สมน้ำหน้า or น่าสงสาร?

Pro-Thaksin/Anti-Junta protesters at Sanam Luang on June 15th, 2007.


Thaksin Shinawatra’s political future has been dealt another serious blow with the Assets Examination Commission’s (AEC) decision to freeze his bank accounts pending a series of investigations into alleged corruption.

The decision, effective immediately, will place 21 bank accounts and approximately Bt 53 billion (US $1.6 billion) in suspension until the outcome of five separate charges are investigated.

The debate that the AEC decision will now inspire can be aptly summarized by two popular Thai phrases; สมน้ำหน้า and น่าสงสาร.

สมน้ำหน้า, or som nam nah, can roughly be translated as ‘it serves (someone) right’1 and there are bound to be thousands of people uttering the phrase with unrestrained glee as they hear of the AEC decision.

Thaksin’s tenure, in the eyes of numerous critics, was characterized by his habitual abuse of power and his obscene wealth is certainly fueling his critic’s anger.

The most notorious of allegations, and certainly instrumental in Thaksin’s overthrow, was the sale of his telcom giant, Shin Corp, to the Singapore based Temasek.

The deal netted Thaksin and his family Bt 73.3 billion and, much to the fury of the critics, went 100% untaxed.

Thaksin is accused of using his position as Prime Minister to manipulate tax laws in the transaction which suggests that his position as a political leader was more about advancing his own business interests than working for the betterment of the country.

For those in the som nam nah camp, the Junta has finally taken off their kid gloves and begun to dismantle Thaksin’s political/financial foundation.

Last week’s decision by the Constitutional Tribunal to disband Thai Rak Thai and ban Thaksin from politics for five years, coupled with the investigation by the AEC, are going to be serious, if not fatal, decisions for the future of the former Prime Minister.

For those saying som nam nah, Thaksin certainly had this coming and the decision by the AEC will be welcome, if not long overdue.

And then there is the other camp.

น่าสงสาร, or nah song san, is translated as ‘it’s a pity’ and the 10,000 plus demonstrators on the Bangkok streets venting anger at the Junta and waving pictures of Thaksin are certainly thinking this way.

For Thaksin’s supporters the AEC decision will be viewed as the further prosecution of their rightfully elected leader.

Thaksin’s popularity, particularly the rural poor who benefited from his 30 baht healthcare scheme, is undisputed.

His success, overwhelmingly proved at the polls, was not simply through populist policies but also orchestrated by his personal popularity.

The fact that he was Thailand’s richest business man seemingly holds no contradiction as self-professed champion of the rural poor.

Thai politics has always been plagued by corruption so why should rural voters, whom have been given unprecedented political attention and pro-poor policies, be fussed about corruption-as-usual?

Now that the AEC along with the Constitutional Tribunal, who were both created by the Junta, have implimented serious efforts to permanently remove Thaksin his supporters will certainly be saying nah song san for their former leader.

More importantly than expressing their pity will be the possibility that they will express their anger.

As previously stated, the streets are teeming with anti-junta/pro-Thaksin supporters and they could turn their sympathy for Thaksin into a serious expression of anger on the streets in the coming days and weeks.

Some, like the editor of the english language daily The Nation, Tulsathit Taptim, are even speculating that Thaksin could instigate a dangerous game of brinkmanship and attempt to start a full scale violent revolt against the Junta.

What the som nam nah and nah song san arguments reveal is how deeply polarized the country is over the former Prime Minister and in Thai politics in general.

The recent decisions against Thaksin, by both the AEC and the Constitutional Tribunal, look more likely to result in further political chaos in the short term than pave the way for national political reconciliation in the long term.

But there is one last group who don’t fall into either camp and their expression might be อะไรก็ได้ or arai ga dai.

Arai ga dai means something akin to ‘whatever’ and there will certainly be some Thais expressing this sentiment.

Bt 53 billion might seem like a lot of money but, as both critics and supports concede, it is widely assumed that Thaksin has transferred ample funds from the country and can live comfortable ‘whatever’ the outcome of the AEC investigation.

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1 สมน้ำหน้า or som nam nah is actually an idiom with a more abstract etymology than simply meaning 'serves (someone) right'. Som means appropriate, nam means water, and nah means face. The appropriate (som) word is literal but the water (nam) and face (nah) are not. I initially thought it meant tears but, in fact, it stems from an older - before the arrival of the mirror - concept. The water and face idea is actually an expression of gazing upon one's own face (told to me as looking into the water inside a freshly split coconut) in the reflection of water during a time of soul searching. So, som nam nah really means something like; the appropriate self refection of one who is faced with a conflict of their own creation. Either way of understanding it, it makes an endlessly comical statement when employed at the inconvenience of friends but it makes and even harsher attack upon one's enemy.

Chaturon Chaisang: Second Class Citizen

Chaturon Chaisaeng at the FCCT.

Khun Chaturon Chaisaeng, acting leader of the now dissolved Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party, greeted the assembled press at the Foreign Correspondents Club Thailand this evening with the opening remarks;

"Thank-you for allowing me to use my freedom of speech…one of the last freedoms I have left."

Although the general ban on political parties, which began after the September 19th coup d’etat, has recently been lifted, Chaturon and 110 other members of TRT have been banned by the Constitutional Court from politics for the next five years.

Yet beyond being banned from participation as a political candidate or even a member of a political party Chaturon and TRT seem to be at risk of losing their freedom of speech also.

T-ITV (formerly I-TV until the junta-installed-government decided that a television station not controlled by the military or government was a bad idea and launched questionable legal action and took over the station three months ago) was scheduled to interview Khun Chaturon for a new talk show until the office of the Prime Minister intervened.

A senior staff member with T-ITV informed me that the station was threatened by a government official who said "if they (reporters) interview someone we don’t like" the station’s staff salaries would not be paid.

Since the government take over three months ago the staff have not been paid.

The government has promised that next week the long overdue salaries would be paid but it seems that I-TV must self-censor its broadcasts if they plan to get paid and stay on air.

During Chaturon’s press conference he claimed that the coup and the recent Constitutional Tribunal’s decision are part of the same effort by the military to dismantle the enormous electoral power that TRT commands.

"One can not help thinking that it had all been planed" claimed Chaturon.

What the military establishment wanted all along was to disband the TRT and create a "weak coalition (between the) democrats and the military" claimed Chaturon.

If the junta was sincere about seeking a return to democracy then freedom of the press is essential and freedom for citizens, even those banned from political office, to speak is implicit.

Khun Chaturon is a banned political actor yet he is still an influential figure whose opinion could add to a healthy political discourse in a proper functioning democracy.

Yet, as the ongoing crisis demonstrates, Thailand is not only far from a functional democracy but also appears to be heading in the wrong direction.

Chaturon claimed that the junta was "determined to destroy us (TRT) from the beginning" and he might be right.

Many have questioned the Constitutional Tribunal’s black and white exoneration of the Democrats and the political assassination of the TRT.

Now, if the junta continues what appears to be the persecution of the TRT, they are at risk of permanently derailing a return to Thailand’s once fragile democracy.

Worse yet, by persecuting a political party with 16 million voters, the junta could create political martyrs that will certainly look to the future to exact their revenge.

Victors Justice = Dictators Justice

Although it is common knowledge that some protesters at the Anti-Junta Pro-Thaksin rallies are being paid ฿300 baht (about $10 usd) to attend, the enthusiastic support from many protesters seems genuine. The Thaksin supporter pictured here was crying during Thaksin's June 15 speech to supporters.


Thailand’s historical Constitutional Tribunal verdict has just been handed down and it appears that ‘justice’ was based upon the persuasive barrel-of-a-gun commanded by the military dictatorship rather than a step towards resolution to the political crisis.

The Democrat party escaped unharmed while the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was dealt a death sentence. TRT has been dissolved and their executives barred for five years in politics.

The legal debate whether the judgement was politically motivated will take time to emerge yet the immediate consequences are easier to understand.

The Democrats, whom have mustered a rather ineffectual opposition to the TRT, are now positioned to dominate a politically decimated election landscape. The newspapers are already hailing Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva as the next Prime Minister.

The future of the political juggernaut TRT, whom command upwards of 16 million voters, seems final.

The acting leader of TRT, Chaturon Chaisaeng, in an emotionally charged post-verdict statement, claimed that the decision was "unacceptable" and that "The country is now under a dictatorship."

He might have a point.

The junta has been singularly obsessed with erasing former Prime Minster Thaksin’s questionable legacy from Thai politics and the Tribunal’s ruling might be understood as the last nail in the TRT coffin.

Backing the Tribunal’s decision is the up-coming draft constitution. Replacing the popular 1997 ‘people’s constitution’ that the junta resigned to the rubbish bin when seizing power, has been described as decidedly ‘anti-Thaksin’ and a legal way of removing Thaksin and his TRT from political office.

So what about the backlash, particularly the TRT supporters?

That is what everyone is asking. Businesses are planning to close, people are talking about stalking up on food, and rumours that floods of TRT supporters are aiming for Bangkok are ripe.

Tomorrow will be a fresh, and possibly violent, day in Thai politics. A day in which the country’s most popular political party has been dissolved by a military dictatorship and the electorate will come out to express their anger.

Judgement Day

How will the military react to large scale angry street protests? No one is sure because, so far, they have been very small. Yet tomorrow's uncertainty could force the junta to act.

The only thing certain on the eve of Thailand's historic constitutional ruling is that it is a perfect recipe for chaos.

Tomorrow the Constitutional Tribunal will hand down its verdict on the conduct of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and Democrat parties in last April’s elections.

TRT is accused of fronting smaller parties in place of a legitimate opposition because most political parties had boycotted the elections. The Democrats, in turn, are accused of luring TRT into electoral fraud by encouraging small parties to accept TRT funds and fill the required opposition role.

Although shady elections are the norm rather than the exception the current crisis is threatening to see both the TRT and the Democrat parties disbanded and their executives barred from running for public office for five years.

The consequences of dismantling the country’s two main political parties is fraught with long term consequences but the short term consequences are what most are worried about now.

TRT alone has 16 million supporters and their reaction to a negative ruling has the very real potential to be expressed with violence.

Yet it isnt as one demensional as only TRT supporters as there are various factions with grievances to express. Anti-Coup protesters, whose strength and ferocity has been steadily growing, are likely to gain further support from the Tribunal ruling. The legitimacy of the junta is already weak but the dissolution or punishment of mainstream political parties is certain to bolster the numbers of protesters waving anti-coup placards.

Mixed into the equation is the consistent threat of politically motivated bomb attacks in the capital. Since the New Year’s Eve bombings there have been at least two more attacks and foreign embassies have been issuing near-monthly warnings that a new wave of attacks is immanent. Already, bomb squads are on the prowl around shopping centers, transportation hubs, political party headquarters, and the Constitutional Tribunal building.

Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s highly revered monarch, has already expressed his wishes that this political crisis will pass without bloodshed but his outlook was somewhat bleak. He warned the tribunal judges to "make a right interpretation (of the law) or the country will be doomed" yet he said that any decision they make will still result in heavy criticism.

One of the few leaders that might be able to scale down the potential violence is the former Prime Minister. Yet any plea for calm from Thaksin is unlikely. Although he is prone to populist rhetoric claiming love for his country he knows that blood in the streets does more to damage the image of the military than his TRT party.

In preparation for massive protests the Council for National Security (CNS) has deployed a 15,000 strong security force in strategic locations across Bangkok and setup road blocks in the provinces to stop protesters from entering the city.

On another front, the military has been deployed to TV and newspaper stations. Although initially it seemed to suggest a crackdown on the already restricted media it actually falls in line with the climate of coups. The soldiers are ‘guarding’ the media outlets in case a rouge faction of the military – obviously unhappy with the Tribunal’s decision NOT to dissolve TRT and/or the Democrats – decides to launch a fresh coup.

Although there is now way to know if violence will be ignited on the Bangkok streets tomorrow and what that chaos might actually mean for the country it could be a preferred outcome of some in the military.

The junta, when justifying last year's coup d’etat, claimed that they were duty bound to intervene because ‘unprecedented divisions in society’ would lead to prolonged political violence. If violence does erupt, the junta can use the same logic they used to seize power but this time to extend their time in power.

Initially, such a senario might seem a bit farfetched yet one worried reporter at Thailand’s T-ITV reminded me that the junta in Burma has been using that same excuse to remain in power since losing the general elections there back in 1990.

Tomorrow might just be a point in history that illumiates the true motives of those in power. The military has, since their coup, maintained that they will return power to the people. If the junta does not capitalize upon tomorrow’s expected chaos then they might actually be telling the truth about Thailand’s return to democracy.

The Climate of Coups

Troops reading the paper on top of their tank the morning after last year's coup. The newpaper's headline reads 'สนธิยืนยัน' or 'Sonthi Confirmed' meaning that General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was confirmed as coup leader.

Since the September 19th 2006 toppling of Prime Minister Thaksin there have been consistent rumours that another coup d’etat is looming.

The following is a typical scenario of how new coup predictions emerge.

On February 5th The Nation newspaper was reporting on the speculation of a new coup.

Troops from Thailand’s Second Army stationed in Nakhon Ratchasima were rumoured to be on their way to Bangkok under the orders of a rogue military commander and the Junta leader, General Sonthi, was in full denial mode.

A well connected academic from Mahidol University called me that evening and reported that General Sonthi was seeking to consolidate power and would launch a coup against the junta's own installed government.

Apparently that is a bit of a Thai tradition when it comes to coup history here.

Another phone call from an acquaintance at a European news agency casually asked if I had seen large numbers of troops or heard any gunfire or loud explosions.

My apartment happens to be near the Information and Communications Technology Ministry – which controls broadcast media capabilities – so the question was not that far-fetched.

The next day, a journalist from Thailand’s I-TV called and reported that the event was more of a 'coup-lite’ because infighting in the junta almost erupting into open hostility but either a power-sharing compromise or a barrel-of-a-gun compromise had been reached before actual fighting began.

Although most people seem to agree that something happened, no one is sure exactly what that something was.

Mixed into coup prognostications are ongoing bomb threats.

On April 11th the Canadian embassy sent sms messages (mobile phone text messages) to their nationals claiming that "Canadians should exercise caution and monitor local news due to reports of possible bombings in and around Bangkok between 11-17 April."

The New Year’s Eve bombings, despite convincing evidence pointing to insurgents in the deep south, are still being blamed upon ‘elements of the old regime’ so the threat of fresh bomb attacks further fuels the climate of political instability.

The latest coup rumor began yesterday evening with a phone call from an academic asking if I had ‘heard anything of another coup?’

To which I replied; ‘Just the usual rumors, what have you heard?’

‘I heard from a friend with police contacts who claims that between the 1st and the 5th of next month (May) the police will be keeping their families at home and preparing to retreat at the sight of large military movements. They (the police) are convinced something is about to happen.’

On the night of the last-year’s coup the police did, indeed, retreat from sight as they are closely aligned with the previous government so the rumor does contain some intriguing details.

So, once again, the forecast is suggesting a high probability of political turmoil and chances of a coup.

Whether another coup is imminent will only be answered over the next week but the consistency of the rumours is an undeniable reflection of the turbulent political climate and the lack of confidence in the junta.

Dogs Don’t Give Birth to Humans, Coups Don’t Give Birth to Democracy

Immediately after the September 19th coup d'etat a considerable number of foreign journalists and academics in Bangkok showered praise upon the new military leaders.

Thaksin’s divisive and failing policies coupled with his grotesque arrogance were too much for most and anything, even the strong arm of the military toppling a democratically elected government, was deemed preferable to his prolonged tenure.

One of the few initial, and rather vocal, voices opposing the junta was Professor Giles Ungpakorn of Chulalongkorn University.

About a week after the coup Giles gave a particularly spirited attack against the junta while it was still unfashionable to do so.

While Bangkok's residents were still lining up to have their pictures taken with the flower draped soldiers Giles was at the Foreign Correspondents Club Thailand reprimanding the assembled foreign media and pro-junta academics.

Supporters of the coup were ‘tank liberals’ he claimed and rhetorically questioned whether academics that supported the coup would “all burn their Comparative Politics books and scrap all courses on ‘democratization’ in favor of teaching military science and tank maintenance?”

Giles’ academic wrath has now been focused into valuable new book titled A Coup for the Rich – Thailand’s Political Crisis.

The book is certainly ‘hot of the press’ but it’s not exactly for sale. It seems that Thailand’s supposedly prestigious Chulalongkorn University has opted for self-censorship and the school’s bookstore will not be selling the book.

What makes the book particularly worth reading is both the fact that its banning reflects the pathetic state of press freedom in Thailand as well as its blunt and open critique of Thai politics.

Giles lashes insightful criticism on almost everyone. The military, the pu yai (upper class), and even the monarchy are fair game.

Such criticism is not just refreshing in a country where open political discussion is extremely curtailed but it is essential if Thailand is to solve the on-going political crisis.

What Giles does best though is bring a clever, spirited, and serious challenge to Thailand’s increasingly confined political space.

His unprecedented questioning of the monarchy is nothing short of breath-taking.

In a climate of fear where any rational questioning of the monarchy has the very real possibility of leading to a prison term it is important to have an academic brave enough to raise important issues that are essential elements to resolving Thailand’s political quagmire.

The book does have flaws though. Giles follows a rather strict socialist ideology that tends to lionize the poor as free from the bigoted villainy of the upper class. Unfortunately, humanity's capacity for bad behavior spans all classes so poverty doesn't automatically result in higher morals values as the book often suggests.

But such criticism is limited. Not only has Giles initiated essential political dialogue that Thailand is starving for, but he initiates dialogue with a comedic flare that is often absent in the academic world.

While scolding the international media for our lackadaisical challenge to military rule he gave a wily smile and reminded us that dogs don’t give birth to humans, should we expect coups to give birth to democracy?

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*As far as I know the only place to buy Giles' book is still from his office in the faculty of political science at Chulalongkorn. If anyone know's another source, please leave a comment and let us know.

The Coming Jihad

Muslims praying at the opening ceremony of a new mosque in Pattani province. 2006. (This photo is in no way supposed to suggest that the people pictured are in any way associated with violence or extremism)

Since Siam (Thailand) annexed the Sultanate of Patani (roughly the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) in 1902 there has been a constant rebellion against Thai rule.

The local population is comprised of Malay-Muslims and they have long resisted the efforts of Thai-Buddhist governments to control them.

A key characteristic of the resistance was the use of ethnic nationalism to fuel anti-government sentiment.

But the power that ethnic nationalism once harnessed has now ceded to a much more powerful fuel of rebellion. What is now fuelling the conflict is a virulent interpretation of Islam that is not just preaching a division between Thais and Malays but is preaching jihad.

Back in the 1970s insurgent groups like the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) ideologically oriented their struggle on a sense of being different from Thai, of being ethnic Malay.

In their struggle they either drew upon glorifying the old Sultanate of Patani to demand independence or looked across the border in an irredentist attempt to join Malaysia.

Yet recent incidents in the deep South reveal that religious extremism has now infiltrated the South and has replaced Malay ethno-nationalism.

The so called ‘Krue Sai’ incident in April 2004 was one of the first incidents that academics, politicians, and those watching the Southern rebellion were given a dramatic example of the new extremism.

105 Malay-Muslim youths died in coordinated attack on at least 10 military/police locations scattered across the three contested provinces.

In the aftermath of the clash a document called Jihad De Patani was found at the scene and it is a manual for jihad.

The document’s English name is Circle at Patani and it contains a vocabulary imported from the battlefields of holy war. For the first time in the Southern conflict the Thais are referred to as kafir (pronounced like ‘kafet’ in Thai) which is Arabic (كافر) for infidel or non-believer.

What had once been a conflict defined between ethnic Malays and ethnic Thais has transformed into a definition between religious groups. In addition to defining each opposing side in religious terms is the introduction of the term monafiq.

Monafiq is the English equivalent to hypocrite and is used to refer to Muslims who work with the kafir Thai.

Those Muslims that work with the Thai state have now been labelled as traitors to their faith.

Some might argue that the introduction of religious terms is inconsequential or a mere detail in a war but it should be noted that these terms have been employed in numerous jihads around the world.

In Afghanistan the Mujahadeen declared jihad against the kafir (Russians) and successfully beat a world superpower. The Mujahadeen are not exactly a home grown organization as much as they are a world-wide religious ideological organization that includes Malay-Muslims from Thailand's deep South.

As Dr Wattana of Prince of Songkla University explained it “I think the idea of jihad, of fighting back the kafet (kafir) is become so popular and powerful in explaining what happened to many problems of many Muslim countries.

So these Mujahadeen come back to Malaysia and Thailand and start their own war.” To such jihadists Patani is not Thailand but it is part of Darussalam - the land of Islam and the kafet Thais are invaders.

Now new ‘separatist’ organizations like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, (which is an Islamic offshoot of the aforementioned BRN) and theGerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP) which, like their name suggests is comprised of former Afghan veterans, are capitalizing upon the psychological power of winning a jihad against kafir like the Russians in Afghanistan. If Islamist fighters were successful in fighting the Russian kafir in Afghanistan then why won’t they be successful in Southern Thailand?

The trouble for Thailand is that the former inept bungling of the Thaksin government blamed Southern violence upon ‘common bandits’ until denying the reality of rebellion in late 2004 became an obvious and ridiculous lie.

Now, the current governing Junta would lose enormous credibility if they admitted that their efforts to stem the rebellion is actually a struggle against jihadists.

The first sign of the coming country-wide jihad were the nine coordinated New Years Eve bombings that shattered the 2006 celebrations in Bangkok.

The junta quickly tried to blame Thaksin's ousted supporters but politically-unbiased evidence clearly points to the South. Now Bangkok is on a daily ‘bomb threat’ alert.

The rebellion in the deep South is moving north but its not the same old rebellion of the past, now its jihad.

* Please note - Pattani spelled with two ‘T’s is a Thai government spelling while Patani with one ‘T’ is often associated with the way the name is spelled in the local Jawi language and sometimes an expression of sympathy with separatism. Each oranization's name is presented with their spelling while my own use follows the more common double T spelling but is not meant to demonstrate any political leaning.

A Land Apart - Documentary Film Trailer

For the past three years myself, and my film partner, have been working on a documentary film about the crisis in Southern Thailand. This is the trailer and the film, we hope, will be out within the year. Please keep in mind that it is a rough draft. The film's name 'A Land Apart' is also a working title so any recommendations for a film name would be appreciated.

The file is rather large so, depending upon your bandwidth, it could take some time to load.

Lost Lands

Young Muslim men attending the opening of a new mosque in Pattani's Yaring district. December 2006.

In Janruary 2007, the Junta's leader, General Sonthi Boonyarataklin, spoke to the local media and claimed that the military and government have access and control in all Thai territory.

He was responding to media suggestions that large portions of rural areas in the Deep Southern insurgent provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have become no-go areas for anyone associated with the Thai government.

There is limited truth to the General’s claim but, in reality, a crude form of autonomy has emerged in the Southern provinces.

What General Sonthi neglected to acknowledge is the fact that unless the military actually occupies a town or village with 100 or more combat troops they are not actually in control.

Soldiers and police officers have been the one consistent target of insurgent attacks and their freedom of movement has subsequently been curtailed.

The result has been a consistent retreat of government forces into heavily fortified bases and sandbagged police stations.

How such a retreat would look on a map of the Southern provinces might be similar to the appearance of islands in an ocean.

The islands would represent clusters of government forces and the vast ocean would represent territories that government forces can not travel unless moving en mass.

The large islands of government forces are congregated in the provincial capital cities of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and the lesser islands would be district capitals and the occasional rural military base.

It is in the vast ocean of rural countryside that the Thai state is no longer in control. As the state’s forces have retreated into their urban strongholds a basic form of autonomy has emerged in the countryside.

Sonthi is right to claim that the military can go where they want but, the problem is, they rarely do.

Some rural villages are now starting to experience years of self-rule. It is in such quasi-autonomous villages that insurgent fighters have adopted the position of authority abandoned by the state.

It is also in such quasi-autonomous villages that virulent interpretations of Islam, imported from such places as Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, are free to fester.

The pondocks (Islamic schools) that operate in the Deep Southern provinces are beyond the reach of government and religious officials so there is simply no accountability or control for schools that might be preaching hatred instead of Islam.

With the combination of separatist militants operating as village level authorities and the infiltration of radical Islam the hope that a foreseeable resolution to Southern violence will emerge is highly unlikely.

In fact, there are signs that the separatists are growing more confident.

Rumors have been circulating that one of the next acts of defiance won’t be a violent attack but will be the raising of the Islamic Republic of Pattani flag above the rural villages of the South.

To remove those flags, General Sonthi will have to dispatch combat troops to take the flags down.

But it won’t just be a couple of troops, it will have to be a major military offensive.

The Thin Line of Military Rule

It didn't take long for protests to form and test the limits of marshal law. The golden object at center on the top of Democracy Monument is a representation of Thailand's constitution. Protesters are particularly angry that the 1997 constitution was thrown out. Bangkok - 2006.

In the days and weeks following September 19, 2006, when the military deposed controversial Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there was a palpable sense of celebration in Bangkok.

Prior to the coup the country had been locked in a dangerous stalemate; many urban middle-class citizens despised the Prime Minister, yet he commanded enough support in the rural areas to remain in office.

Most analysts worried that the political divide, aggravated by Thaksin’s failure to either step-down or negotiate with the mounting opposition, would not just keep the country trapped in political limbo but would lead to serious and bloody clashes in the streets.

When General Sonthi Boonyaratglin’s tanks forced Thaksin from power many people celebrated because they felt that the stalemate had been broken without bloodshed, and were hopeful that the political crisis was over.

Thailand was in its coup d’etat honeymoon period.

Now that two months have passed, the optimistic honeymoon period is now giving way to a much more cynical mood.

The removal of the stalemate by military muscle has revealed itself to be a temporary solution. The “unprecedented divisions in society” that the Junta cited as their rationale for moving against the government may not be so easily healed.

Worse yet, the Junta’s foray into the political arena has created a host of new problems. In order to seize power the military trespassed upon democratic terrain, declared martial law, banned political gatherings, severely censored the media, and dissolved the popular 1997 constitution.

Removing Thaksin might have been popular at first, but once people realised that the “bloodless” coup d’etat had also delivered a serious blow to civil society and democracy, the political price of the coup increased dramatically.

The coup has also raised uncomfortable memories of military rule.

In the years 1971, 1973, and 1991 Thailand experienced violent struggles between supporters of civilian democratic rule and the military.

Those violent struggles have shaped Thailand’s political arena significantly. Clearly attempting to distance themselves from that history, one of the first statements made by the Junta (re-branded the Council for National Security), was that they would install an interim civilian government and hold elections within a year.

The appointment of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and his quasi-civilian government was seen as a good start, but one might argue that it is merely a token nod towards democracy.

The Junta has still reserved the right to dismiss the new government if they choose, so clearly power remains firmly in the military’s hands.

Anti-coup sentiment is already starting to appear on the streets of Bangkok.

The first act of direct defiance against martial law saw about 300 protesters gather around Democracy Monument to demand elections and the reinstatement of the 1997 constitution.

It was a cautious baby step as far as public dissent goes, but an important one nonetheless.

The huge anti-Thaksin protests that had rumbled around the capital before the coup might begin to trade in their old placards for anti-coup placards and return to the streets.

If this happens, the Junta will be faced with a damned if they do, damned if they don’t scenario. If they end martial law and allow protestors to gather, the numbers could swell into a dangerous challenge to the Junta’s authority.

If they quash the budding movement they will trigger historical comparisons to the brutal military regimes of the past.

There is one situation that the Junta could capitalize upon in order to retain public support. This revolves around their dramatic policy u-turn vis-a-vis the insurgency-racked Southern provinces.

Unlike Thaksin’s violent and wholly incompetent track record in the South, the Junta has pulled back the stick and extended an olive branch.

This should not come as a real surprise since General Sonthi was, before seizing power, the military commander in charge of pacifying the uprising.

He had also publicly quarrelled with Thaksin’s strategy but was bound by hierarchy to submit to the Prime Minister’s authority.

Now that Sonthi is in charge he might just be in a position to alter the course of the rebellion. This would be a monumental undertaking, however, since Thaksin’s antagonistic failures did not simply produce sympathy for the separatists, but has opened the door for real Islamic extremists, who may be intent on declaring jihad.

Despite the changing mood, the Junta might still survive their brief tenure with some popularity intact, but they are on very perilous ground.

If they can resuscitate the basic rights of the citizens, restore democracy, avoid negative historical comparisons with past military regimes, weather the challenges from civil society, and make positive changes in the increasingly bleak Southern rebellion, then they could earn a novel place in Thai political history.

But their chances for success are extremely low and there seem to be a number of pivotal forks in the road.

If, for example, the “unprecedented divisions in society” have not been healed after a year of military rule, would the Junta postpone elections? If such a delay did take place, or if any other hurdle scuttles the Junta’s exit plan, then the Junta’s reputation and governing term might quickly transform into a dictatorship.

As the Thai people are well-aware, such a dictatorship might have much darker prospects than Thaksin’s controversial tenure.