Photo of the Day: Dowsing with the Fourth Army

For those following the GT 200 scandal and the military's continued use of the million-baht-coat-hanger, this photo might be amusing.

It is an actual dowsing rod from the Sufficiency Village training center across the road from the Sirindhorn base in Yala province and was being used to show local villagers how to find water. I guess they might as well have been looking for explosives.

Gen Pichet Wisaijorn is observing. November 2009.

Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict

Black Hawk co-pilot looking out over over Yala province. November 2009.

Op-ed in the Bangkok Post - Autonomy as a means to ending a brutal conflict on February 2, 2010:

The issue of autonomy has been steadily gaining interest and is now a serious consideration as a means of mitigating the long-running conflict in the southern border provinces.

The fact that a political solution is being openly debated is a positive step because, short of a Carthaginian Peace, there is no military option for solving an armed insurgency which rejects the legitimacy of the state.

Yet autonomy is not a magical solution to the complex problems fuelling the unrest in southern Thailand. Autonomy is subject to a number of complicated problems which could either derail the process or result in an autonomy agreement so watered down that any final agreement is void of any meaningful political powers.

Such complications raise the spectre of autonomy failing to address core grievances of unrest and could further strain relations between Bangkok and the southern border provinces.

While concerns don't totally negate autonomy, issues such as national political conflict, sovereignty, the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim community, the role of the international community, a weak judicial system, and the future of the Thai-Buddhist community are all issues which must be addressed should autonomy help bring a lasting peace to Thailand's troubled deep South.

A Unique Issue or a Symptom?

The most pressing issue, and indeed most soul-searching for the Thai nation, is whether the conflict in the southern border provinces is a unique issue specific to the region, or a symptom of a broader political ailment afflicting Thailand. The ethnic and religious cleavages in the Malay-Muslim provinces might be complicating factors, but at the heart of the problem is a broken relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled.

While a more extreme symptom in the border provinces, the same problematic relationship between those who are ruling and those who are ruled is reflected in the national political conflict. The struggle, simplified by the colour-coded street protests, might be fuelled by a myriad factors but at the heart of the struggle is the problematic issue of legitimacy for those in power. How this relates to the autonomy debate in the South rests upon the fundamental distinction of how to address the root cause of conflict.

If the apparently disparate conflicts in the southern border provinces and the national political turmoil are indeed symptoms of a broader political ailment afflicting the nation, then a special autonomy agreement fails to address the larger national illness while superficially treating the symptoms in the southern border provinces. This is obviously a complex issue but it is a consideration that must decide between a special autonomy arrangement for the symptoms in the southern border provinces, or the treatment of the political illness afflicting the nation.

A final consideration in this equation is the fact that the national political conflict has drawn Bangkok's focus away from addressing the southern crisis, which means that peace in Bangkok is a likely prerequisite for peace in the deep South.

Autonomy versus Sovereignty

The next issue will be for autonomy to dissociate itself from the sensitive issue of sovereignty. Autonomy is not synonymous with independence. Autonomy is only a political device that allows a distinct ethnic or social group to exercise political control over affairs of special concern to them, while maintaining the unity of the state and allowing the state to maintain political control over issues of common/national interest. But, as just demonstrated, autonomy has a clumsy definition and the distinction between autonomy and independence is often lost or purposely obfuscated by powerful opponents of autonomy.

Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Thai Army, General Anupong Paojinda, recently did this in November 2009, when responding to Puea Thai chairman General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's suggestion of autonomy in the deep South by saying, "The insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area." For autonomy to gain more political momentum it is essential that the Thai nation not only understand what autonomy is, but also understand why it is necessary, how it has the potential to address local grievances and, most importantly, how it does not threaten Thailand's sovereignty.

Malay-Muslim Yearnings

Another pressing issue is the lack of understanding of the political leanings of the Malay-Muslim population. Due to the history of separatist struggle and the authority's subsequent heavy-handed reaction to the separatist challenge, there is a distinct lack of political voice emanating out of the southern border provinces.

Essentially, the distinction between legitimate political expression and violent separatism has been lost, which has prevented locals from openly expressing political opinions and airing their grievances for fear of being labelled a separatist.

While the gagging of political voice is a barrier to transforming violent struggle into legitimate non-violent political participation, a lack of political voice also complicates the drive towards autonomy because there are only a limited number of elites which claim to be the voice of the large and diverse community. This could result in an elite-driven autonomy agreement that might serve the few Malay-Muslim leaders who stand to be the primary beneficiaries of increased political devolution, but could fail to serve the majority of southern residents.

The distinct problem is that an elite-driven process could result in an agreement that divides the state's resources and position of political power amongst elites but fails to address local grievances and governance preferences, which would undermine the long-term peace that advocates of autonomy are hoping for.

While an elite-driven process is the more likely scenario, this process should also be accompanied by a detailed public opinion survey designed to reveal the political inclinations of southern citizens, to understand their concerns and grievances, and to infuse those issues into the details of an autonomy agreement.

International Dimension

Another consideration in the autonomy question will be the role of the international community. International assistance in helping Thailand resolve the southern insurgency has been fiercely resisted by both the government and the military. Yet the role of the international community should be re-evaluated.

The first stage in re-evaluating the role of the international community is to understand that a large intervention is not being called for. The type of international assistance that is more likely would be technical and academic, and designed to use shared experiences with utilising autonomy arrangements to address ethno-religious conflicts while maintaining a state's unity.

Countries like Canada, Spain and the United Kingdom have similar experiences with creating autonomy-based solutions to separatist challenges and could provide considerable technical insight into process and design issues which would directly correlate with the durability and success of an autonomy agreement. Additionally, such countries also share the experience of being constitutional monarchies and understand how these institutions need not be negatively reflected upon.

Finally, the international community can provide assistance as a non-partisan negotiation facilitator that can provide considerable value in helping get stakeholders to the table, and build an equitable accommodation designed to address the diverse communities and address the multifaceted grievances fuelling unrest.

Judicial Challenges

Thailand's judicial system will be a problematic area for the future of an autonomy agreement. While Thailand has a well-established judicial system, there are concerns that partisanship in the judiciary could complicate a future agreement. Autonomy agreements are complex and require frequent negotiation between the centre and the autonomous zone. These negotiations can largely be adjudicated through the legal system should all parties have faith in the impartiality of the courts. Yet, since the resurgence of violence in 2004, there has not been a single prosecution of security forces for human rights abuses despite numerous allegations.

This lack of prosecution has been raised by some in the border provinces as an example of judicial inequality. The problem that this raises for the prospect of a future autonomy agreement is that the court's adjudication process is not understood by some stakeholders as a non-partisan venue for negotiating the adjustments needed between the centre and the autonomous zone. This raises the spectre of extra-judicial negotiations taking place in either non-transparent elite negotiations or through a return to violence.

Those designing an agreement need to be cognisant of the challenges posed by the country's democratic and legal systems. Importantly, the details of autonomy would need to be clear, have considerable support of the wide range of stakeholders, and would need to include guidelines for resolving conflicts and providing adjustments between Bangkok and the autonomous zone.

Thai-Buddhist Support

The issue of Thai-Buddhist citizens in the southern border provinces needs specific care in an autonomy agreement. This will not be easy but every effort must be made to accommodate their interests, ensure their democratic rights, and specifically ensure their safety. Tensions along ethno-religious lines have already resulted in a migration of Thai-Buddhists out of the three southern border provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala and, in some instances, Thai-Buddhists have been violently driven out in what some experts claim is ethnic cleansing.

While human rights and safety issues are paramount, from the perspective of autonomy and the hope of establishing peace, the concerns of Thai-Buddhists need to be answered and included in the process of establishing peace through autonomy.

Ultimately, while autonomy is a complex process subject to a number of major pitfalls, the fact that autonomy is gaining increased interest is a positive step in the search for a much-needed political solution to the southern insurgency.

While it will be a major challenge for autonomy to gain the required support from national stakeholders, the larger challenge will be to construct a durable autonomy agreement that can strike a balance between the state and the complicated grievances fuelling unrest in the southern border provinces. This is not an impossible task, but it will require parties to be cognisant of the challenges, willing to compromise, and prepared to construct a highly detailed agreement.

The Daily Dose

From Voice TV comes an English language news show called the Daily Dose. I particularly like the show's lead story on an Asia Times story Reds ready to rumble in Thailand which they describe as:

"Reds ready to rumble in Thailand By Nelson Rand and Chandler Vandergrift in Atimes.com had some keen insights into the army's (sic).

These are several key phrases from the article which is worth a read.The military effectively suppressed April's UDD protest, but questions are emerging about possible cracks in the chain of command. While Thailand's military has long been factionalized along graduating class lines, it is now also believed to be divided among competing units, according to experts."

Negotiating with the Reds

*ALL PHOTOS COPYRIGHT*
UDD leader Kwanchai Poipana at FM 97.50 radio station in Udon Thani. Note the handgun on the table.

From the HD Centre comes an op-ed printed in the Malaysian Insider:

"Virtually unseen and certainly unexpected, a new threat is emerging in Asia - and it is not growing on the back of extremist religious dogma. Rather, the newest non-state armed groups battling governments in the name of justice and freedom draw on what was thought to be a dead ideology: Marxism

....

There is also a strong left-wing current humming through other popular opposition groups such as the Red Shirt movement in Thailand [National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship]. This movement may be built around support for ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, but it is led and inspired by intellectuals who cut their ideological teeth in the Thai Communist Party of the 1970s.

The good news is that while many governments baulk at engaging with Islamic extremist groups considered to be beyond the pale because of their ideological justification of violent acts that target innocent civilians, many of these left-wing groups have specific political demands that often stem from obvious social and economic deprivations or injustices. They resemble old-fashioned liberation movements or peasant uprisings. This suggests dialogue and negotiation can be effective tools for ending violence.

The bad news is that most governments, and some of the left-wing movements, remain stubbornly opposed to dialogue."

While Michael Vatikiotis' op-ed is a couple of weeks old it seems particularly apt to bring the topic of negotiations up while the tensions are rising for the Red's rally in Khao Yai Thiang.

There was talk of negotiations in the last few weeks but, if there were indeed efforts to arrange talks, these seem to have failed as neither side seemed to back away from demands.

As reported in the BKK Post, Thaksin's demands were:

"restoration of the 1997 constitution; a general election; a fair trial on all the cases against him, both those already judged and those pending; and, of course, the return of his legally acquired assets currently frozen by the government."

And the establishment responded:

"Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva has made clear his government is ready to talk with Thaksin provided that the first returns to face his two-year jail term"

While Vatikiotis urged negotiate with the Reds on issues of "social and economic deprivations or injustices" it seems negotiations failed over a two-year jail sentence.

The topics of negotiation are unfortunate because the issues fueling social conflict are not exactly reflected in the topics being negotiated.

Thaksin's assets and jail sentence are somewhat irrelevant in context of the broader issue of a partisan judiciary.

And while an election and the 1997 constitution are significant, the bigger issue of legitimacy and the relationship between those who rule and those being ruled is being fought largely outside of the democratic arena. An election and a trusted constitution are essential, but extra-democratic means of exercising power is the issue which needs to be negotiated.

The failure of an elite-level negotiation is also unfortunate as tensions seem to be at the boiling point as reported by* the Asia Times in a story titled Reds ready to rumble in Thailand:

"While UDD leaders insist their campaign will be peaceful, they also indicate that their protest movement is near a breaking point over what they perceive as a series of non-democratic power grabs and partisan judicial decisions. "We fight through peaceful means," explained pro-UDD radio broadcaster Kwanchai, while suggestively placing a pistol on a nearby table. "But if the government uses force, we will fight back.""

* Note that this last quote tells the story of photo above meaning I am not exactly unbiased for using the Asia Times article.

Warring Colours

Photo of the Day: Constitution Day with the Reds

The Reds rallying at Democracy Monument on Constitution Day.

The Bangkok Post estimated a suspiciously low number of 5000 protesters while Red leaders were claiming 20,000.

If I had to guess, I would say at least 15,000 if not the full 20,000.

What is, unfortunately, not surprising is that the English language Thai media completely neglected to report on what was the rational for the protest.

While it is easier to draw the palace and pretend it is an affront to the King's over-compensating birthday celebrations that is not the case.

It is Constitution Day, and considering paramount issue of the military tearing up the 1997 constitution, there is a serious reason to protest on this day.

But, as the largely partisan Thai press is prone to do, they neglect reporting on the issue at hand and churn out either useless or biased stories that fail to inform readers what the issues at hand are and what BOTH sides are saying. God forbid they let the reader decide who is right are wrong.

Chai Yo!

Photo of the Day: Orwellian Thailand

*All Images Copyright* (this means that newspapers like the Seoul Times should not be stealing my photos!)

Photos from this evening's national anthem ceremony at the National Stadium.

The whole ceremony was Orwellian in the sense that it felt like "an attitude and a policy of control by propaganda, surveillance, misinformation, denial of truth, and manipulation of the past...[which is] practiced by modern repressive governments." (thanks wiki!)

Simple lies by Anupong

View of Narathiwat from a Black Hawk helicopter. November 12, 2009.

(This post was originally called 'fisking Anupong' until it was brought to my attention that there is another definition for fisking...who knew?!)

I personally don’t like unpacking questionable statements and articles in the news because it is time consuming.

Yet sometimes, an article is so littered with politician’s blatant lies and journalistic incompetence that it simply begs to be deconstructed.

The Bangkok Post’s recent article Army takes a hard line with rebels is a case in point:

PATTANI : The army has shot down a call to negotiate with insurgents to end conflicts in the restive South.

Army chief Anupong Paojinda said no talks would be held with separatist groups during his tenure, which ends in September next year. "We won't negotiate with them. But we will take legal action against them," he told the Bangkok Post.

NS: Anupong is simply lying, negotiations have been an ongoing, but largely a secretive process, since Surayud was installed as Prime Minister.

"They have to be brought to trial for having murdered innocent people," said Gen Anupong, who accompanied Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban on a trip to inspect government development projects in Pattani and Narathiwat last week.

NS: In this context, the Royal Thai Army also needs to be “brought to trial for having murdered innocent people” considering the long list of victims in the Tak Bai incident or prominent cases like Iman Yapa.

Gen Anupong was reacting to calls by Puea Thai chairman Gen Chavalit Yongchaiyudh to negotiate with separatist groups to end the violence.

Gen Chavalit has also proposed an amnesty for militants in the three Muslim-dominated provinces.

Since violence resurfaced in the region six years ago, it has claimed almost 4,000 lives.

The Internal Security Operations Command believes 8,000-10,000 insurgents are active in the deep South. The insurgents took shelter in more than 200 villages in the so-called red zone and used pondok schools as a base to carry out attacks against civilians and state officials, it said.

"The insurgents want to separate our land and set up an autonomous area," the army chief said.

NS: This is a serious problem on two levels. If it is a translation problem then it is simply shoddy reporting by the Bangkok Post. But if it is what Anupong said, it is still shoddy reporting because he is clearly obfuscating issues and a professional journalist should have questioned this or at least qualified it by stating in the next sentence that Anupong was either confused or being purposely deceptive.

As for Anupong, and taking that he actually meant what he said, he is simply being a shifty liar. Separatism and autonomy are very different issues. Separatism would result in an independent state while an autonomous area would not violent the ‘one and unitary’ condition of the constitution, would not divide the nation (แบ่งชาติ), and would simply devolve local governance powers and decision making to the border provinces….much like Bangkok enjoys.

They carried out attacks to draw international attention to their "plight".

But the army leader said that the southern violence was a domestic issue that could be solved by the government alone.

NS: International attention is not exactly a major factor in southern militants’ tactics, but it is a major fear of Thai elites who are ever fearful that their prolonged incompetence in addressing the southern conflict will ultimately draw in the international community. But, this quote does allow Anupong to repeat the standard line that ‘conflict is a domestic issue’ and everyone should simply forget about it.

No other countries, including fellow members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, had offered themselves as brokers in talks between the government and the separatist groups.

NS: It is common knowledge that Malaysia (while not an honest broker as they are a stakeholder in the conflict) and Indonesia have offered to broker talks.

Prime Minister Najib Razak of Malaysia plans to tour the three southernmost provinces with Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva early next month. The trip is intended as a show of Malaysian support for Thailand's efforts to tackle the violence.

NS: WTF?! Is this article an opinion piece from the self-deluded Nation or Manager? Malaysia might support the military’s declarations that they will not violent human rights but the Malaysian PM is certainly accountable to his own constituents who are critical of the Thai military’s heavy handed tactics. In addition, Razak floated the idea of autonomy which flip-flopper Abhisit initially supported but has since backtracked on. But really, the key point of the trip by Razak will be to show his constituents that he is pressuring Thailand to treat the Malay-Muslim minority in the Deep South with some dignity and respect for their rights and CERTAINLY NOT as a show of support.

Gen Anupong said no Asean members would interfere in the southern issue. NS: Yes, we got the message already, an internal issue. The army had no plan to withdraw troops from the area. There are 20,000 soldiers, 18,000 police and 40,000 defence volunteers providing security for two million people in the deep South.

NS: This is more complicated given the number of irregular troops.

As i understand it, it is higher and goes like this:

In addition to the 20,000 soldiers and 18,000 police there are 50, 000 village defence volunteers (ชรบ), 10,000 rangers (ทหานพราน), 20,000 defense corps (อรบ) and 6,000 Or Sor (อส which are well armed troops who are full time paid soldiers under command of the Ministry of Interior and the only ‘volunteer’ part of their work is that they are not conscripted). This total of armed state-sanctioned forces is at about 124,000 depending on a couple of variations. This rough works out to 1 state-armed person per 20 residents in the Deep South.

"We will not abandon people to live alone. Without us, how could they survive?" Gen Anupong said.

NS: Who is he abandoning and who would not survive? Clearly it is not the 80% Malay-Muslim population that he is talking about but the 20% Thai-Buddhist population and these kind of black and white comments are simply pandering to the nation by employing empty but emotional nationalist rhetoric.

He had told border officials to keep a close watch on people with dual Thai-Malaysian nationality as he believed many were involved in attacks in the deep South.

Security experts believe militants with dual nationality carry out attacks there, then flee to neighbouring Malaysia to avoid being caught.

NS: Case in point of the nonsense about Malaysian PM going to show ‘support for Thailand's efforts’. If Razak was supportive of Thai efforts then he would cooperate at the border on security issues and take action against suspected militants retreating into Malaysia.

The question of how to tackle assailants with dual Thai-Malaysian nationality will be tabled for talks between the two leaders when Mr Najib is visiting here, officials say.

Gen Anupong also criticised "the Pattani model" pushed by Gen Chavalit as a solution to the violence.

Gen Chavalit has proposed a form of elected self-government for the region, similar to the way Bangkok is run.

He says the government is deliberately misinterpreting his call as advocacy for an independent Pattani state, which he opposes.

NS: Yes, certainly. As Anupong did above and I mentioned here, it will be easy for the opposition to misrepresent what autonomy is.

He was not proposing separatism, just self-government. Gen Anupong, however, said the details were still unclear and had led to misunderstanding among southern residents.

" I don't understand exactly what Gen Chavalit is advocating. Further discussions are needed. I believe he has a hidden agenda," he said.

NS: More obfuscating the issues and simple lies by Anupong. ‘A hidden agenda’? Obviously it is a clear agenda to flummox Abhisit’s embattled and ineffective government. But what might be ‘hidden’ is potential long term solution to the intractable southern insurgency.

What do Malay-Muslims really want?

* All images copyright *

Ramadan and the Central Mosque in Pattani City. August 26, 2009

The question of what Malay-Muslims really want is a serious blind spot in the southern insurgency.

Obviously, it would seem a critical issue to understand not only the grievances fueling the insurgency but to understand the political desires of the nearly two million Malay-Muslim citizens in the southern border provinces.

This is also of critical importance as the issue of autonomy has been a hotly contested political issue lately.

Yet no one can say, with any authority, what the residents there want.

This is in part because the Thai state fails to differentiate between the legitimate political expressions of grievance and separatism. For Thai authorities, Malay-Muslims expressing dissatisfaction with the government is the same as expressing support for separatism.

Because we dont really know that Malay-Muslims want, journalists, academics, and myself, tend to simplify this blind spot and cluster all Malay-Muslims into a homogeneous group.

This is obviously not accurate but serves as journalistic shorthand for a complex issue without easy answers.

As Jason Johnson writes in the Asia Times Online, this has:

"led to widespread misconceptions about the spiraling conflict, including that nearly all of the minority group harbor Patani Malay Muslim nationalist sentiment and resentment towards the Thai state".

In fact, Jason's article makes a number of interesting comments and particularly:

"As de facto spokespeople for the Patani Malay Muslim nation [Malay Muslim intellectuals], they tend to overstate the nationalist cares and concerns of ordinary Malay Muslims, frequently speaking about group pride in the ancient Kingdom of Patani, the Malay Muslims unique way of life, and the need for the Thai government to give greater recognition to this identity by, for instance, allowing some form of autonomy."

With the debate over autonomy brewing, it would be nice to know if a possible autonomy agreement would be serving the political aspirations of a majority of residents or whether it will be an elite driven process granted by Bangkok and solely serving the needs of a few Malay-Muslim elites and by separatists who would be major beneficiaries of increased political power.

Ultranationalist PAD

* All images copyright *
PAD supporters in Sanam Luang on Sunday November 15, 2009.

I have been going to the street protests in Bangkok for about four years now and think I am used to the acerbic nationalism used to stoke the crowds.

Both Yellow (PAD) and Red (UDD) are guilty of this.

Yet PAD's rally on Sunday in Sanam Luang ratcheted up the nationalist nonsense into nothing short of a rallying cry for war.

War with both Cambodia and a civil war within Thailand.

Over at Prachatai they have a summery of the some of the comments on stage:

"Prasert Lertyaso called for the beheading of Hun Sen, General Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, and Thaksin Shinawatra, alluding to an old Thai saying of shedding blood to wash royal feet. He banished Thaksin’s supporters to Phnom Penh and Dubai."

"Saken Sutthiwong said that Cambodia was afraid that [Thai] F16 fighter jets would miss their targets and bomb Angkor Wat and Prear Vihear instead, because they earn their living from those ‘old stones’."
"Then some students came up to condemn Hun Sen and Thaksin, the traitor. They vowed to fight to the death to protect the Nation, Religion and King. "

"...Gen Preecha Iamsuphan, who had led yellow shirts in raucous protests near the Prear Vihear site in September, spoke to the crowd that it was time to get rid of traitors, as they all had appeared before their eyes. ‘We have to quickly finish them off for the sake of our beloved King and ancestors, so that Thais stop quarrelling with one another because of these scoundrels.’"

"Sondhi Limthongkul said the nation was important because it was composed of religion and the King. When people have faith in religion, religion is strengthened and so is the monarchy. Religion and the King will never be separable."

While such rhetoric sounds bad, some of the songs they sang might have been worse:

"Two royally-penned songs, ‘The Highest Dream’ and ‘Scum of the Earth’, were played"

Hobby, commenting at Prachatai, notes that New Mandala has an interesting write up on the song 'Scum of the Earth'.

From Ben Anderson writing about the slaughter of students at Thammasat University in 1976:

"Radio stations controlled by rightists, and especially the extremist Armored Division Radio, commissioned and played incessantly violent songs such as “Nak Phaendin” (Heavy on the Earth) and “Rok Phaendin” (Scum of the Earth)."

And Thongchai Winichakul writing about the same tragic events:

"Meanwhile military propaganda had dehumanized the radical students, labeling them ‘scum of the earth’ (nak phaendin), the enemy of the “Nation, Religion and the Monarchy”"

This ultra-nationalist vitriol is dangerous on its own but it comes just before the Red Shirt announcement that they will "will make the war against the government" and plan to bring up to a million supporters on the streets during Nov 29 to Dec 3.

While it is doubtful that they will actually get a million supporters (although Nick N did give a rather high estimate of 50,000 to 60,000 at their Saturday Khao Yai gathering which he also blogged about here) it is still a highly combustible scenario.

With PAD calling for blood and the Reds about to pour into Bangkok, Thailand's national political conflict is likely to grow more and more violent over the next few weeks.