Victors Justice = Dictators Justice

Although it is common knowledge that some protesters at the Anti-Junta Pro-Thaksin rallies are being paid ฿300 baht (about $10 usd) to attend, the enthusiastic support from many protesters seems genuine. The Thaksin supporter pictured here was crying during Thaksin's June 15 speech to supporters.


Thailand’s historical Constitutional Tribunal verdict has just been handed down and it appears that ‘justice’ was based upon the persuasive barrel-of-a-gun commanded by the military dictatorship rather than a step towards resolution to the political crisis.

The Democrat party escaped unharmed while the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party was dealt a death sentence. TRT has been dissolved and their executives barred for five years in politics.

The legal debate whether the judgement was politically motivated will take time to emerge yet the immediate consequences are easier to understand.

The Democrats, whom have mustered a rather ineffectual opposition to the TRT, are now positioned to dominate a politically decimated election landscape. The newspapers are already hailing Democrat leader Abhisit Vejjajiva as the next Prime Minister.

The future of the political juggernaut TRT, whom command upwards of 16 million voters, seems final.

The acting leader of TRT, Chaturon Chaisaeng, in an emotionally charged post-verdict statement, claimed that the decision was "unacceptable" and that "The country is now under a dictatorship."

He might have a point.

The junta has been singularly obsessed with erasing former Prime Minster Thaksin’s questionable legacy from Thai politics and the Tribunal’s ruling might be understood as the last nail in the TRT coffin.

Backing the Tribunal’s decision is the up-coming draft constitution. Replacing the popular 1997 ‘people’s constitution’ that the junta resigned to the rubbish bin when seizing power, has been described as decidedly ‘anti-Thaksin’ and a legal way of removing Thaksin and his TRT from political office.

So what about the backlash, particularly the TRT supporters?

That is what everyone is asking. Businesses are planning to close, people are talking about stalking up on food, and rumours that floods of TRT supporters are aiming for Bangkok are ripe.

Tomorrow will be a fresh, and possibly violent, day in Thai politics. A day in which the country’s most popular political party has been dissolved by a military dictatorship and the electorate will come out to express their anger.

Judgement Day

How will the military react to large scale angry street protests? No one is sure because, so far, they have been very small. Yet tomorrow's uncertainty could force the junta to act.

The only thing certain on the eve of Thailand's historic constitutional ruling is that it is a perfect recipe for chaos.

Tomorrow the Constitutional Tribunal will hand down its verdict on the conduct of the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) and Democrat parties in last April’s elections.

TRT is accused of fronting smaller parties in place of a legitimate opposition because most political parties had boycotted the elections. The Democrats, in turn, are accused of luring TRT into electoral fraud by encouraging small parties to accept TRT funds and fill the required opposition role.

Although shady elections are the norm rather than the exception the current crisis is threatening to see both the TRT and the Democrat parties disbanded and their executives barred from running for public office for five years.

The consequences of dismantling the country’s two main political parties is fraught with long term consequences but the short term consequences are what most are worried about now.

TRT alone has 16 million supporters and their reaction to a negative ruling has the very real potential to be expressed with violence.

Yet it isnt as one demensional as only TRT supporters as there are various factions with grievances to express. Anti-Coup protesters, whose strength and ferocity has been steadily growing, are likely to gain further support from the Tribunal ruling. The legitimacy of the junta is already weak but the dissolution or punishment of mainstream political parties is certain to bolster the numbers of protesters waving anti-coup placards.

Mixed into the equation is the consistent threat of politically motivated bomb attacks in the capital. Since the New Year’s Eve bombings there have been at least two more attacks and foreign embassies have been issuing near-monthly warnings that a new wave of attacks is immanent. Already, bomb squads are on the prowl around shopping centers, transportation hubs, political party headquarters, and the Constitutional Tribunal building.

Bhumibol Adulyadej, the country’s highly revered monarch, has already expressed his wishes that this political crisis will pass without bloodshed but his outlook was somewhat bleak. He warned the tribunal judges to "make a right interpretation (of the law) or the country will be doomed" yet he said that any decision they make will still result in heavy criticism.

One of the few leaders that might be able to scale down the potential violence is the former Prime Minister. Yet any plea for calm from Thaksin is unlikely. Although he is prone to populist rhetoric claiming love for his country he knows that blood in the streets does more to damage the image of the military than his TRT party.

In preparation for massive protests the Council for National Security (CNS) has deployed a 15,000 strong security force in strategic locations across Bangkok and setup road blocks in the provinces to stop protesters from entering the city.

On another front, the military has been deployed to TV and newspaper stations. Although initially it seemed to suggest a crackdown on the already restricted media it actually falls in line with the climate of coups. The soldiers are ‘guarding’ the media outlets in case a rouge faction of the military – obviously unhappy with the Tribunal’s decision NOT to dissolve TRT and/or the Democrats – decides to launch a fresh coup.

Although there is now way to know if violence will be ignited on the Bangkok streets tomorrow and what that chaos might actually mean for the country it could be a preferred outcome of some in the military.

The junta, when justifying last year's coup d’etat, claimed that they were duty bound to intervene because ‘unprecedented divisions in society’ would lead to prolonged political violence. If violence does erupt, the junta can use the same logic they used to seize power but this time to extend their time in power.

Initially, such a senario might seem a bit farfetched yet one worried reporter at Thailand’s T-ITV reminded me that the junta in Burma has been using that same excuse to remain in power since losing the general elections there back in 1990.

Tomorrow might just be a point in history that illumiates the true motives of those in power. The military has, since their coup, maintained that they will return power to the people. If the junta does not capitalize upon tomorrow’s expected chaos then they might actually be telling the truth about Thailand’s return to democracy.

The Climate of Coups

Troops reading the paper on top of their tank the morning after last year's coup. The newpaper's headline reads 'สนธิยืนยัน' or 'Sonthi Confirmed' meaning that General Sonthi Boonyaratglin was confirmed as coup leader.

Since the September 19th 2006 toppling of Prime Minister Thaksin there have been consistent rumours that another coup d’etat is looming.

The following is a typical scenario of how new coup predictions emerge.

On February 5th The Nation newspaper was reporting on the speculation of a new coup.

Troops from Thailand’s Second Army stationed in Nakhon Ratchasima were rumoured to be on their way to Bangkok under the orders of a rogue military commander and the Junta leader, General Sonthi, was in full denial mode.

A well connected academic from Mahidol University called me that evening and reported that General Sonthi was seeking to consolidate power and would launch a coup against the junta's own installed government.

Apparently that is a bit of a Thai tradition when it comes to coup history here.

Another phone call from an acquaintance at a European news agency casually asked if I had seen large numbers of troops or heard any gunfire or loud explosions.

My apartment happens to be near the Information and Communications Technology Ministry – which controls broadcast media capabilities – so the question was not that far-fetched.

The next day, a journalist from Thailand’s I-TV called and reported that the event was more of a 'coup-lite’ because infighting in the junta almost erupting into open hostility but either a power-sharing compromise or a barrel-of-a-gun compromise had been reached before actual fighting began.

Although most people seem to agree that something happened, no one is sure exactly what that something was.

Mixed into coup prognostications are ongoing bomb threats.

On April 11th the Canadian embassy sent sms messages (mobile phone text messages) to their nationals claiming that "Canadians should exercise caution and monitor local news due to reports of possible bombings in and around Bangkok between 11-17 April."

The New Year’s Eve bombings, despite convincing evidence pointing to insurgents in the deep south, are still being blamed upon ‘elements of the old regime’ so the threat of fresh bomb attacks further fuels the climate of political instability.

The latest coup rumor began yesterday evening with a phone call from an academic asking if I had ‘heard anything of another coup?’

To which I replied; ‘Just the usual rumors, what have you heard?’

‘I heard from a friend with police contacts who claims that between the 1st and the 5th of next month (May) the police will be keeping their families at home and preparing to retreat at the sight of large military movements. They (the police) are convinced something is about to happen.’

On the night of the last-year’s coup the police did, indeed, retreat from sight as they are closely aligned with the previous government so the rumor does contain some intriguing details.

So, once again, the forecast is suggesting a high probability of political turmoil and chances of a coup.

Whether another coup is imminent will only be answered over the next week but the consistency of the rumours is an undeniable reflection of the turbulent political climate and the lack of confidence in the junta.

Dogs Don’t Give Birth to Humans, Coups Don’t Give Birth to Democracy

Immediately after the September 19th coup d'etat a considerable number of foreign journalists and academics in Bangkok showered praise upon the new military leaders.

Thaksin’s divisive and failing policies coupled with his grotesque arrogance were too much for most and anything, even the strong arm of the military toppling a democratically elected government, was deemed preferable to his prolonged tenure.

One of the few initial, and rather vocal, voices opposing the junta was Professor Giles Ungpakorn of Chulalongkorn University.

About a week after the coup Giles gave a particularly spirited attack against the junta while it was still unfashionable to do so.

While Bangkok's residents were still lining up to have their pictures taken with the flower draped soldiers Giles was at the Foreign Correspondents Club Thailand reprimanding the assembled foreign media and pro-junta academics.

Supporters of the coup were ‘tank liberals’ he claimed and rhetorically questioned whether academics that supported the coup would “all burn their Comparative Politics books and scrap all courses on ‘democratization’ in favor of teaching military science and tank maintenance?”

Giles’ academic wrath has now been focused into valuable new book titled A Coup for the Rich – Thailand’s Political Crisis.

The book is certainly ‘hot of the press’ but it’s not exactly for sale. It seems that Thailand’s supposedly prestigious Chulalongkorn University has opted for self-censorship and the school’s bookstore will not be selling the book.

What makes the book particularly worth reading is both the fact that its banning reflects the pathetic state of press freedom in Thailand as well as its blunt and open critique of Thai politics.

Giles lashes insightful criticism on almost everyone. The military, the pu yai (upper class), and even the monarchy are fair game.

Such criticism is not just refreshing in a country where open political discussion is extremely curtailed but it is essential if Thailand is to solve the on-going political crisis.

What Giles does best though is bring a clever, spirited, and serious challenge to Thailand’s increasingly confined political space.

His unprecedented questioning of the monarchy is nothing short of breath-taking.

In a climate of fear where any rational questioning of the monarchy has the very real possibility of leading to a prison term it is important to have an academic brave enough to raise important issues that are essential elements to resolving Thailand’s political quagmire.

The book does have flaws though. Giles follows a rather strict socialist ideology that tends to lionize the poor as free from the bigoted villainy of the upper class. Unfortunately, humanity's capacity for bad behavior spans all classes so poverty doesn't automatically result in higher morals values as the book often suggests.

But such criticism is limited. Not only has Giles initiated essential political dialogue that Thailand is starving for, but he initiates dialogue with a comedic flare that is often absent in the academic world.

While scolding the international media for our lackadaisical challenge to military rule he gave a wily smile and reminded us that dogs don’t give birth to humans, should we expect coups to give birth to democracy?

_________________________________

*As far as I know the only place to buy Giles' book is still from his office in the faculty of political science at Chulalongkorn. If anyone know's another source, please leave a comment and let us know.

The Coming Jihad

Muslims praying at the opening ceremony of a new mosque in Pattani province. 2006. (This photo is in no way supposed to suggest that the people pictured are in any way associated with violence or extremism)

Since Siam (Thailand) annexed the Sultanate of Patani (roughly the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat) in 1902 there has been a constant rebellion against Thai rule.

The local population is comprised of Malay-Muslims and they have long resisted the efforts of Thai-Buddhist governments to control them.

A key characteristic of the resistance was the use of ethnic nationalism to fuel anti-government sentiment.

But the power that ethnic nationalism once harnessed has now ceded to a much more powerful fuel of rebellion. What is now fuelling the conflict is a virulent interpretation of Islam that is not just preaching a division between Thais and Malays but is preaching jihad.

Back in the 1970s insurgent groups like the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN) ideologically oriented their struggle on a sense of being different from Thai, of being ethnic Malay.

In their struggle they either drew upon glorifying the old Sultanate of Patani to demand independence or looked across the border in an irredentist attempt to join Malaysia.

Yet recent incidents in the deep South reveal that religious extremism has now infiltrated the South and has replaced Malay ethno-nationalism.

The so called ‘Krue Sai’ incident in April 2004 was one of the first incidents that academics, politicians, and those watching the Southern rebellion were given a dramatic example of the new extremism.

105 Malay-Muslim youths died in coordinated attack on at least 10 military/police locations scattered across the three contested provinces.

In the aftermath of the clash a document called Jihad De Patani was found at the scene and it is a manual for jihad.

The document’s English name is Circle at Patani and it contains a vocabulary imported from the battlefields of holy war. For the first time in the Southern conflict the Thais are referred to as kafir (pronounced like ‘kafet’ in Thai) which is Arabic (كافر) for infidel or non-believer.

What had once been a conflict defined between ethnic Malays and ethnic Thais has transformed into a definition between religious groups. In addition to defining each opposing side in religious terms is the introduction of the term monafiq.

Monafiq is the English equivalent to hypocrite and is used to refer to Muslims who work with the kafir Thai.

Those Muslims that work with the Thai state have now been labelled as traitors to their faith.

Some might argue that the introduction of religious terms is inconsequential or a mere detail in a war but it should be noted that these terms have been employed in numerous jihads around the world.

In Afghanistan the Mujahadeen declared jihad against the kafir (Russians) and successfully beat a world superpower. The Mujahadeen are not exactly a home grown organization as much as they are a world-wide religious ideological organization that includes Malay-Muslims from Thailand's deep South.

As Dr Wattana of Prince of Songkla University explained it “I think the idea of jihad, of fighting back the kafet (kafir) is become so popular and powerful in explaining what happened to many problems of many Muslim countries.

So these Mujahadeen come back to Malaysia and Thailand and start their own war.” To such jihadists Patani is not Thailand but it is part of Darussalam - the land of Islam and the kafet Thais are invaders.

Now new ‘separatist’ organizations like the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Koordinasi, (which is an Islamic offshoot of the aforementioned BRN) and theGerakan Mujahideen Islami Pattani (GMIP) which, like their name suggests is comprised of former Afghan veterans, are capitalizing upon the psychological power of winning a jihad against kafir like the Russians in Afghanistan. If Islamist fighters were successful in fighting the Russian kafir in Afghanistan then why won’t they be successful in Southern Thailand?

The trouble for Thailand is that the former inept bungling of the Thaksin government blamed Southern violence upon ‘common bandits’ until denying the reality of rebellion in late 2004 became an obvious and ridiculous lie.

Now, the current governing Junta would lose enormous credibility if they admitted that their efforts to stem the rebellion is actually a struggle against jihadists.

The first sign of the coming country-wide jihad were the nine coordinated New Years Eve bombings that shattered the 2006 celebrations in Bangkok.

The junta quickly tried to blame Thaksin's ousted supporters but politically-unbiased evidence clearly points to the South. Now Bangkok is on a daily ‘bomb threat’ alert.

The rebellion in the deep South is moving north but its not the same old rebellion of the past, now its jihad.

* Please note - Pattani spelled with two ‘T’s is a Thai government spelling while Patani with one ‘T’ is often associated with the way the name is spelled in the local Jawi language and sometimes an expression of sympathy with separatism. Each oranization's name is presented with their spelling while my own use follows the more common double T spelling but is not meant to demonstrate any political leaning.

A Land Apart - Documentary Film Trailer

For the past three years myself, and my film partner, have been working on a documentary film about the crisis in Southern Thailand. This is the trailer and the film, we hope, will be out within the year. Please keep in mind that it is a rough draft. The film's name 'A Land Apart' is also a working title so any recommendations for a film name would be appreciated.

The file is rather large so, depending upon your bandwidth, it could take some time to load.

Lost Lands

Young Muslim men attending the opening of a new mosque in Pattani's Yaring district. December 2006.

In Janruary 2007, the Junta's leader, General Sonthi Boonyarataklin, spoke to the local media and claimed that the military and government have access and control in all Thai territory.

He was responding to media suggestions that large portions of rural areas in the Deep Southern insurgent provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat have become no-go areas for anyone associated with the Thai government.

There is limited truth to the General’s claim but, in reality, a crude form of autonomy has emerged in the Southern provinces.

What General Sonthi neglected to acknowledge is the fact that unless the military actually occupies a town or village with 100 or more combat troops they are not actually in control.

Soldiers and police officers have been the one consistent target of insurgent attacks and their freedom of movement has subsequently been curtailed.

The result has been a consistent retreat of government forces into heavily fortified bases and sandbagged police stations.

How such a retreat would look on a map of the Southern provinces might be similar to the appearance of islands in an ocean.

The islands would represent clusters of government forces and the vast ocean would represent territories that government forces can not travel unless moving en mass.

The large islands of government forces are congregated in the provincial capital cities of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat and the lesser islands would be district capitals and the occasional rural military base.

It is in the vast ocean of rural countryside that the Thai state is no longer in control. As the state’s forces have retreated into their urban strongholds a basic form of autonomy has emerged in the countryside.

Sonthi is right to claim that the military can go where they want but, the problem is, they rarely do.

Some rural villages are now starting to experience years of self-rule. It is in such quasi-autonomous villages that insurgent fighters have adopted the position of authority abandoned by the state.

It is also in such quasi-autonomous villages that virulent interpretations of Islam, imported from such places as Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, are free to fester.

The pondocks (Islamic schools) that operate in the Deep Southern provinces are beyond the reach of government and religious officials so there is simply no accountability or control for schools that might be preaching hatred instead of Islam.

With the combination of separatist militants operating as village level authorities and the infiltration of radical Islam the hope that a foreseeable resolution to Southern violence will emerge is highly unlikely.

In fact, there are signs that the separatists are growing more confident.

Rumors have been circulating that one of the next acts of defiance won’t be a violent attack but will be the raising of the Islamic Republic of Pattani flag above the rural villages of the South.

To remove those flags, General Sonthi will have to dispatch combat troops to take the flags down.

But it won’t just be a couple of troops, it will have to be a major military offensive.

The Thin Line of Military Rule

It didn't take long for protests to form and test the limits of marshal law. The golden object at center on the top of Democracy Monument is a representation of Thailand's constitution. Protesters are particularly angry that the 1997 constitution was thrown out. Bangkok - 2006.

In the days and weeks following September 19, 2006, when the military deposed controversial Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, there was a palpable sense of celebration in Bangkok.

Prior to the coup the country had been locked in a dangerous stalemate; many urban middle-class citizens despised the Prime Minister, yet he commanded enough support in the rural areas to remain in office.

Most analysts worried that the political divide, aggravated by Thaksin’s failure to either step-down or negotiate with the mounting opposition, would not just keep the country trapped in political limbo but would lead to serious and bloody clashes in the streets.

When General Sonthi Boonyaratglin’s tanks forced Thaksin from power many people celebrated because they felt that the stalemate had been broken without bloodshed, and were hopeful that the political crisis was over.

Thailand was in its coup d’etat honeymoon period.

Now that two months have passed, the optimistic honeymoon period is now giving way to a much more cynical mood.

The removal of the stalemate by military muscle has revealed itself to be a temporary solution. The “unprecedented divisions in society” that the Junta cited as their rationale for moving against the government may not be so easily healed.

Worse yet, the Junta’s foray into the political arena has created a host of new problems. In order to seize power the military trespassed upon democratic terrain, declared martial law, banned political gatherings, severely censored the media, and dissolved the popular 1997 constitution.

Removing Thaksin might have been popular at first, but once people realised that the “bloodless” coup d’etat had also delivered a serious blow to civil society and democracy, the political price of the coup increased dramatically.

The coup has also raised uncomfortable memories of military rule.

In the years 1971, 1973, and 1991 Thailand experienced violent struggles between supporters of civilian democratic rule and the military.

Those violent struggles have shaped Thailand’s political arena significantly. Clearly attempting to distance themselves from that history, one of the first statements made by the Junta (re-branded the Council for National Security), was that they would install an interim civilian government and hold elections within a year.

The appointment of Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont and his quasi-civilian government was seen as a good start, but one might argue that it is merely a token nod towards democracy.

The Junta has still reserved the right to dismiss the new government if they choose, so clearly power remains firmly in the military’s hands.

Anti-coup sentiment is already starting to appear on the streets of Bangkok.

The first act of direct defiance against martial law saw about 300 protesters gather around Democracy Monument to demand elections and the reinstatement of the 1997 constitution.

It was a cautious baby step as far as public dissent goes, but an important one nonetheless.

The huge anti-Thaksin protests that had rumbled around the capital before the coup might begin to trade in their old placards for anti-coup placards and return to the streets.

If this happens, the Junta will be faced with a damned if they do, damned if they don’t scenario. If they end martial law and allow protestors to gather, the numbers could swell into a dangerous challenge to the Junta’s authority.

If they quash the budding movement they will trigger historical comparisons to the brutal military regimes of the past.

There is one situation that the Junta could capitalize upon in order to retain public support. This revolves around their dramatic policy u-turn vis-a-vis the insurgency-racked Southern provinces.

Unlike Thaksin’s violent and wholly incompetent track record in the South, the Junta has pulled back the stick and extended an olive branch.

This should not come as a real surprise since General Sonthi was, before seizing power, the military commander in charge of pacifying the uprising.

He had also publicly quarrelled with Thaksin’s strategy but was bound by hierarchy to submit to the Prime Minister’s authority.

Now that Sonthi is in charge he might just be in a position to alter the course of the rebellion. This would be a monumental undertaking, however, since Thaksin’s antagonistic failures did not simply produce sympathy for the separatists, but has opened the door for real Islamic extremists, who may be intent on declaring jihad.

Despite the changing mood, the Junta might still survive their brief tenure with some popularity intact, but they are on very perilous ground.

If they can resuscitate the basic rights of the citizens, restore democracy, avoid negative historical comparisons with past military regimes, weather the challenges from civil society, and make positive changes in the increasingly bleak Southern rebellion, then they could earn a novel place in Thai political history.

But their chances for success are extremely low and there seem to be a number of pivotal forks in the road.

If, for example, the “unprecedented divisions in society” have not been healed after a year of military rule, would the Junta postpone elections? If such a delay did take place, or if any other hurdle scuttles the Junta’s exit plan, then the Junta’s reputation and governing term might quickly transform into a dictatorship.

As the Thai people are well-aware, such a dictatorship might have much darker prospects than Thaksin’s controversial tenure.

The ‘Thai body’ and its Periphery

Burmese citizens, huddled together on a rubber inner tube, illegally crossing the Moei River that separates Thailand from Burma. Mai Sot, Thailand/Myawadi, Burma - 2005.

At 8 am and 6 pm the national anthem can be heard across Thailand.

In schools children sing it, television and radio stations dutifully broadcast it, loud speakers mounted upon telephone poles in cities and villages cackle with it, and everyone within the state – even at its very edges and whether citizen or not – are expected to stop what they are doing, stand-up, and wait respectfully until the song ends.

Thailand is the unity of Thai blood and body.
The whole country belongs to the Thai people, maintaining thus far for the Thai.
All Thais intend to unite together.
Thais love peace but do not fear to fight.
They will never let anyone threaten their independence.
They will sacrifice every drop of their blood to contribute to the nation.
They will sacrifice every drop of their blood to contribute to the nation.
CHAI YO. [Cheers].

The national anthem, like the border containing the state, is a work of political fiction.

If Thailand was indeed ‘the unity of Thai blood’ with the territorial body of the state then the space created – the political state of Thailand – would be an exclusive space for ethnic Thais.

While circumnavigate the Thai border, the territorial edge of the ‘Thai body’, it is not the lack of actual ethnic Thais that is most striking but the range of ethnic diversity that is most striking.

The periphery of the state is characterized by ethnic diversity that is manifest in contested territory, contested identities, and contested politics.

The circumference of the ‘Thai body’ has very little in common with the narrow nationalist identity espoused by the state.

Yet it is not that the Thai state is particularly at fault.

The ethnic nationalism that causes alienation in peripheral communities is a by-product of the global system of demarcated nation-states.

To understand how embedded the paradigm of the demarcated nation-state is one simply has to think of one global institution – the United Nations. The Thai state is simply exercising spatial governance, with nationalism as a tool of state-craft, in a reflection of the international system of 'nations'.

The real fault is, of course, the irrational concept of a border coupled with the fiction of a nation.

A border demands that a singular polity exercises absolute sovereignty over a specifically finite space.

At the sharp edge of sovereign space another polity becomes the absolute sovereign.

The concept may not seem irrational if the border was only to contain finite geographic space but the border contains heterogeneous humanity that becomes subject to the homogeneous identity projected by a ‘nation-state’.

Majority identity (in this case ‘Thai’) vs. minorities issues are implicit in the creation of a nation-state.

To have a demonstration of Thai nationalism stressing identity singularity we can again return to the border and the national anthem.

Physically crossing over the sharp division from Burma, Cambodia, Malaysia, or Lao is to instantly be disciplined into Thai political space.

The flow of ethnic/religious/cultural/political diversity that flows over the border stops at 8am and 6pm to observe the political ritual of the national anthem.

For the average visitor the anthem might be an inconsequential event.

But for the residents of the periphery, those that are not Thai but live within the political ‘Thai body’ they are told twice daily that the land they occupy ‘belongs to the Thai people’ and not them.

Coup d'etat or Revolution?

Combat troops deployed to guard against a possible counter-coup at Democracy Monument. Bangkok - September 20, 2006.

On September 19th the Thai military, lead by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, removed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra from power.

The event was quickly labelled a coup d’etat and the international community – particularly Western states – condemned it and lamented the break down of democratic principles.

The view from the streets of Bangkok has been rather different.

The word revolution (ปฏิวัต) has been used to describe the recent events and scenes of citizens giving flowers to soldiers seem to support the idea of a popular movement against an unpopular government.

The difficulty is that ‘coup d’etat’ and ‘revolution’ are not interchangeable terms and each describes very different events.

The expression coup d’etat carries with it ideas of ruthless tyrants vandalizing democratic ideals in bloody street clashes.

Revolution, on the other had, conjures images of a people’s power movement breaking free from the iron grip of a brutal and unjust dictatorship.

If the terms coup d’etat and revolution have both been used to describe the toppling of Thaksin’s government then Thailand’s political crisis might be best understood as being a combination of both.

Was it a Coup?

The short answer is clearly ‘yes’ but the long answer is ‘yes, but…’.

Tanks did roll, combat troops were deployed, and Thaksin was overthrown by General Sonthi – that is a fact.

Yet the long answer would have to question Thaksin’s corrosive effect on democracy and the consequences of allowing him to remain in power.

Thaksin’s rise to power in 2001 as a populist billionaire was indeed a happier time in Thai democracy.

Sure, the Thai political arena is known to creatively bend the rules which results in vast sums of money exchanging hands, positions of power being doled out to cronies or family members, and blood is often spilled but there certainly are recognizable democratic traits.

At the poll booths citizens are free to choose who they like and the election process is perceived internationally as free and fair.

As Thaksin’s political problems began to mount the rules of democracy declined.

Libel suits launched by Thaksin against the media and private individuals became commonplace.

Yes, the media was free to say what they wanted but most could simply not afford it. Thaksin’s gang of lawyers had forced the media to ‘self censor’ to avoid costly and time consuming legal battles.

Thaksin had also dismantled the foundations of Thailand’s democratic institutions. The ranks of the judiciary, the Senate, and the now disgraced Election Commission were all swollen with Thaksin’s friends and family.

The most recent snap election that Thaksin called to defuse the myriad of calls for him to step down resulted in a boycotted single-party election, massive claims of fraud, a rare intervention by the king, the election’s subsequent annulment, and finally the jailing of pro-Thaksin Election Commission officials for malfeasance.

Thaksin’s stubborn grip on power had simply destroyed the democratic process.

Was it a Revolution then?

Maybe not a textbook revolution but there has been widespread public support.

The tanks forming road blocks around the seat of political power, Government House, have been covered in flowers in a spontaneous gesture by the residents of Bangkok.

The military has reciprocated with its own symbolic gesture of alliance to the people. Although the troops are combat ready, most have removed their ammunition clips from their rifles.

Yes, they are armed, but not armed against the people.

The justification for seizing power, as claimed by the military’s new Committee for Democratic Reform, was based upon welfare of the people.

Speculation that the highly polarized political crisis would lead to violent clashes was not just speculation but the public was resigned to the inevitability of violence.

Violent incidents between pro and anti-Thaksin camps were growing in frequency and in brutality in the weeks before military take over.

A large anti-Thaksin protest by the People’s Alliance for Democracy that was scheduled to take place if the military intervention had not happened had the very real possibility of massive bloodshed.

Rumours were circulating that a well armed division of Forestry Police were being transported to Bangkok put down the protest.

Because widespread violence was expected the military claims they were duty bound to intervene.

The highly influential retired General, Prem Tinsulanonda, just over a month before the military action, gave a speech to cadets telling them that the loyalty of the military is to the king first, the citizens next, and the government trailing behind in a distant third.

It seems as though Prem’s words were not just hollow rhetoric but a strategic declaration of military alignment with the growing number of dissatisfied citizens.

A final, and extremely important, indication that the military action was on behalf of the people was the action’s royal approval. It is well known in Thailand that the King’s approval can legitimize or topple a government.

During the last major conflict that brought soldiers onto the streets, in 1991, the King intervened with some ‘words of advice’ and diffused a violent power struggle.

It was vitally important for the military leaders to have royal approval but, more revealing, is that royal approval would not likely have been granted if the overthrow of the government wasn’t in the people’s best interest.

During the first week of military rule there has been a palpable sense of revolution on the Bangkok streets.

The challenge is now for the military to maintain that feeling of revolution. Yet to maintain the revolutionary goodwill it will require the military to step down and return the political realm to civilian control.

If the feeling of revolution is lost then a true textbook coup d’etat has taken place and an era of military rule, an era of dictatorship, has began.