Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict

Black Hawk co-pilot looking out over over Yala province. November 2009.

Op-ed in the Bangkok Post - Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict on February 2, 2010:

The issue of autonomy has been steadily gaining interest and is now a serious consideration as a means of mitigating the long-running conflict in the southern border provinces.

The fact that a political solution is being openly debated is a positive step because, short of a Carthaginian Peace, there is no military option for solving an armed insurgency which rejects the legitimacy of the state.

Yet autonomy is not a magical solution to the complex problems fuelling the unrest in southern Thailand. Autonomy is subject to a number of complicated problems which could either derail the process or result in an autonomy agreement so watered down that any final agreement is void of any meaningful political powers.

Such complications raise the spectre of autonomy failing to address core grievances of unrest and could further strain relations between Bangkok and the southern border provinces.

While concerns don't totally negate autonomy, issues such as national political conflict, sovereignty, the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim community, the role of the international community, a weak judicial system, and the future of the Thai-Buddhist community are all issues which must be addressed should autonomy help bring a lasting peace to Thailand's troubled deep South.

A Unique Issue or a Symptom?

The most pressing issue, and indeed most soul-searching for the Thai nation, is whether the conflict in the southern border provinces is a unique issue specific to the region, or a symptom of a broader political ailment afflicting Thailand. The ethnic and religious cleavages in the Malay-Muslim provinces might be complicating factors, but at the heart of the problem is a broken relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled.

While a more extreme symptom in the border provinces, the same problematic relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled is reflected in the national political conflict. The struggle, simplified by the colour-coded street protests, might be fuelled by a myriad factors but at the heart of the struggle is the problematic issue of legitimacy for those in power. How this relates to the autonomy debate in the South rests upon the fundamental distinction of how to address the root cause of conflict.

If the apparently disparate conflicts in the southern border provinces and the national political turmoil are indeed symptoms of a broader political ailment afflicting the nation, then a special autonomy agreement fails to address the larger national illness while superficially treating the symptoms in the southern border provinces. This is obviously a complex issue but it is a consideration that must decide between a special autonomy arrangement for the symptoms in the southern border provinces, or the treatment of the political illness afflicting the nation.

A final consideration in this equation is the fact that the national political conflict has drawn Bangkok's focus away from addressing the southern crisis, which means that peace in Bangkok is a likely prerequisite for peace in the deep South.

Autonomy versus Sovereignty

The next issue will be for autonomy to dissociate itself from the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Autonomy is not synonymous with independence. Autonomy is only a political device that allows a distinct ethnic or social group to exercise political control over affairs of special concern to them, while maintaining the unity of the state and allowing the state to maintain political control over issues of common/national interest. But, as just demonstrated, autonomy has a clumsy definition and the distinction between autonomy and independence is often lost or purposely obfuscated by powerful opponents of autonomy.

Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Anupong Paojinda, recently did this in November 2009, when responding to Puea Thai chairman General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's suggestion of autonomy in the deep South by saying, "The insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area." For autonomy to gain more political momentum it is essential that the Thai nation not only understand what autonomy is, but also understand why it is necessary, how it has the potential to address local grievances and, most importantly, how it does not threaten Thailand's sovereignty.

Malay-Muslim Yearnings

Another pressing issue is the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim population. Due to the history of separatist struggle and the authority's subsequent heavy-handed reaction to the separatist challenge, there is a distinct lack of political voice emanating out of the southern border provinces.

Essentially, the distinction between legitimate political expression and violent separatism has been lost, which has prevented locals from openly expressing political opinions and airing their grievances for fear of being labelled a separatist.

While the gagging of political voice is a barrier to transforming violent struggle into legitimate non-violent political participation, a lack of political voice also complicates the drive towards autonomy because there are only a limited number of elites which claim to be the voice of the large and diverse community. This could result in an elite-driven autonomy agreement that might serve the few Malay-Muslim leaders who stand to be the primary beneficiaries of increased political devolution, but could fail to serve the majority of southern residents.

The distinct problem is that an elite-driven process could result in an agreement that divides the state's resources and position of political power amongst elites but fails to address local grievances and governance preferences, which would undermine the long-term peace that advocates of autonomy are hoping for.

While an elite-driven process is the more likely scenario, this process should also be accompanied by a detailed public opinion survey designed to reveal the political inclinations of southern citizens, to understand their concerns and grievances, and to infuse those issues into the details of an autonomy agreement.

International Dimension

Another consideration in the autonomy question will be the role of the international community. International assistance in helping Thailand resolve the southern insurgency has been fiercely resisted by both the government and the military. Yet the role of the international community should be re-evaluated.

The first stage in re-evaluating the role of the international community is to understand that a large intervention is not being called for. The type of international assistance that is more likely would be technical and academic, and designed to use shared experiences with utilising autonomy arrangements to address ethno-religious conflicts while maintaining a state's unity.

Countries like Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar experiences with creating autonomy-based solutions to separatist challenges and could provide considerable technical insight into process and design issues which would directly correlate with the durability and success of an autonomy agreement. Additionally, such countries also share the experience of being constitutional monarchies and understand how these institutions need not be negatively reflected upon.

Finally, the international community can provide assistance as a non-partisan negotiation facilitator that can provide considerable value in helping get stakeholders to the table, and build an equitable accommodation designed to address the diverse communities and address the multifaceted grievances fuelling unrest.

Judicial Challenges

Thailand's judicial system will be a problematic area for the future of an autonomy agreement. While Thailand has a well-established judicial system, there are concerns that partisanship in the judiciary could complicate a future agreement. Autonomy agreements are complex and require frequent negotiation between the centre and the autonomous zone. These negotiations can largely be adjudicated through the legal system should all parties have faith in the impartiality of the courts. Yet, since the resurgence of violence in 2004, there has not been a single prosecution of security forces for human rights abuses despite numerous allegations.

This lack of prosecution has been raised by some in the border provinces as an example of judicial inequality. The problem that this raises for the prospect of a future autonomy agreement is that the court's adjudication process is not understood by some stakeholders as a non-partisan venue for negotiating the adjustments needed between the centre and the autonomous zone. This raises the spectre of extra-judicial negotiations taking place in either non-transparent elite negotiations or through a return to violence.

Those designing an agreement need to be cognisant of the challenges posed by the country's democratic and legal systems. Importantly, the details of autonomy would need to be clear, have considerable support of the wide range of stakeholders, and would need to include guidelines for resolving conflicts and providing adjustments between Bangkok and the autonomous zone.

Thai-Buddhist Support

The issue of Thai-Buddhist citizens in the southern border provinces needs specific care in an autonomy agreement. This will not be easy but every effort must be made to accommodate their interests, ensure their democratic rights, and specifically ensure their safety. Tensions along ethno-religious lines have already resulted in a migration of Thai-Buddhists out of the three southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala and, in some instances, Thai-Buddhists have been violently driven out in what some experts claim is ethnic cleansing.

While human rights and safety issues are paramount, from the perspective of autonomy and the hope of establishing peace, the concerns of Thai-Buddhists need to be answered and included in the process of establishing peace through autonomy.

Ultimately, while autonomy is a complex process subject to a number of major pitfalls, the fact that autonomy is gaining increased interest is a positive step in the search for a much-needed political solution to the southern insurgency.

While it will be a major challenge for autonomy to gain the required support from national stakeholders, the larger challenge will be to construct a durable autonomy agreement that can strike a balance between the state and the complicated grievances fuelling unrest in the southern border provinces. This is not an impossible task, but it will require parties to be cognisant of the challenges, willing to compromise, and prepared to construct a highly detailed agreement.

What do Malay-Muslims really want?

* All images copyright *

Ramadan and the Central Mosque in Pattani City. August 26, 2009

The question of what Malay-Muslims really want is a serious blind spot in the southern insurgency.

Obviously, it would seem a critical issue to understand not only the grievances fueling the insurgency but to understand the political desires of the nearly two million Malay-Muslim citizens in the southern border provinces.

This is also of critical importance as the issue of autonomy has been a hotly contested political issue lately.

Yet no one can say, with any authority, what the residents there want.

This is in part because the Thai state fails to differentiate between the legitimate political expressions of grievance and separatism. For Thai authorities, Malay-Muslims expressing dissatisfaction with the government is the same as expressing support for separatism.

Because we dont really know that Malay-Muslims want, journalists, academics, and myself, tend to simplify this blind spot and cluster all Malay-Muslims into a homogeneous group.

This is obviously not accurate but serves as journalistic shorthand for a complex issue without easy answers.

As Jason Johnson writes in the Asia Times Online, this has:

"led to widespread misconceptions about the spiraling conflict, including that nearly all of the minority group harbor Patani Malay Muslim nationalist sentiment and resentment towards the Thai state".

In fact, Jason's article makes a number of interesting comments and particularly:

"As de facto spokespeople for the Patani Malay Muslim nation [Malay Muslim intellectuals], they tend to overstate the nationalist cares and concerns of ordinary Malay Muslims, frequently speaking about group pride in the ancient Kingdom of Patani, the Malay Muslims unique way of life, and the need for the Thai government to give greater recognition to this identity by, for instance, allowing some form of autonomy."

With the debate over autonomy brewing, it would be nice to know if a possible autonomy agreement would be serving the political aspirations of a majority of residents or whether it will be an elite driven process granted by Bangkok and solely serving the needs of a few Malay-Muslim elites and by separatists who would be major beneficiaries of increased political power.

Autonomy!

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*

Singing on the beach in Pattani province. August 2009.

There has been a growing interest in granting some form of autonomy to the Deep South as a means of mitigating unrest in the region.

Since the rise of violence in 2003, the Thai state under has failed, often miserably, in its counterinsurgency efforts.

Normally, heavy handed tactics by security forces backed up by inappropriate and even warmongering rhetoric by successive Prime Ministers has done nothing but add fuel to the southern fire.

Yet there has been growing discourse in Thai academic and political circles that has admitted the state's persistent failures and has understood that greater political participation through the devolution of state powers is needed to quell the violence.

While Thai discourse has favored terms like decentralization or administrative reform what is really being talked about is a form of autonomy.

This is, of course, not separatism but a means of granting locals in the Deep South more political participation so that they have basic decision making control over affairs such as education, religious practice, and development.

A brief summary of the rise of Thai political discourse on autonomy might have started as early as 2005 when the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was formulating their recommendations for fostering peace in the Deep South. Insiders speculate that autonomy was the core recommendation that former Prime Minister and NRC Chairman Anand Panyarachun was planning to suggest. But, a 'powerful stakeholder' commanded that autonomy not be recommended and it was dropped.

In February 2008 Chalerm Yubamrung, then serving as Interior Minister, launched a trial balloon suggesting that public hearings on the issue of Southern autonomy be conducted. While immediately slapped down by Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej, Chalerm claimed to have support from the governors of the southern provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun, Yala, and Songkhla in addition to the Southern Border Provinces Administration Centre (SBPAC) director Pranai Suwannarat

By June 2009, Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, while speaking on his weekly television program, had already floated the idea of turning Pattani, Narathiwat, and Yala into a “special administrative zone” while still being in line with the one and unitary state precondition established in the constitution.

And now, in response to Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak's suggestion that Thailand grant some form of autonomy to the Deep South, the Straits Times and Channel News Asia are reporting that Abhisit has considerably raised the bar:

"Thailand is supporting this approach but it's not an independent region. It does not contradict the constitution, but instead allows more public participation in the form of a local assembly," he told reporters."

Finally, and just after I called Abhisit's performance a failure, I must give him some praise.

This is just a small step in a long and evolving process of course, but it is an important and significant step towards a long term resolution to the conflict.

What will happen next will likely be a spirited attack by right wing nationalists.

If conservatives like Privy Council president Prem Tinsulanonda could not tolerate the idea of Pattani-Malayu (the dialect spoke by about two million Thai citizens in the Deep South) being a working language in the Deep South then he, and his intolerant brethren, will likely mount a fierce rebuke to autonomy.

The Royal Thai Army, which runs the Deep South like a fiefdom and basks in extraordinary state spending, will likely also strike back at Abhisit. This is serious. Abhisit's government is beholden to the military and, should they withdraw their backing, the government is on shaky ground.

And the ultra-nationalist lunatics that comprise the anti-democratic People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) will be furious. Their violent antics at Phrea Vihear could be replayed over any notion of special autonomy being granted in the Deep South.

Such a backlash could cause the government to considerably water down the details of autonomy.

And this is the real danger.

Autonomy as a means of mitigating conflict has the potential to address the core grievances in the Deep South that fuel unrest.

But a watered down autonomy agreement void of any meaningful devolution of powers reaffirms the fears and mistrust that many residents of the Deep South have in the Thai state.

It would also bolster the hawkish nationalists who would accuse the Deep South of not being cooperative and would lead to further calls for a military solution to the crisis.

And, as Abhisit and Panitan Wattanayakorn have been mulling over a Sri Lankan-type solution, it is not unfathomable to envision a different and very dangerous direction that the conflict could go if autonomy is not managed properly.