

And, honestly, Samak was such a belligerent animal so far removed from concepts of peace and reconciliation that it should not simply be a surprise that policy did not change but is a thankful surprise that he did not declare all out war against the country's minority Malay Muslims.

And now Somchai's wounded and dying government has been 100% consumed with maintaining power and utterly unconcerned with policy, let alone the South.

Really, how can anyone really think that policy can emerge from a country that is now stumbling along without a functioning government?

Abhisit Vejjajiva and Pattani-Malayu

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Military check stop in Yala in August. Language barriers are a serious problem in the South. Most residents speak Pattani-Malayu which is a dialect of Malay. The Thai civil service speaks either central Thai or, as in the case of the soldiers interviewing the women, speak the northeastern Lao dialect.


On August 27, 2008, I was given an exclusive interview with the official opposition leader and leader of the Democrat Party Abhisit Vejjajiva at his office in parliament.

This interview will appear in my forth coming documentary film about the southern insurgency. This is not the full interview transcript, of course, but an important point was raised about the southern language of Pattani-Malayu.


C: And what about the use of Pattani-Malayu? There are about two million speakers of this Malay dialect.

Abhisit : Yup, I think a commission that was set up under the Thaksin administration, ironically…

C: The National Reconciliation Commission.

Abhisit: they did make a proposal concerning the use of Malay as a local language and we think that should be encouraged. Similarly there are also cases, not criminal cases, where you could apply Sharia law, that should also be allowed.

C: In instances of family law?

Abhisit: That's right.

C: If the Democrat Party were to come to power, would Pattani-Malayu become a working language?

A: Yes, we support that proposal.

Yala is a Sexy Town

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Surprisingly saucy stage show at the local Galaxy Disco in Yala. August, 2008. For a small town in the grip of an insurgency with strong ethnic and ultra-conservative religious overtones, the stage shows at BOTH space-themed discos are surprisingly sexy.

And now for something completely different...

I love stereotypes and I often help perpetuate them.

If a journalist goes to the southern border provinces what will they focus on? Muslims, soldiers, insurgents, roadblocks, birds in cages, mosques, bla, bla, bla.

But, beyond the confines of stereotypes, the world - and in this case, Southern Thailand - is much more than the stereotypes that journalists are often required to chase.

Case in point: the city of Yala - in the center of a four year long insurgency - is also a thriving university town and a generally cool place to visit.

Sure, check stops, soldiers, and brooding mood of violence can be noticed but that is about 10% of the story.

The rest is vibrant multicultural life that should get as much attention as the stale 'insurgency' story.

And that is it, a sexy picture and a different view from the southern border provinces that usually produces images of Muslims, soldiers, insurgents, roadblocks, birds in cages, mosques, bla, bla, bla...

Amulets and War

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From a trip to Phaaw Ming village in Pattani province August 2008 to work on a documentary film about the southern insurgency.

Q: Have you ever experienced violence here that made you scared?

Medic: I have never been in an incident. But I have lost some of my subordinates so I was sad but I try to do my best.

Q: How do you take care of your self when you are on duty?

Medic: First I wear body armor. I wear a helmet all the time while traveling. Once I get to the location I can take it off in some cases, such as now, it is safe with a lot of people. But if we are in the car, we have to be careful all the time. We cannot fall asleep and have to be prepared.

Q: Apart from helmet, do you wear Buddha amulet?

Medic: Yes, I do. It is the pendent we are all get.

Q: What kind of amulet is that?

Medic: It is Lung Pu jeam. I've got it from the military. Lung Pu jeam and Lung Pu Tuad. This one is from my home in Lumpoon, Pra lod, my dad gave it to me. That is all. The rest are for moral support.

"Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency"

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Thahan Phran or ranger on guard for the arrival of former Prime Minister and Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont at the 4th Peace Fair organised by SBPAC in Yala August 1st 2008.

The International Crisis Group has just released at report titled "Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency" which details how security forces have effectively lowered the level of violence in the southern border provinces.

This is despite the fact that political chaos in Bangkok has prevented the Samak government from implementing any positive changes in the South.

This initially seems like good news but the fundamental grievances that are driving this conflict have still not been properly addressed.

The military has succeeded in locking down the violence through an extensive security plan yet this should not be understood as a solution as much as temporary quick fix.

To address the long term grievances, the International Crisis Group suggests:

In particular, the government should:

• appoint a deputy prime minister to take charge of the effort to cope with southern violence, instead of allowing the military to lead on the issue;
• empower the Southern Border Provinces Administrative Centre (SBPAC) by expediting the enactment of a law to govern its operations and to make it independent from the military-controlled Internal Security Operations Command;
• revoke martial law, amend the emergency decree and the internal security act to increase accountability of the security forces, and allow detainees prompt access to lawyers and family;
• ensure accountability for past human rights abuses, such as the deaths of nearly 200 Muslims in the 2004 Tak Bai and Krue Se incidents – the single most effective way to rebuild trust with Malay Muslims;
• make clear it is ready to negotiate seriously with genuine leaders of the insurgency, but make it a condition of the negotiations that their inter­locutors demonstrate they genuinely control insurgents on the ground;
• and give serious consideration to ways of granting some degree of self-rule, or decentralisation of power, to help end the conflict.

To read their full report, please click here: Thailand: Political Turmoil and the Southern Insurgency

Car Bombing

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The following images are from the large car bomb that was detonated in the southern border town of Sungai Kolok, Narathiwat on Thursday August 21st.

This attack, according to the Yala bomb squad, was the largest car bombing in Southern Thailand.

There were two explosions. The first was hidden in a motorcycle and detonated to attract the police/military, first responders, media, and civilians who often crowd around.

The second bomb, a homemade devise made out of 2-3 large fire extinguisher casings and filled with metal shrapnel, was then remotely detonated by an insurgent who was
likely watching the scene.

The final photos are from Chalee Boonswat's funeral. He was a reporter for Thai Rath newspaper and was killed by the second explosion.

Is Thailand a Failed State?

Thai Solider outside a mosque in Ampur Bananstar, Yala province.

Is Thailand a failed state?

The short answer, I think, is no, but the longer answer is maybe.

I once talked with Dr Chaiwat Satha-anand from Thammasat University – a prominent academics and a common face on Thai TV – who told me; “Thailand is not a failed state…but we are starting to show signs of failure.

He was talking about the southern crisis and was specifically talking about the life of southern residents.

He told me that there is a panic for legitimacy in the Thai government, a panic that started in Thaksin's time and has gone on to consume the various governments since.

Samak's government is particularly at risk and can only focus on its own survival. It has no time, no moral authority, and apparently no will to try to resolve the violent rebellion in the southern border provinces.

And law, already suffering in the border provinces, has further broken down in the south. Justice does not exist and citizens have resorted to carrying guns for their own protection because the state can not protect them.

This is a fundamental problem in that the state should have a monopoly on the use of force. Not only are armed insurgents challenging that, but ordinary people have decided to take their own safety, and the law, into their own hands.

The government has imposed draconian laws, such as the emergency decree and marshal law, that strip citizens of their rights and has give the security forces immunity from prosecution. The military, the police, and a growing number of armed militias are now operating with complete legal immunity.

The violence has also divided the community.

In the past, the Thai-Buddhists and the Malay-Muslim citizens were not divided by some bizarre civilizational barrier but lived in a distinctly multicultural space that was characterised by ethnic and religious diversity.

Now, the corrosive persistence of violence and poisonous nationalisms are pushing a divide between Thai Buddhist and Malay Muslim citizens.

But compared to failed states like Burma, Laos, and Cambodia, Thailand doesn’t compare.

Burma is in utter shambles, so poverty stricken, repressed, and ethnically divided that some experts will admit that a resolution to the vast problems there might never emerge.

Cambodia is ruled by the self proclaimed 'strong man' Hun Sen for over 20 years and the country is also mired in poverty, and deeply scared from a genocide which the country has yet to reconcile with itself.

Laos is simply a communist museum, locked into the past, and seems unlikely to wake up to the modern world.

So, no Thailand is not a failed state but, as professor Chaiwat said, it is showing signs of being one.