M79s and ungovernability

While the red shirts are gaining traction with their political message of double standards in the judicial system, there is a more serious problem with looming ungovernability in Thailand.

When I first came to Thailand I was told that "only the stupid and the poor go to jail".

And while there are exceptions, this sharp summary of the Thai judicial system is apt.

There are judicial double standards currently being manipulated by Abhisit's disingenuous and ineffectual government and the powerful non-democratic powers which control Thailand, but the real problem is that there simply is not much 'rule of law' anyway.

While we might talk about the manipulation of the judiciary, corrupt police, or simply the scoff-law traits so prevalent in Thai society, the real problem is that major violent crimes conducted in the political arena are rarely, if ever, resolved.

The list is too long to be detailed but major events like the eight new year's eve bombings in 2006 which killed three and injured 38 or the attempted assassination of Sondhi Limthongkul have simply disappeared, like countless other cases, without resolution.

The key point is that political violence - if not simply violence in general - is not only rampant but exists virtually unchecked. Major violent crimes occur with startling frequency and are rarely, if ever, subject to the police arrest, trial, or conviction.

(This is not even mentioning the southern insurgency which will never, and I really do mean never, be resolved without an end to the judicial impunity exercised by state security forces.)

Take the case of M79 grenade launchers as the quintessential example. Not only have M79s been the weapon of choice for the last couple years in a string of unresolved attacks which have escalated in the last couple weeks but there is the more serious issue of M79 manufacturing.

Characteristic of the shambolic enforcement and judicial system, police raids in Ayutthaya and Samut Prakan provinces uncovered workshops producing literally thousands of M79 grenade launchers but failed to explain or resolve the very serious issues of the production of war weapons.

Also characteristic of Abhisit's military-dependent government, groundless and shrill accusations from sycophantic and mindless ministers quickly pointed towards the red shirt protesters as the destination of the M79s.

We should not underestimate what the accusations imply.

Should protesters be arming themselves with thousands of war weapons, the implication is clear. If thousands of weapons were being commissioned by opponents of the government it would mean that Thailand is at the cusp of a serious and bloody civil war.

But, what is more likely, is that Thailand's puppet government, non-democratic leaders, keystone cops, and incompetent judiciary have fostered a serious ungovernability crisis in Thailand.

The big question, and one hardly broached by the local media, was the more likely destination of a large scale commission of war weapons.

Burma would be a logical guess. The Wa and the Tatamadaw are are at it again and it is not exactly a leap of the imagination to think that locally manufactured weapons are being sold to the Wa or the myriad of ethnic separatist groups or drug gangs operating in Burma.

But, the most plausible explanation, is that the M79s were being manufactured for local consumption not for anti-government forces but for the unaccountable Thai military.

If the GT 200 scandal has taught us anything, it is that wildly uncontrolled military spending equals wildly uncontrolled military corruption.

Military corruption - as opposed to bottom-up police corruption - is a top-down process in which weapons procurement is a core source of ill-gotten revenue for Thailand's curiously wealthy generals.

Rumor is that the recent silence around the raids on the manufacture of M79s is not because the police 'investigation' led to the red shirts but because the military had spent x-billion baht on M79s supposedly manufactured abroad but had commissioned them locally (despite serious concerns over quality in which many simply can not be fired) in a standard-practice procurement scheme that would net top generals millions of baht.

And here we have the crux of ungovernability.

How can a state function properly when those supposedly upholding the state are slinging incendiary allegations of civil war to bolster their highly questionable legitimacy while turning a blind eye to blatant military corruption and allowing an already impotent police force to fail, again and again and again, to bring resolution to serious politically-inspired crime?

So, while the red shirts are gaining political capital pointing out a major deficiency in the Thai judicial system, the net result of a chronic lack of law and order means that the state can not accommodate political contestation and is stumbling forward, like an aging alcoholic, towards a crisis of ungovernability.

Photo of the Day: Showing support

On the Makwang Bridge last night (March 13) at about 6:10 PM. Large contingent of riot control troops standing guard in the heat when a chauffeured car pulls up and a well-to-do Bangkok resident hands out water for the troops.

Petition highlights hypocrisy

*All Photos Copyright*
One of the many boxes containing signatures petitioning the king to pardon Thaksin. This box, obviously, has 23, 168 signatures. Sanam Luang, July 31, 2009.

The Red Shirt's royal petition to pardon former PM Thaksin certainly seems to have the Establishment running scared.

The government has responded in Orwellian fashion and will host a TV program on NBT to "improve public understanding of the issue of a royal pardon for ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra" with the goal of informing people who "already signed in support of the petition could always withdraw their names once they have a better understanding".

While the government's awkward and fumbling efforts are reminiscent of recent moral panic campaigns aimed at karaoke bars and internet cafes or the simply bizarre MOSO campaign by the Internal Security Operations Command, the real problem is that it highlights the hypocrisy so ingrained in this Red vs. Yellow conflict.

Those who disingenuously preach that the king is above politics are the same people who draw power and use the throne to advance their own interests.

Aptly put by the Bangkok Pundit: "Needless to say the same people outraged today are the same ones who petitioned HM the King under Article 7 in 2006 to remove Thaksin. But of course that was a "good" petition unlike this one is "evil""

If some people can create a royal petition while others can not, one might ask; who does the palace really represent?

While it might be best to leave that as a rhetorical question to avoid running afoul of lese majeste laws, the Red's petition certainly does expose the fundamental hypocrisy that is a core problem in this conflict.


* Also, dont miss Nick Nostitz's post at New Mandala...simply great reporting!

When Proxies go to War

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Pro-Government supporters cheering Police General Salang Bunnag at Royal Plaza, October 22, 2008.

Retired police General Salang has been repeating his threats to oust the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protesters from Government House and with a strange twist.

From The Nation:

"Salang said he would seal off Government House to starve off the protesters, who would be denied supplies of food and water for three days.

He said friendly foreign countries have agreed to supply him with the weapons, which would be used in the operation that would not create any loss of lives.

He declined to name the foreign countries or the details of his operation to reclaim Government House from the protesters."

And what 'friendly foreign country' would actually supply weapons to a former police general?

None of course, that is nonsense.

But, in the same way that PAD's million-baht-a-day protest enjoys certain royal patronage, there are other interested stakeholders who would happily arm Salang's vigilante group.

Its not simply that Thailand is awash with weapons anyway or that it is unlikely a difficult thing for former police officer to have access to the state's armories or that small arms dealers feeding insurgent armies in Burma would happy to sell arms or that Cambodia's small arms markets could supply countless weapons or even, god forbid, those Chinese-made 'non-lethal' tear gas grenades that proved to be seriously lethal might find their way back into use but it is more likely that Salang will be armed from the pro-government camp.

And by pro-government, that could simply be the government itself.

Given that the floundering government has lost much legitimacy over the violence that erupted on October 7th it is unlikely that they would risk another confrontation.

But a proxy militia – either funded by the government itself or by a certain unmentionable faction of an unmentionable institution – could certainly be employed to go to war with PAD.

A Quick and Dirty Analysis of the PAD Conflict

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From a happier time at government house with the PAD protesters - September 2008.

The following is a quick and dirty analysis of the current crisis revolving around the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) using a 'presenting', 'proximate', and 'structural' framework.

The presenting problem; Protests.

The proximate factors, according to the United Nations, are "likely to contribute to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation, sometimes symptomatic of deeper problems." And, the following examples are taken from what the Thai public has expressed and I don't necessarily agree with all but they do provide the needed wide scope of issue that people feel are the problems.

In addition, it is useful to divide these into categories such as Political, Social, Economic, and Security yet some issues can be present in multiple categories.

The proximate political factors are:

• Resentment towards Thaksin
• Fears of a puppet government
• Debate of about the nature of democracy
• Dissatisfaction with people in power
• Constitutional amendment
• Political polarization
• Protecting the monarchy
  
• Protecting Thai political culture
• Political process dissatisfaction
• One vote, one person
• Dis/Reconstruction of the political system

The proximate social factors are:

• Resentment towards Thaksin
• Protecting the monarchy
• Political polarization
• Protecting Thai political culture
• Mistrust
• Mass media manipulation
  
• Aggressive mood

The proximate economic factors are:

• Corruption
• Economic stress
• Conflict of interests
• Feeling of economic insecurity
• One vote, one person

The proximate security factors are:

• Reprisals/Punishment/Treason
• Control of the mob
  
• Limited capacity for conflict in Thai society
  
• Mass media manipulation
  
• Protecting the monarchy
• Mistrust of security forces
  

The structural issues, according to the UN, are the "pervasive and long standing factors and differences that become built into the policies, structures and culture of a society and may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict." For this data, I have made extrapolated the deeper issues, from the proximate, that are driving this conflict.

Importantly, if a solution is to be reached, it essential to address the structural causes of conflict rather than the presenting or proximate issues in the conflict. If only changes are made to proximate issues then the conflict might momentarily deescalate but it will not go away. This factor, would also explain why the protests have been a reoccurring since 2004.

The structural social factors are:

• Polarized social classes of rich urban and poor rural
  
• Nepotism/corruption
• Conflict avoidance in Thai society rather than confrontation and resolution
  

The structural political factors are:

• Debate over democracy - manifest in PAD's inability to gain political power
  

The structural security factors are:

• Inconsistencies in the justice system
• Limited capacity for conflict mediation
  

The structural economic factors are:

• Economic disparity
• Corruption
  

What is essentially important here is that neither the dissolution of government or the acceptance of PAD's thoroughly anti-democratic idea of 'new politics' would help solve the crisis.

No matter what happens in over the coming days and weeks in Bangkok it will not resolve the conflict because the structural problems causing these protests have not been addressed and the cycle of protest and violence will continue.

Lèse majesté and Harry Nicolaides

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Rama 5 (King Chulalonkorn) statue worship near Government House.

Over at the New Mandala there is an important discussion about Thailand's draconion lèse majesté laws.

The article, written byAndrew Walker and Nicholas Farrelly, is well written, articulate and I post it here because of how important this issue is in Thai society.

The whole article can be read bellow or at New Mandala here.

In Thailand the legal system seeks to ensure that public comment about the monarchy can only be favourable. Under the lèse majesté provision of the criminal code, any action that insults or disrespects the royal family can bring a sentence of up to 15-years behind bars.

The most recent victim of this law is Melbourne man Harry Nicolaides, who has worked in Thailand as a university lecturer and freelance writer. He was arrested at Bangkok airport on 31 August 2008. As Nicolaides continues to languish in a Bangkok prison cell, the use and abuse of the lèse majesté law has received a modicum of worldwide scrutiny. However since 21 September, Nicolaides’ case has been completely out of the news.

He has been quietly forgotten.

Lèse majesté is a weapon used to defend the perceived honour of Thailand’s royal family. According to Paul Handley, the author of an unauthorised 2006 biography of the king, “[i]n Thailand, all that truly stands between royal virtue and London-tabloid-style media treatment is the lèse majesté statute.”

Since Handley’s controversial book–which is banned in Thailand–there have been a number of high-profile cases of lèse majesté involving foreigners. The two most recent instances where accusations have been levelled at non-Thais are illustrative of the problems with implementing this law.

In December 2006 Oliver Jufer was charged with the offence after defacing images of the king in Chiang Mai during a drunken spree. He was held for four months without bail, and after a quick trial was sentenced to ten years in prison. Jufer served another few weeks before he was pardoned by the king and deported to his native Switzerland.

At the time, outrage about his draconian treatment for an act of immature vandalism led to even more outlandish attacks on the Thai monarchy. There was a flurry of provocative and childish online protests that used the global reach of the YouTube video-sharing website to mock the Thai royals. In response, the Thai government banned YouTube. This sparked further international bemusement and condemnation. To conform to local expectations of fair comment, YouTube is today only available in Thailand in filtered form.

Since the Jufer fiasco, in April 2008 the BBC’s Bangkok correspondent Jonathan Head has been embroiled in a lèse majesté fight of his own. He has not been charged but is the subject of ongoing investigations. Head’s case is related to that of Jakrapob Penkair, an outspoken critic of military intervention in Thai politics and an eloquent ally of deposed former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Comments made to the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand during 2007 landed both men in trouble.

When only Thais are involved, lèse majesté does not get as much attention. But one case that has entranced the international press involved student activist and social critic, Chotisak Onsoong. Earlier this year he was charged with lèse majesté after refusing to stand during the playing of the king’s anthem at a Bangkok cinema. Almost unique among recent lèse majesté cases, Chotisak welcomed the charge with further acts of public defiance.

The view of the king himself on lèse majesté is not completely clear. In his 2005 birthday speech he cautioned against the over-exuberant use of this criminal provision. Nonetheless many factions within the Thai elite continue to indulge in episodes of lèse majesté accusation and counter-accusation to score political points.

The king’s formidable media management apparatus is apparently comfortable with this situation. While he may have some personal reservations, the king has yet to make any explicit recommendation that lèse majesté be abolished. Perhaps it remains too useful as a tool for stifling open public debate about the role of the royal family in national political and economic life. Lèse majesté helps guarantee an unrelenting public diet of positive royal news.

In Thailand, it is even hard to report the details of a lèse majesté charge without fear of sanction. Detailed reporting runs the risk of repeating the offence. Self-censorship reigns. So Harry Nicolaides will be unlikely to ever see substantial details about his case published in the Thai media.

Hopefully foreign journalists will exercise their greater freedom to report on his predicament. Some, including the BBC’s Jonathan Head, The Age’s Peter Gregory, Reuters, the Associated Press and Reporters Without Borders have already made important contributions. But for the past two weeks there has been silence.

All reports suggest that the charge relates to a passage in an obscure book published by Nicolaides that describes the rather flamboyant private life of a Thai prince. This may have been an error of judgement on Nicolaides’ part but it does not, in any way, justify his current treatment. Respect for other country’s legal systems is all very well. But this is a law that silences Thais and foreigners alike. It prevents what we would regard as perfectly normal, if somewhat prurient, reporting on royal lives. More importantly, it muzzles public discussion of a range of issues that lie at the heart of Thailand’s ongoing political crisis.

The Australian media could be doing more to highlight the plight of Nicolaides and to open up broader regional discussion on this outdated taboo.

'Nationalism is a Fiction: It Requires the Willing Suspension of Disbelief'

The above title quote is from an article called The Narcissim of Minor Difference by Michael Ignatieff.

And it seems rather apt here.

The following images are from a forwarded email that is making the rounds in Thailand.

It is titled "ประเทศไทย ช่วยกันส่งต่อให้มากๆ นะ" which translates roughly as: Help Thailand by forwarding this message.

The content is clear without the need to read Thai - Thailand was, and still is, in threat of being riped apart by rapacious colonial powers and neighbours.

And everyone wants a peice; the English, the French, the Chinese, the Burmese, and the Cambodians.

The timeliness of the message, in particular to the Preah Vihear temple dispute is clear.

But, to believe this nationalist nonsense, does require the suspension of disbelief. The series of images show an imaginary Thailand that nationalists belief once existed.

But it never did of course.

It was never a unified and demarcated territory until AFTER the colonial powers demarcated British Burma/Malay and French Indochine.

There was conquest and there were 'Thai' armies laying siege to other disparate kingdoms but it was never a demarcated territory as this nationalist propaganda suggests.

The main point in Ignatieff's article - which is focused on the war in the Balkans - is that "neighbours once ignorant of the very idea that they belong to opposing civilizations begin to think - and hate - in these terms; how they vilify and demonize people they once called friends; how, in short, the seeds of mutual paranoia are sown, grain by grain, on the soil of common life."

These maps are the seeds of growing nationalism, and the seeds of hate between neighbours who share a common land.

We Love Udon...So We Will Kill

*Warning* The first video is a little nasty as one PAD member seems to get set on by a pack "We Love Udon" animals. The police reaction is a case in point, the seem to do nothing.


Mob violence is really an ugly thing in Thailand.

As the following videos show, a group belligerent thugs calling themselves "We Love Udon" have decided to back up Samak's flailing government and physically put down a People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) protest. I believe two died in the incident.

I have no respect for PAD. Their view of 'democracy' would be comical if it wasn't so disturbingly anti-democratic. And their acerbic ultra-nationalism hatred is seriously dangerous and represents the very worst of type of nationalist poison that infects societies and directs them onto a path of violence against minorities, against political opposition, on other religions, and eventually violence that often turns on itself killing the same fools who instigated it.

So, although I dont really feel bad that PAD lunatics are getting beaten by other lunatics, I do worry about how the police failed to intervene. Peaceful protest is a cornerstone of democartic process and the police are supposed to maintain order.

Yet Thai police have two reactions to virtually all violent incidents. The first is to ignore the situation, allow it to grow out of control, and wait until people are injured or killed.

The other process is to unleash brutal violence on any one in their path.

As these videos show, Thailand's notoriously incompetent and corrupt police decided to watch the violence instead of stop it.

When a riot begins, they are the law and their duty is to protect the people - even if that means keeping two ignorant, hate fulled, and violent groups from slaughtering each other.