Why did Surayud's Policy Fail in the South?

*All Photos Copyright*
Former Prime Minister and Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont, looking slightly annoyed at me for taking his picture, at a Peace Fair organized by SBPAC in Yala August 1st 2008.

From the Bangkok Post titled: Number of attacks drop, but not the threat

Assistant national police chief Pol Lt-Gen Adul Saengsingkaew attributed the decrease to the rebels making "adjustments to their plotting of violence'.'

Although there were fewer attacks in recent months, the degree of violence was increasing, said Pol Lt-Gen Adul, who is commander of the Police Operation Centre's Forward Command in charge of the four restive provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Songkhla and Yala. The office is based in Yala.

"The situation seems to be better on the surface, the insurgents still keep building confidence among themselves in the three provinces to show their power," he said.

He said one reason for the violence increasing last year was because the government of then-prime minister Surayud Chulanont launched its reconciliation policy in the far South.

Really? Policies of reconciliation caused more violence? I guess that implies that policies of securitization and war will result in Peace?

Although Prime Minister Abhisit's policy towards the South is still not clear, it is unfortunate to hear the same old tired security perspective about enforcing a negative peace.

Negative peace is simply the absence or limitation of violence because the peace is being enforced through the threat of violence.

Obviously, the southern citizen's long standing grievances have not been address but a heavy security arrangement prevents violence.

Which then raises the question; why did Surayud's policy of reconciliation fail? Two simple reasons.

At the time of the coup and the removal of Thaksin, southern insurgents had a point to make. Their fight was not simply with Thaksin but with years of physical and cultural violence committed by the Thai nation-state which enforces a strict ethno-Thai and religious-Buddhist nationalism which alienates the ethnic Malay Muslims in the south. To think they would stop fighting just because Thaksin was removed is naive because Thaksin was only a hawkish instigator, the fight is with the Thai state.

The second reason was because Surayud's 'reconciliation' was nothing more than a hollow apology. The only change offered were the kind words of Surayud which proved to be insincere as Bangkok had no intention of changing its policies on the south.

And now with Pol Lt-Gen Adul Saengsingkaew beating the war drum, it seems to be that further securitization of the southern border provinces is in order.

And, we all know that the last four years of hawkish security policies have failed to achieve nothing but a high body count.

Forgotten War? Yes. Policy Change? No.

* photos copyright*
The view above Yala province courtesy of a helicopter flight with the 4th Army August 2008.

Most of what is in the International Crisis Group's (ICG) latest article about the insurgency in the southern border provinces is not really news.

ICG claims:

"Thais, numbed by the repeated atrocities and in any case unsympathetic towards the grievances of Malay Muslims in the south of Thailand, have lost interest."

And, in light if the chaos in Bangkok, it is obvious that Thais have lost interest.

What is more interesting is the idea of what they call a 'policy vacuum' in the South.

"It may seem unrealistic to argue that the Thai government should undertake a serious policy initiative on the south at a time when it is locked in deep political conflict in Bangkok. But unfortunately, waiting for an end to Bangkok's political crisis may mean waiting a very long time. The south cannot afford to wait."

This is utter nonsense. And uncharacteristic for an organization which I hold in high regard.

Since the 2006 coup d'etet, there has been very little in the way of concerted policy originating from Bangkok.

Surayud's government apologized, but failed to address long stranding grievances in the South.

Samak's government, besides being antagonistic and inept, did not have the time or inclination to do more than try to secure their own administration in the face of the growing challenge from the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD).

And, honestly, Samak was such a belligerent animal so far removed from concepts of peace and reconciliation that it should not simply be a surprise that policy did not change but is a thankful surprise that he did not declare all out war against the country's minority Malay Muslims.

And now Somchai's wounded and dying government has been 100% consumed with maintaining power and utterly unconcerned with policy, let alone the South.

Really, how can anyone really think that policy can emerge from a country that is now stumbling along without a functioning government?