Sunday, March 14, 2010

Photo of the Day: Reds coming to Bangkok

From Sunday morning in Nonthaburi, reds coming into Bangkok.


The trip was slowed by security forces preventing boats from leaving and then only allowing one boat at a time to leave while only being half full.

At Rama 8 bridge, small navy boats forced them to dock and all reds had to get off. Still, they were not deterred and were in a triumphant mood.

While the government is trying to slow them down, I suspect it will be the weather that will ultimately wear them down.







Saturday, March 13, 2010

Photo of the Day: Reds massing




All photos taken Saturday March 13 from 12 noon until 7:30 PM.


The NSC has estimated that there are about 100,000.

If they continue to grow, they will be moving into historic highs for protesters on the streets.

Will it be a game changer? Will their be violence? Who knows, so many variables that there is no way to know.

Rumors circulating stated that at 9pm the so-called 'third hand' would launch some sort of attack which would justify marshal law and unleash the troops to clear the streets. But, there are always lots of rumors.

Either way, it is a combustible situation on the streets.





Photo of the Day: Showing support

On the Makwang Bridge last night (March 13) at about 6:10 PM. Large contingent of riot control troops standing guard in the heat when a chauffeured car pulls up and a well-to-do Bangkok resident hands out water for the troops.



Friday, February 19, 2010

Photo of the Day: Dowsing with the Fourth Army


For those following the GT 200 scandal and the military's continued use of the million-baht-coat-hanger, this photo might be amusing.


It is an actual dowsing rod from the Sufficiency Village training center across the road from the Sirindhorn base in Yala province and was being used to show local villagers how to find water. I guess they might as well have been looking for explosives.

Gen Pichet Wisaijorn is observing. November 2009.

Wednesday, February 3, 2010

Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict

Black Hawk co-pilot looking out over over Yala province. November 2009.


Op-ed in the Bangkok Post - Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict on February 2, 2010:

The issue of autonomy has been steadily gaining interest and is now a serious consideration as a means of mitigating the long-running conflict in the southern border provinces.

The fact that a political solution is being openly debated is a positive step because, short of a Carthaginian Peace, there is no military option for solving an armed insurgency which rejects the legitimacy of the state.

Yet autonomy is not a magical solution to the complex problems fuelling the unrest in southern Thailand. Autonomy is subject to a number of complicated problems which could either derail the process or result in an autonomy agreement so watered down that any final agreement is void of any meaningful political powers.

Such complications raise the spectre of autonomy failing to address core grievances of unrest and could further strain relations between Bangkok and the southern border provinces.

While concerns don't totally negate autonomy, issues such as national political conflict, sovereignty, the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim community, the role of the international community, a weak judicial system, and the future of the Thai-Buddhist community are all issues which must be addressed should autonomy help bring a lasting peace to Thailand's troubled deep South.

A Unique Issue or a Symptom?

The most pressing issue, and indeed most soul-searching for the Thai nation, is whether the conflict in the southern border provinces is a unique issue specific to the region, or a symptom of a broader political ailment afflicting Thailand. The ethnic and religious cleavages in the Malay-Muslim provinces might be complicating factors, but at the heart of the problem is a broken relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled.

While a more extreme symptom in the border provinces, the same problematic relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled is reflected in the national political conflict. The struggle, simplified by the colour-coded street protests, might be fuelled by a myriad factors but at the heart of the struggle is the problematic issue of legitimacy for those in power. How this relates to the autonomy debate in the South rests upon the fundamental distinction of how to address the root cause of conflict.

If the apparently disparate conflicts in the southern border provinces and the national political turmoil are indeed symptoms of a broader political ailment afflicting the nation, then a special autonomy agreement fails to address the larger national illness while superficially treating the symptoms in the southern border provinces. This is obviously a complex issue but it is a consideration that must decide between a special autonomy arrangement for the symptoms in the southern border provinces, or the treatment of the political illness afflicting the nation.

A final consideration in this equation is the fact that the national political conflict has drawn Bangkok's focus away from addressing the southern crisis, which means that peace in Bangkok is a likely prerequisite for peace in the deep South.

Autonomy versus Sovereignty

The next issue will be for autonomy to dissociate itself from the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Autonomy is not synonymous with independence. Autonomy is only a political device that allows a distinct ethnic or social group to exercise political control over affairs of special concern to them, while maintaining the unity of the state and allowing the state to maintain political control over issues of common/national interest. But, as just demonstrated, autonomy has a clumsy definition and the distinction between autonomy and independence is often lost or purposely obfuscated by powerful opponents of autonomy.

Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Anupong Paojinda, recently did this in November 2009, when responding to Puea Thai chairman General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's suggestion of autonomy in the deep South by saying, "The insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area." For autonomy to gain more political momentum it is essential that the Thai nation not only understand what autonomy is, but also understand why it is necessary, how it has the potential to address local grievances and, most importantly, how it does not threaten Thailand's sovereignty.

Malay-Muslim Yearnings

Another pressing issue is the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim population. Due to the history of separatist struggle and the authority's subsequent heavy-handed reaction to the separatist challenge, there is a distinct lack of political voice emanating out of the southern border provinces.

Essentially, the distinction between legitimate political expression and violent separatism has been lost, which has prevented locals from openly expressing political opinions and airing their grievances for fear of being labelled a separatist.

While the gagging of political voice is a barrier to transforming violent struggle into legitimate non-violent political participation, a lack of political voice also complicates the drive towards autonomy because there are only a limited number of elites which claim to be the voice of the large and diverse community. This could result in an elite-driven autonomy agreement that might serve the few Malay-Muslim leaders who stand to be the primary beneficiaries of increased political devolution, but could fail to serve the majority of southern residents.

The distinct problem is that an elite-driven process could result in an agreement that divides the state's resources and position of political power amongst elites but fails to address local grievances and governance preferences, which would undermine the long-term peace that advocates of autonomy are hoping for.

While an elite-driven process is the more likely scenario, this process should also be accompanied by a detailed public opinion survey designed to reveal the political inclinations of southern citizens, to understand their concerns and grievances, and to infuse those issues into the details of an autonomy agreement.

International Dimension

Another consideration in the autonomy question will be the role of the international community. International assistance in helping Thailand resolve the southern insurgency has been fiercely resisted by both the government and the military. Yet the role of the international community should be re-evaluated.

The first stage in re-evaluating the role of the international community is to understand that a large intervention is not being called for. The type of international assistance that is more likely would be technical and academic, and designed to use shared experiences with utilising autonomy arrangements to address ethno-religious conflicts while maintaining a state's unity.

Countries like Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar experiences with creating autonomy-based solutions to separatist challenges and could provide considerable technical insight into process and design issues which would directly correlate with the durability and success of an autonomy agreement. Additionally, such countries also share the experience of being constitutional monarchies and understand how these institutions need not be negatively reflected upon.

Finally, the international community can provide assistance as a non-partisan negotiation facilitator that can provide considerable value in helping get stakeholders to the table, and build an equitable accommodation designed to address the diverse communities and address the multifaceted grievances fuelling unrest.

Judicial Challenges

Thailand's judicial system will be a problematic area for the future of an autonomy agreement. While Thailand has a well-established judicial system, there are concerns that partisanship in the judiciary could complicate a future agreement. Autonomy agreements are complex and require frequent negotiation between the centre and the autonomous zone. These negotiations can largely be adjudicated through the legal system should all parties have faith in the impartiality of the courts. Yet, since the resurgence of violence in 2004, there has not been a single prosecution of security forces for human rights abuses despite numerous allegations.

This lack of prosecution has been raised by some in the border provinces as an example of judicial inequality. The problem that this raises for the prospect of a future autonomy agreement is that the court's adjudication process is not understood by some stakeholders as a non-partisan venue for negotiating the adjustments needed between the centre and the autonomous zone. This raises the spectre of extra-judicial negotiations taking place in either non-transparent elite negotiations or through a return to violence.

Those designing an agreement need to be cognisant of the challenges posed by the country's democratic and legal systems. Importantly, the details of autonomy would need to be clear, have considerable support of the wide range of stakeholders, and would need to include guidelines for resolving conflicts and providing adjustments between Bangkok and the autonomous zone.

Thai-Buddhist Support

The issue of Thai-Buddhist citizens in the southern border provinces needs specific care in an autonomy agreement. This will not be easy but every effort must be made to accommodate their interests, ensure their democratic rights, and specifically ensure their safety. Tensions along ethno-religious lines have already resulted in a migration of Thai-Buddhists out of the three southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala and, in some instances, Thai-Buddhists have been violently driven out in what some experts claim is ethnic cleansing.

While human rights and safety issues are paramount, from the perspective of autonomy and the hope of establishing peace, the concerns of Thai-Buddhists need to be answered and included in the process of establishing peace through autonomy.

Ultimately, while autonomy is a complex process subject to a number of major pitfalls, the fact that autonomy is gaining increased interest is a positive step in the search for a much-needed political solution to the southern insurgency.

While it will be a major challenge for autonomy to gain the required support from national stakeholders, the larger challenge will be to construct a durable autonomy agreement that can strike a balance between the state and the complicated grievances fuelling unrest in the southern border provinces. This is not an impossible task, but it will require parties to be cognisant of the challenges, willing to compromise, and prepared to construct a highly detailed agreement.

Sunday, January 17, 2010

The Daily Dose



From Voice TV comes an English language news show called the Daily Dose. I particularly like the show's lead story on an Asia Times story Reds ready to rumble in Thailand which they describe as:

"Reds ready to rumble in Thailand By Nelson Rand and Chandler Vandergrift in Atimes.com had some keen insights into the army's (sic).

These are several key phrases from the article which is worth a read.The military effectively suppressed April's UDD protest, but questions are emerging about possible cracks in the chain of command. While Thailand's military has long been factionalized along graduating class
lines, it is now also believed to be divided among competing units, according to experts."


Saturday, January 9, 2010

Negotiating with the Reds

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*
UDD leader Kwanchai Poipana at FM 97.50 radio station in Udon Thani.
Note the handgun on the table.



From the HD Centre comes an op-ed printed in the Malaysian Insider:

"Virtually unseen and certainly unexpected, a new threat is emerging in Asia - and it is not growing on the back of extremist religious dogma. Rather, the newest non-state armed groups battling governments in the name of justice and freedom draw on what was thought to be a dead ideology: Marxism
....

There is also a strong left-wing current humming through other popular opposition groups such as the Red Shirt movement in Thailand [National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship]. This movement may be built around support for ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, but it is led and inspired by intellectuals who cut their ideological teeth in the Thai Communist Party of the 1970s.

The good news is that while many governments baulk at engaging with Islamic extremist groups considered to be beyond the pale because of their ideological justification of violent acts that target innocent civilians, many of these left-wing groups have specific political demands that often stem from obvious social and economic deprivations or injustices. They resemble old-fashioned liberation movements or peasant uprisings. This suggests dialogue and negotiation can be effective tools for ending violence.

The bad news is that most governments, and some of the left-wing movements, remain stubbornly opposed to dialogue."

While Michael Vatikiotis' op-ed is a couple of weeks old it seems particularly apt to bring the topic of negotiations up while the tensions are rising for the Red's rally in Khao Yai Thiang.

There was talk of negotiations in the last few weeks but, if there were indeed efforts to arrange talks, these seem to have failed as neither side seemed to back away from demands.

As reported in the BKK Post, Thaksin's demands were:

"restoration of the 1997 constitution; a general election; a fair trial on all the cases against him, both those already judged and those pending; and, of course, the return of his legally acquired assets currently frozen by the government."

And the establishment responded:

"Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has made clear his government is ready to talk with Thaksin provided that the first returns to face his two-year jail term"

While Vatikiotis urged negotiate with the Reds on issues of "social and economic deprivations or injustices" it seems negotiations failed over a two-year jail sentence.

The topics of negotiation are unfortunate because the issues fueling social conflict are not exactly reflected in the topics being negotiated.

Thaksin's assets and jail sentence are somewhat irrelevant in context of the broader issue of a partisan judiciary.

And while an election and the 1997 constitution are significant, the bigger issue of legitimacy and the relationship between those who rule and those being ruled is being fought largely outside of the democratic arena. An election and a trusted constitution are essential, but extra-democratic means of exercising power is the issue which needs to be negotiated.

The failure of an elite-level negotiation is also unfortunate as tensions seem to be at the boiling point as reported by* the Asia Times in a story titled Reds ready to rumble in Thailand:

"While UDD leaders insist their campaign will be peaceful, they also indicate that their protest movement is near a breaking point over what they perceive as a series of non-democratic power grabs and partisan judicial decisions. "We fight through peaceful means," explained pro-UDD radio broadcaster Kwanchai, while suggestively placing a pistol on a nearby table. "But if the government uses force, we will fight back.""

* Note that this last quote tells the story of photo above meaning I am not exactly unbiased for using the Asia Times article.

Thursday, December 10, 2009

Photo of the Day: Constitution Day with the Reds





The Reds rallying at Democracy Monument on Constitution Day.

The Bangkok Post estimated a suspiciously low number of 5000 protesters while Red leaders were claiming 20,000.

If I had to guess, I would say at least 15,000 if not the full 20,000.

What is, unfortunately, not surprising is that the English language Thai media completely neglected to report on what was the rational for the protest.

While it is easier to draw the palace and pretend it is an affront to the King's over-compensating birthday celebrations that is not the case.

It is Constitution Day, and considering paramount issue of the military tearing up the 1997 constitution, there is a serious reason to protest on this day.

But, as the largely partisan Thai press is prone to do, they neglect reporting on the issue at hand and churn out either useless or biased stories that fail to inform readers what the issues at hand are and what BOTH sides are saying. God forbid they let the reader decide who is right are wrong.

Chai Yo!